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Abstract
This thesis considers the creation, commercial success, decline, and abandonment of
Depot Harbour, a major grain port in Ontario. I argue that the rapid, early success of the
port beginning in 1898 was only possible with the confluence of economic globalization
of grain markets, the expansion of the grain trade and transportation routes in Canada,
and ownership invested in the port’s success. The transfer of ownership to a national
railroad left Depot Harbour exposed to the negative ramifications of consolidation and
nationalization of the railroad system of Canada, which led to its neglect and ultimate
abandonment by 1945 despite the ongoing expansion of the grain trade. The development
and operation of the port was an intrusion into the property and lives of the indigenous
population of Parry Island and left a legacy that included property loss and changes in the
economic base for that community.

Summary for Lay Audience
The production of wheat in the western region of Canada from the 1890s through the
1920s marked an important phase in the economic growth of the country. This wheat
economy was possible because consumers in Europe suddenly began to import large
volumes of grain. Transportation across the Great Lakes was a key component in the
transportation of wheat from farm to market. This thesis examines why Depot Harbour, a
major grain port in Ontario, was created, achieved early success in handling wheat
exports, slowly declined, and was ultimately abandoned. This thesis assesses how a
global economy that was becoming more connected, changes in the port’s ownership, and
developments in the country’s transportation system all influenced the historical
trajectory of this port. This thesis also considers how the port intruded into the property
and lives of the indigenous population of Parry Island and left a legacy that included
dispossession of land and a major shift toward reliance on wage employment as an
economic base.

Keywords
Grain trade, wheat economy, trade, Georgian Bay, Great Lakes, railroads, shipping,
transportation, Ontario, Canada
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Introduction
While driving across the forested expanse of Parry Island today, not a single marker
provides any clue of the existence of what was very briefly once one of the most significant
ports in Ontario. Signs point a visitor to the fire station, band office, and other community
institutions of the Wasauksing First Nation, but the only hint of the major railroad line that
once led to bustling docks and homes is the aging wooden bridge where railroad tracks
have been paved over with wooden planks. A visitor who happens upon the correct gravel
road across the island may catch a glimpse of a concrete foundation overgrown with forest
and arrive at an empty lot abutting crumbling docksides dotted with rusting steel bollards.
The lack of memorialization belies the significance and scale of the port that once stood on
these shores.
At the turn of the 20th century, a major port called Depot Harbour stood on that
corner of Parry Island. As the interior plains and prairies of North America produced an
ever-increasing stream of wheat for export, Depot Harbour transferred more of the
harvested bounty eastward to European consumers than any other port in central Canada.
Yet within 50 years of its creation, the grain port was out of business and its facilities
stood in ruins. Its rise and fall were influenced by the interplay between its local position
in eastern Georgian Bay; its relationship to the Canadian transportation network, first as a
key railroad regional rail and port connection, then as the terminus of one of many branch
lines under a national rail company; and international commodity markets.
Depot Harbour was created in the 1890s when J.R. Booth, an Ottawa timber
magnate, extended the rail lines that served his timberlands to the shores of Georgian Bay
and focused on attracting a share of the booming western grain trade. It offered the most
direct Canadian connection between the Upper Great Lakes and ocean ports, and it
quickly surpassed all other Ontario ports in the volume of grain it transshipped eastward.
Booth invested in his port community and provided it with excellent infrastructure. It was
poised to continue as the preeminent Ontario grain port. Yet when economic conditions
forced Booth to sell his port in 1904, its new ownership, the Grand Trunk Railway,
neglected it, despite the insufficiency of Canadian lake ports to handle the growing flow
1

of exported western wheat. Growth in the grain trade continued through the 1920s, but as
the terminus of a far-flung branch line of the Grand Trunk, it continued its descent into
antiquation. By the late 1920s, its ownership decided that the port was near the end of its
usefulness and began to abandon it. The global economic downturn beginning in 1929
sealed this fate, and although Depot Harbour’s port operations held on through the 1930s,
even the upturn in transportation activities catalyzed by the Second World War did not
reverse its fortunes.
Depot Harbour arose during an unprecedented expansion in the global grain trade,
and its final demise was influenced by downturn in trade that was part of the global Great
Depression of the 1930s. However, between 1900 and 1930 the trajectory of Depot
Harbour was shaped most significantly not by transnational, macroeconomic conditions
in the grain trade, but rather by developments in the Canadian transportation system.
These were, most notably, overconfidence in the economic future of Canada, which
occurred during a period when the Canadian federal government was determined to
extend the national transportation system in Canada. The assumption in the continual
growth of the Canadian economy led to the federal government supporting multiple new
transcontinental railways. This expansion led to the overbuilding of the Canadian railway
system. In addition, the geographic arrangement of the overall Grand Trunk Railway
system was not favorable to linking Depot Harbour to the rest of the company’s network
upon its acquisition in 1904. These factors caused the Grand Trunk Railway and its
successor, the Canadian National Railway, to underinvest and de-prioritize port
operations at Depot Harbour despite the overall growing need for grain shipping
infrastructure on the Great Lakes in Ontario.
Upon the acquisition of Depot Harbour, the Grand Trunk already owned and
operated other grain ports on Georgian Bay that were better connected to its trunk line in
southern Ontario; therefore, despite Depot Harbour’s more direct connection to Montreal,
the railway company invested in modernization and expansion at other ports (specifically
Midland) while allowing Depot Harbour’s facilities to stagnate. When ownership and
management of Depot Harbour passed from the Grand Trunk to the nationalized
Canadian National Railway (CNR) system in the early 1920s, the inferior facilities at
2

Depot Harbour meant that it was poorly positioned to compete with other ports. Because
the entire Canadian railroad system had been overbuilt in the early 20th century, the CNR
needed to consolidate operations, and Depot Harbour became a logical place at which
port operations could be reduced and eventually abandoned.
Thus, understanding the historical trajectory of the port requires an examination
of both the effects of economic globalization and events within the boundaries of the
Canadian nation-state. The transnational rise of the grain trade provided the need for
expanded transportation facilities on the Great Lakes. Yet ownership decisions shaped by
conditions specific to the transportation system of Canada were a key aspect in the
economic degeneration of Depot Harbour. This thesis seeks to reintegrate the place of the
nation into the history of Depot Harbour as a necessary complement to the role played by
the forces of globalization operating at a transnational scale.
Over the last three decades, transnational histories favoring the use of
methodologies that look beyond the nation-state and instead focus on international and
global networks and phenomena have become widespread. Dissatisfaction with
historiographies focused upon and constrained by national boundaries has driven this turn
away from the utilization of the nation as the central unit of analysis.1 In Canada, this
shift has helped improve upon the myopia and limitations of nationalistic histories, but a
complete turn away from the nation also presents limitations. In this thesis, the history of
Depot Harbour demonstrates the importance of bridging history at the national level with
developments in transnational trade.
From the 1920s, the writing of history in English Canada was articulated as a
distinctly national project, intended to create a written history that elevated Canada as a
“civilized” country superior and distinct from the non-European and indigenous North
American worlds. In Canada, historians focused on using history to promote an idealized
nation where the “great” English and French races lived in harmony. Emphasis on the
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Karen Dubinsky, Adele Perry, and Henry Yu, Within and without the Nation: Canadian History as
Transnational History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015), 8–9.
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emergence of a strong, modern nation from a disparate collection of colonies was
important in this approach to history as Canada sought to map a new, more equal position
for itself within the British Commonwealth. The nationalistic approach to history thus
focused on national governments and high-level politics bounded within the nation.2 It
therefore often failed to connect and contextualize developments within a single nation to
phenomena occurring at the global level.
Since the 1990s, practitioners of “transnational” history have worked to revise the
ongoing hold of the nation across a variety of historiographies. They have sought to
address the inadequacies of histories rooted in the nation-state and instead employ
alternatives that use generally larger units of analysis to better understand the effects of
global migration, new technologies of communication and transportation, and the
intensification of networks that transcend national borders.3 These issues are of
significant relevance to economic historians, and they have employed this framework
toward the era of global integration between 1870 and 1914 and the term of
deglobalization that followed, from the outbreak of the First World War to 1945. In the
period up to 1914, reductions in transportation costs triggered mass immigration and the
production and export of primary commodities. From 1914 onward to the conclusion of
the Second World War, global trade shrank, and many nations retreated to nationalism.4
Transnational approaches to these historical events have proven to be a useful framework
in explaining a world of increased mobility of people, products, and capital.
However, the abandonment of “methodological nationalism” - wherein the nation,
state, or society is the natural social and political form of the modern world and the
default framework for analysis – in favor of transnational approaches risks a complete
shift toward “methodological ‘fluidism,’” where everything is equally and immediately
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interconnected and the political boundaries of the nation-state are of minimal
importance.5 In studying Depot Harbour, applying the methodological framework of a
fluid, transnationally globalizing early 20th century world would mean looking solely to
macroscopic developments in international trade to explain the port’s historical
trajectory. However, the history of the port demonstrates that this approach is
insufficient. Depot Harbour was created largely in response to developments in the
international commodity market and grew to prominence as the grain trade increased. Yet
its decline began while the grain trade continued to flourish, and the decision to abandon
the port was made while Great Lakes shipping grew, and grain exports continued to
swell. Developments entirely within Canada, shaped by a politics of nationalism that ran
alongside but counter to interconnected commerce with the United States, were
responsible for these divergences. The concrete geographical location of the port shaped
its development as much as unbounded, international commodity flows. As a case study,
Depot Harbour thus demonstrates that the analysis at the level of the nation-state should
be combined with analysis at the global and transnational level.

Literature Review
Historians have long recognized the importance of transportation systems and
commodity exports in the economic development of Canada. The grain export boom of
the early 20th century was an important driver of western development and nationwide
economic growth. The existing body of scholarship establishes the significance of the
wheat staples economy in early 20th century Canada and the role played by the
transportation route across the Great Lakes in allowing this wheat economy to flourish.
The factors of economy, transportation, and geography are vital to the story of Depot
Harbour because they describe the macroeconomic context in which it was created,
developed, declined, and disappeared.
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Many schools of historical thought that deal with economy, transportation, and
geography inform my methodology and interpretation in this thesis. I present an overview
of the general trajectory of Canadian economic history in order to discuss how the topics
of Great Lakes shipping, wheat, and Depot Harbour were developed. In presenting this
record of Canadian economic history, I demonstrate how the insights and omissions of
multiple historiographical schools since the 1920s inform this thesis and the argument
presented herein.
Even as recent historians have moved toward employing transnational and global
perspectives, I find utility in beginning with a much older Canadian literature rooted in
the geography and natural resources of northern North America. This literature, situated
at the intersection of export products and geography, was first developed in the
“Laurentian School” of the 1920s. The Laurentian School, and the closely related “staples
thesis,” provide the foundational historiographical argument for the importance of the
Great Lakes water route as key to the development of the Canadian economy. The
importance of this lake export route is central to my thesis, and the Laurentian School and
staples thesis have remained influential in Canadian economic history to the present day;
thus, they provide the starting point for the historiographical context of this study.
The Laurentian school was developed beginning in the 1920s by Harold Innis in
the notable works A History of the Canadian Pacific Railway (1923) and The Fur Trade
in Canada (1930). Innis studies these major Canadian economic enterprises and argues
that they were basically extensive systems of continent-wide communications, albeit
based in the movement of valuable goods. These arguments laid the groundwork for the
later work of D.G. Creighton, who most explicitly articulates this interpretation of
Canadian history. Creighton’s works Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence (1938) and
Dominion of the North (1944) were particularly seminal explorations of the
communications argument. This approach rests on the idea that the St. Lawrence water
route and its tributary connections across North America became the basis of an

6

extensive communication and transportation system around which the nation of Canada
took shape.6
The Laurentian argument states that since the St. Lawrence watershed lies on an
east-west orientation from the Atlantic Ocean into the continental interior, it provides a
significant geographic influence on the development of Canadian commerce. This
Laurentian approach differs from earlier Canadian historiographical schools. The first of
these earlier schools was the Britannic School, which argues that the development of
Canada as a separate nation in North America was due to the political and cultural
influence of British institutions which saw Canada as a constituent member of a broader
Britannic community. This Britannic viewpoint was closely followed by the Nationhood
school, which focuses on the gradual development of Canadian autonomy from British
control through political action of nationalist-minded political figures and movements
that sought to remove Canada from the tangled web of imperialist world politics.7 These
schools focus on the political development of Canada and do not posit that North
American geography played a central role in Canadian history. Unlike these approaches
based on political history and cultural ties, the Laurentian School presents a natural
justification for a Canadian nation united from East to West.8 The expansion of central
Canada’s access to western markets and goods across a geographically advantageous
corridor was a key driver of Depot Harbour’s creation and economic success, thus the
Laurentian school’s focus on the importance of natural geography for a unified Canada
provides a historiographical foundation to connect the particular site of Depot Harbour to
the national development of Canada.

6
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The Laurentian school argues that the waterways of Canada were not only
important for connecting the continental interior to coastal regions, but they also provide
a route that allowed British imperial influence to penetrate from across the Atlantic to
areas far within North America. Its proponents argue that the waterway connections
reaching into the middle of the continent linked the west to the metropolitan centers of
the St. Lawrence valley, but the connections did not stop at the edge of the Atlantic.
Instead, they reached across the ocean to British markets and finance, joining Canada to
Britain. The school argues that due to these connections, the Canadian frontier of the
interior was more closely connected to Europe than the American mid-western frontier,
which developed more independently behind the barrier of the Appalachian Mountains.
Ideas and immigrants were directly transferred into the heart of the continent. The
Laurentian perspective thus implies that Canadian development was, if not precisely
global in nature, molded by overseas imperial influences, particularly transnational flows
of finance, culture, and migration.9 It informs how the transportation route between
Georgian Bay and Montreal, as an improvement to the natural route provided by the
Laurentian watershed, was tied to the trans-Atlantic movement of grain from the western
Canadian colonial frontier to the British imperial center.
This school also tends to examine Canadian history from the perspective of
developing metropolitan centres in eastern Canada. It studies the effects of these hubs of
commerce and industry on the west. Included in this approach was the idea that
businessmen and conservative political elements based in eastern cities acted as agents of
national expansion. These entities organized the economic development of western
regions, growth that was predicated on the export of staple products such as timber and
wheat. These exports trades required bulky commodities to be transported over long
distances. Harold Innis argues that the complex system of trade and transportation across
North America was managed and directed from the urban centres of central Canada. In

9

Ibid., 77–78.
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the case of Depot Harbour, it was precisely an Ottawa-based businessman (J.R. Booth)
who organized the construction and operation of the grain port.
Innis’s argument also links the Laurentian school to the staple thesis in Canadian
history by positing that the staples export economy was only feasible because of the
transportation system provided by the St. Lawrence watershed.10 The staples thesis
postulates that the export of natural resources and agricultural products underlay
successive waves of economic development in Canada, beginning with the exploitation of
cod fisheries in the 15th century and continuing to and through the period of the western
wheat boom of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The staples thesis was founded by
the work of Harold Innis and W.A. Mackintosh in the 1920s. The staples thesis and
Laurentian school overlap in their argument about the development of the Canadian
economy, but while the Laurentian school focuses on the natural geography of the
northern North American interior, the staples thesis focuses on the primary export
products that were harvested and exported from regions across the St. Lawrence
watershed. Innis and Mackintosh established the staples theory in works that include The
Fur Trade in Canada (1930) and The Cod Fisheries: The History of an International
Economy (1940); and "Economic Factors in Canadian History" and “Some Aspects of a
Pioneer Economy,” respectively.11 They argue that the export of staple products was the
leading sector in the economy and set the pace for economic growth. As a result, these
historians argue that the individual staple left its particular imprint across the economy
and society of Canada, and that economic growth was only sustained if an excessive
reliance on a small number of export staples was avoided.12 While the staples thesis

10
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focuses thus on the ramifications of an economy based on the export of natural resources
of agricultural products, it is tied to the Laurentian thesis due to the transportation routes
that carried these resources to overseas markets.
While cod were harvested directly from the waters of the North Atlantic, the
staples that succeeded it – such as furs, timber, and wheat – were located on the North
American mainland and required transportation from their site of production to coastal
ports where they could be shipped to European markets. Wheat in the early 20th century
faced the longest transportation route from field to market, since it was grown in the landlocked western plains of Canada and thus required transportation over thousands of miles
to ocean ports. In the early 1920s, W.A. Mackintosh wrote that presence of markets for
the disposal of staple products determined the course of economic development in North
America, stating “the staple itself is the basis of prosperity.”13 He argues that the quality
of transportation systems and routes determined the location and extent of significant
economic development in North America.
Canadian westward expansion was stifled by the barrier of the Laurentian
highlands which blocked access between the western end of the Great Lakes and the
western Canadian prairies. This frustration of western Canadian development provided
the background for the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) and
emphasized the need for Canadian transportation routes to be constructed and operated at
a transcontinental scale. Mackintosh argues that the railway’s connection between Lake
Superior and Winnipeg was its most essential addition to the Canadian transportation
system because it extended access from the St. Lawrence waterway into new country
capable of rapid economic expansion. The improved transportation facilities overcame
the physical barrier of the Laurentian highlands and facilitated the production of wheat in
western Canada to serve as a staple export on the world stage. The successful
development of the wheat staple economy in the west facilitated the growth of Canada, as

13
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illustrated by Mackintosh’s argument that it “permitted the initial step of the Canadian
advance in the twentieth [century]” through its export to world markets.14
Donald Creighton expanded this approach in the late 1930s. His work The
Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence (1938) contends that in the century following the
conquest of New France in 1763, Canadian merchants struggled to win a territorial
empire encompassing the St. Lawrence River, the Great Lakes, and their watershed and
hinterlands. Although Creighton argued that ultimately this endeavor was defeated by
1850, his work further established the centrality of the St. Lawrence transportation
system as key to the Canadian economy.
The 1930s also featured two works of economic history that assert the importance
of lakes shipping for the wheat staple economy. Mary Quayle Innis’s An Economic
History of Canada (1935) briefly states that the main Canadian transportation route
eastward from Fort William was via lake freighter to ports on Lake Huron and Georgian
Bay, where it was transferred to trains for export via Montreal. More details are provided
by A History of Transportation in Canada (1938) by G.P. deT. Glazebrook.
Glazebrook devotes a chapter to modern waterways in Canada, in which he is
primarily concerned with the development of canals, especially the Welland Canal
between Lake Erie and Lake Ontario,’ and upon the St. Lawrence River. He agrees with
the Laurentian school in framing the development of these canals as attempts by
businessmen and nationalist politicians in central Canada to capture trade originating in
the country that bordered the upper Great Lakes. Despite his focus on canal systems, he
also mentions Georgian Bay. It was a component of the proposed canal systems, one of
which would have linked the Ottawa River, Lake Nipissing, and the French River; the
other linked the bay to Toronto and Lake Ontario. Both canals could have created a
shortened, all-Canadian route from the upper lakes to Montreal, but were never

14
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constructed. Nonetheless, their proposal speaks to the geographic advantageousness of a
transportation route through Georgian Bay.
Glazebrook also includes the role of Georgian Bay ports in Canadian commodity
conveyance. The Canadian inland merchant marine depended on the transport of bulk
freight from west to east, which after the development of the Canadian west as a wheat
growing area in the late 1890s came primarily in the form of grain carried from Fort
William. Glazebrook describes the routes travelled by east-bound wheat over the lakes
and included the amounts received by Georgian Bay ports. He states that the aims of
Canadian shipping interests were to secure as much traffic as possible for Canadian
vessels and to secure as much business as possible for Canadian ports. Glazebrook also
advocates that railroads, overall, increased lake shipping traffic by increasing the flow of
commodities to upper lakes ports. Glazebrook thus establishes that Canadian shipping
interests on the Great Lakes specifically targeted western wheat exports as a major stream
of commerce that should be moved through Canadian channels, connecting the
development of the Canadian Great Lakes fleet directly to the wheat economy.15
By the end of the first half of the 20th century, the staples thesis and Laurentian
school placed natural geographic features and export products as central influences on the
development of Canada. This body of scholarship recognizes that overseas markets were
required for the success of an export staples-driven economy, and identifies the vital role
played by effective transportation systems in linking the region of staple production and
international markets. The historians who founded and crystallized these concepts aimed
to demonstrate how it was geographic features, natural resources, and international
economic markets that served as key influences in the trajectory of the Canadian nation,
not British political institutions or Anglo-Saxon cultural traits. Still, the Laurentian
school and staples thesis aim to explain the evolution of Canada as a unified country.
They employ the Canadian nation-state as their frame of reference and focus on the way
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in which geographic features and staple exports influenced the trajectory of the entire
nation. In early 20th century Canada, wheat was the staple export and its shipment over
the Great Lakes was an essential geographic route for its export.
The staples thesis remained the dominant framework for Canadian economic
historians into the 1960s. For the wheat economy specifically, The National Policy and
the Wheat Economy by Vernon C. Fowke (1957) focuses, for the period up to 1930, on
the relationship between the national policy and the development of the wheat economy
in western Canada. Formally defined, the National Policy was a policy of tariff protection
instituted by the Conservative government in 1879. The term “national policy” in
informal use collectively refers to the combination of tariff, railway, land and
immigration policies developed over the years after Confederation.16 Fowke’s work
retains the perspective focusing on how central Canadian merchants were able to realize a
profitable, expanding agricultural frontier in the west with the aid of a transcontinental
line that was built with significant government support and which ensured Canadian
economic sovereignty in the west. Like Creighton, Fowke discusses the importance of the
St. Lawrence-Great Lakes water transportation route in the period up to 1850, but largely
omits the role that lake routes played in the successful agricultural development of the
west at the turn of the 20th century. Fowke argues that by providing the infrastructure to
allow for an east-west axis of trade connecting the Canadian West to Ontario and
Quebec, the national policy set the necessary conditions that allowed for the boom of the
prairie region. Because the national policy focused on the construction of an all-Canadian
transcontinental railroad, his argument focuses on the role of the railroad, not the lakes
shipping route. Fowke’s work is an example of how Canadian historians have often
focused on the role played by railroads in explaining the western wheat economy, at the
expense of lakes shipping.
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Beginning in the late 1960s, Canadian historians began to turn away from an
emphasis on the trajectory of a unified Canada that evolved from a set of colonies into a
modern nation-state. They instead argued that rather than trying to amalgamate the
myriad geographic regions, ethnic groups, and socioeconomic classes across northern
North America into an artificially constructed, singular national narrative, it was more
appropriate to explain experiences and identities across Canada by employing an
approach of “limited identities” based on class, ethnicity, and region.17 The major regions
into which the country was divided were the Atlantic region, consisting of the four
Maritime provinces; the Quebec region; the Ontario region; the Plains West, consisting of
the region from Manitoba to the Rocky Mountains; and the Far West, consisting of the
Pacific Coast and the interior mountain valleys.18 Each region had its own distinct
regional identity, and historians across the country began to produce regional histories.19
Because the wheat economy was centered in the Plains West, it was covered most
extensively in histories of that region. Regional histories are by their nature delimited by
boundaries. These boundaries are consciously created to serve a specific image, which in
the case of the Canadian Prairie West was one of fertile farmland meant to garner
immigration and settlement. The topography of this region became popularly received as
“absolutely flat, absolutely treeless, absolutely boring.”20 Western regional histories were
thus focused on developments within the flat, western plains. The Great Lakes and its
rocky, forested shores fell outside this definition of the western region, thus they were not
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centrally featured in regionally-focused histories of the wheat staples economy. One
result of these regional boundaries is that historians of western Canada have examined
how displacement and attempted annihilation of indigenous peoples was a prerequisite to
the creation of the wheat economy, but historians of Ontario have ignored how this
process played out around the Great Lakes. James Daschuk’s Clearing the Plains:
Disease, Politics of Starvation, and the Loss of Aboriginal Life (2013) argues how statesupported policies of starvation and insufficient government responses to outbreaks of
infectious disease were used as tools to control indigenous nations in the West. In
contrast, no comparable study of indigenous displacement on the Canadian shores of the
Great Lakes in the late 19th century has been conducted by historians of Ontario. Thus,
the existing historiography has failed to link developments in western Canada to those in
the Great Lakes region, even though processes of indigenous displacement driven by the
wheat economy occurred in both regions.
Regarding the economics of the wheat trade, regional limits in historiographical
approaches do not mean that western histories are ignorant of technological and
economic developments that transcended intranational and international boundaries to
affect the West, but such histories avoid depth of detail regarding developments across
the Great Lakes. One of the canonical works of western history, Gerald Friesen’s The
Canadian Prairies (1984), demonstrates how the transportation of wheat across the
Laurentian watershed was omitted from detailed description in a western regional history.
Friesen links the development of a successful wheat economy to the rise of bread as a
staple food in the industrial nations of the North Atlantic World and understood the
importance of the transportation route connecting agricultural production to consumers.
However, he limits his description of the transportation of wheat beyond Lake Superior to
the following: “Most prairie grain before 1930 travelled by lake freighter from the
Thunder Bay ports to terminals on the lower Great Lakes - on Georgian Bay and at
Buffalo and Port Colborne - where, once again, trans-shipment to rail cars for the final

15

voyage took place.”21 Thus, since the Great Lakes lie outside of the geographic limits of
the Canadian Prairie West, western histories omit the lakes transportation system as a
major topic of study.
However, the Canadian shores of the Great Lakes are situated entirely within the
geographic boundaries of Ontario. Yet Ontario regional histories have not significantly
studied transportation through eastern Georgian Bay either. There are two major reasons
for the gap in Ontario historical scholarship regarding eastern Georgian Bay. One is
geographic, the other thematic. First, as a geographic area, the eastern and northern
shores of Georgian Bay fall into, or at least lie on the margin of, the vast region of subArctic Canada that is deemed “the forgotten North” by Kenneth Coates and William R.
Morrison.22 They argue that the vast sub-arctic fringe region that comprises the northern
portion of the provinces and makes up over a third of Canada’s land mass was ignored by
Canadians, while the territorial, Arctic North above the 60th parallel was an object of
fascination in the Canadian national imagination. While the region defied an easy
description, its southern border is placed around the 45th parallel in Ontario, which is
slightly to the south of Parry Island.23 Eastern Georgian Bay thus occupies a fuzzy
boundary space between southern Ontario, with its urban centres and rich farmland, and
the provincial North, whose development is characterized by isolated pockets of natural
resource exploitation. Studies of northern economic development tend to focus further
north on agriculture and natural resources, covering topics such as the failure of
agricultural colonization in Ontario’s clay belt near Timmins, the economic history of
northwestern Ontario, the impact of hydroelectric projects in the northeast, the steel
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industry in Sault Ste. Marie, and history of northern mining communities.24 Eastern
coastal Georgian Bay lacks mineral resources and contains only sparse pockets of arable
land, and although its lands are heavily forested, its timber resources pale in comparison
to those located away from the coast.25 These features, in combination with its location
on the southern margin of the provincial north, have kept eastern Georgian Bay from
featuring heavily in economic histories of northern Ontario.
Still, Coates and Morrison provide a useful conceptual foundation for examining
Depot Harbour. They argue that provincial norths across Canada experienced “internal
colonialism” wherein Canadians from the provincial souths “discover” and exploit the
northern regions for their natural resources, damaging the environment and First Nation
societies. This perspective frames how Canadian capitalists in urban centers viewed eastern
Georgian Bay in the late 19th century as an undeveloped resource frontier ready for
exploitation.
Histories focused on the Great Lakes also often ignore Georgian Bay and its
connections across the entire watershed. The bay’s surface area is comparable to that of
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Lake Ontario and it is largely separated from the main body of Lake Huron by the Bruce
Peninsula and Manitoulin Island, arguably making it a “sixth great lake.”26 However, if
considered as a separate lake, it is the only great lake entirely within Canada. The
historiography of the Great Lakes until recently was characterized by American and
Canadian historians working within the political boundaries of their own country, and a
preponderance of literature on Great Lakes shipping was produced by Americans. They
largely ignored Canadian developments on the lakes or provided only superficial reference
to them, thus leaving out the importance of the Georgian Bay route.
Meanwhile, the location of eastern Georgian Bay on the margin of southern Ontario
and its provincial north contributed to the lack of Canadian histories that focused on the
region. As historian C.E. Campbell wrote in 2005, the eastern region of the Bay “has been
a significant cultural, economic, and political resource in modern Canada but has never
really been studied, apart from a few popular histories.”27 Campbell’s work stands out as
the major modern history specifically focused on Georgian Bay. She discusses how
railways pulled previously-remote Georgian Bay firmly into the orbit of urban Canada and
the modern industrial age, specifically mentioning how J.R. Booth’s railway realized an
east-west connection from Montreal to the bay that shortened transportation across the
continent.28 Her work demonstrated the importance of Georgian Bay to the history of
Canada and contextualized the process of urban interests entering the area and exploiting
its natural resources as a part of a broader trend that occurred across North America in the
late 19th century.
Still, the history of modern transportation and industry in eastern Georgian Bay
clashes with the public perception of the area as pristine back country. Popular and
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academic histories represented Georgian Bay in the period from New France to the War of
1812 as a grand stage upon which the drama of imperial conflict and continental expansion
occurred, but in the mass consciousness of Canadians it remained frozen in time as a premodern wilderness. This perception was enhanced in depictions of the region as untouched
hinterland by the Group of Seven painters in the early 20th century. The tourist industry
also promoted it as a colonial frontier. Like the American Frontier, the region remained a
link to a glorified national past, but whereas the American Frontier was deemed closed in
1893, Georgian Bay remained an untouched outback.29 This perception has lasted from the
first large wave of tourist activity in the 1890s to the present day, which has kept the
development of modern industry and transportation in the area from being a major subject
of popular interest.
The second cause for the gap in scholarship regarding the relationship of
Georgian Bay grain ports to the economic development of Canada was the intellectual
revolution that began to alter the writing of history in Canada in the late 1960s and was in
full effect by the mid-1980s. The aforementioned turn to a history of “limited identities”
in Canada occurred as part of a drastic change in historical writing toward histories
written from the perspective of individuals and groups who were not part of the political
and economic elite.30 The new social history approached economic history from the
perspective of the working class, first in the form of labor unions and industrial relations,
then in a more holistic mode that considered the cultural backgrounds and social
relations.31 The paradigm shift away from historical writing focused on the role of
political economy in the unified, national development of Canada meant that the question
of how central Canadian capitalists worked to develop and control the western wheat
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economy – a line of inquiry that included the transportation routes that allowed them to
do so – fell away from being a major topic of scholarship in the field of history, as
historians focused on social history topics.
The turn to social history meant fewer historians focused on traditional economic
history questions in Canada, such as the development of the wheat economy. Economists
and methods from the field of economics began to significantly influence Canadian
economic history. The field became heavily influenced by cliometrics, which is the use of
economic theory and quantitative measurement. In The Journal of Economic History
approximately 12% of articles in 1965 employed a cliometrics approach, but by the 1980s
over 80% did.32 Donald Chambers and Donald Gordon’s 1966 Journal of Political
Economy paper, “Primary Products and Economic Growth: An Empirical Measurement,”
marks the turning point in Canadian economic history by using formal theory and
statistical methods to measure the contribution of the “wheat boom” of 1896-1914 to
Canadian economic growth.
Since the cliometrics shift occurred, the wheat boom and the staple theory
continued to engage economic historians. The development of new approaches and
questions advanced the understanding of historical Canadian economic development by
providing quantitative analyses of economic expansion and connecting historical events
to economic theory. However, major works in this field remained geographically focused
on developments in the Canadian West and thematically focused on explaining the causes
of the boom. Frank D. Lewis’s “Farm Settlement on the Canadian Prairies, 1898 to 1911”
(1981) focuses on transport costs but its examination was limited to the cost of rail
transportation from the prairie provinces to Fort William and the cost of bringing the
wheat crop by wagon to a rail shipping point.33 “The Origins of the Canadian Wheat
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Boom, 1880–1910” by Tony Ward (1994) focuses on the technological improvements
that allowed western farmers to extend the growing season, and its limited discussion of
transport costs focused exclusively on railways in the west.34 Thus while the cliometrics
approach offered new tools for the economic historian, it was not directly applied to the
lakes transportation system.
The history of Canadian transportation has continued to be a major topic of
scholarship since the 1960s, but works have tended to focus on railroads. Major topics
include the role of the Dominion Government in construction of the Canadian Pacific
Railway and the construction and operation of the Grand Trunk Railway.35 In contrast,
Canadian Great Lakes shipping in the early 20th century was absent from Canadian
historiography between the 1960s and the late 1990s. The three standard Canadian
economic textbooks written in that period barely note developments in the early 20th
century for Canadian Great Lakes shipowners, and more specialized texts are little
better.36 Progress without Planning: The Economic History of Toronto from
Confederation to the Second World War by Ian Drummond (1987) only notes the
increase in tonnage and growth in financing without providing many details, whereas The
Sault Ste. Marie Canal: A Chapter in the History of Great Lakes Transport understands
the importance of western Canadian grain as a factor in the growth of the Canadian lakes
shipping, but it focuses on the history of the Canadian canal at Sault Ste. Marie. Five
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Centuries of Canadian Business by Michael Bliss (1987) and A Concise History of
Business in Canada (1994) both fail to mention investment or growth in Canadian Great
Lakes shipping in the early 20th century.
In 1998, M. Stephen Salmon provided an important expansion to the
historiography of Canadian lakes shipping with his work "‘A Prosperous Season’:
Investment in Canadian Great Lakes Shipping, 1900-1914.”37 This work of business
history analyzes the expansion of Canadian shipping firms by focusing on four Canadian
bulk carrying companies to demonstrate that the opening of the west and the concurrent
growth of the grain trade were the primary causes for the creation of a modern Canadian
Great Lakes fleet. He connected the need for central Canadian capitalists to maintain a
hold on their western hinterland through the expansion of the inland merchant marine as
an essential link in Canadian control of the western grain trade. Salmon followed with his
2005 article “‘This Remarkable Growth’: Investment in Canadian Great Lakes Shipping,
1900-1959.”38 Here, he follows the trajectory of three Canadian Great Lakes shipping
companies (Canada Steamship Lines, Paterson Steamships Limited, and the Quebec and
Ontario Transportation Company) and traced how the Canadian inland merchant marine
grew from a marginal existence on the fringes of the American grain export business to a
central position in the Canadian economy. Salmon argues that the Canadian fleet
experienced three major periods of sustained growth interrupted by two world wars and
the Great Depression, and that the first two periods (up to 1929) were driven primarily by
the grain trade. Salmon’s work remains the most focused study of Canadian Great Lakes
shipping. My thesis relies on his scholarship for the most direct explanation and analysis
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of the overall landscape of the Canadian lakes merchant fleet in the late 19th and early
20th centuries.
In the same period when Salmon was writing (the late 1990s), historians began to
produce transnational and global histories that better situate Canadian Great Lakes
shipping and grain ports as part of a Great Lakes economic region that transcended an
international political border. These histories describe a late 19th to early 20th century
world whose commodity markets and transportation networks were ever more
interconnected.39 They look beyond developments within individual nation-states and
instead focus on forces and developments that acted at both smaller scales (such as
regions) and larger scales (such as the entire globe).
Since the mid-1990s, historians have increasingly questioned the primacy of the
nation-state as the primary unit of scholarly analysis. A range of alternatives were
proposed, from comparative history and connective history to ocean history and its
subsets, Atlantic and Pacific history. The term “transnational” came to most often
represent this historiographical shift.40 For the Great Lakes region, the first major work
employing a transnational approach came in 2005 with Permeable Border: the Great
Lakes Basin as Transnational Region, 1650-1990, which concurrently traced the
connections between Canadian and American economic development, examined the
meaning of the border, and followed the cross-border movements of goods.41 This work
focuses on the Great Lakes region as having a permeable and malleable international

39

Some of these works include Historical Foundations of Globalization (ed. James Foreman-Peck,
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998), Globalization and History: The Evolution of a Nineteenth-century
Atlantic Economy by Kevin H. O'Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1999),
Globalization in Historical Perspective (ed. M.D. Bordo, A.M. Taylor and J.G. Williamson, Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2003), Power and Plenty: Trade, War, and the World Economy in
the Second Millennium by Ronald Findlay and Kevin O’Rourke (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2007).
40

Dubinsky, Perry, and Yu, Within and without the Nation: Canadian History as Transnational History,
8–9.
41

John J. Bukowczyk, “Migration, Transportation, Capital, and the State in the Great Lakes Basin, 18151890,” in Permeable Border: The Great Lakes Basin as Transnational Region, 1650-1990, by John J.
Bukowczyk (Pittsburgh; University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005), 29–77.
23

boundary across which people, products, and capital moved to lesser and greater extents
based on “a bundle of contingencies presenting both opportunities and constraints.”42 The
book represents an innovation in Great Lakes histories by approaching the region as an
area whose economic ties transcended the international political boundary. However,
specifically on the topic of lakes shipping, it continues to maintain a periodization which
states that waterborne transport was most important and developed, in the form of both
American and Canadian canal systems during the early 19th century, whereas by the latter
part of the century “railroads progressively transformed the lakes into large, watery
obstacles deterring Canadian-American intercourse.”43 This perspective discounts the
volume of traffic carried between Canada and the United States via lakes shipping and
instead posits that the lakes mainly served to obstruct commerce rather than aid it.
Other transnational histories use units of analysis larger than the region and
comparatively examine late 19th and early 20th century Canada with other settler
economies. James Belich’s Replenishing the Earth: the Settler Revolution and the Rise of
the Anglo-World, 1783 – 1939 (2011) contextualizes the “boom” of the western Canadian
wheat economy as one of the last and largest manifestations of “explosive” colonization
by Anglophone settlers, a phenomenon of the 19th century that left Anglophones as the
wealthiest and most powerful peoples on earth by 1900.44 Belich argues that a “boom
mentality” aligned with Canadian efforts to boost colonization and increased Canadian
influence in attracting British investment in the Canadian west.45 Belich advocates for
this explanation rather than the traditionally ascribed causes of westward railroad
expansion, improvements in wheat farming and processing, and the filling-up of available
American land. He also argues that the main economic activity of the boom period of
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1896-1914 was growth itself, contending that the creation of rails, roads, towns, houses,
fences, and farm buildings was the major employer in the prairies and driver in growth
per capita while wheat exports were not yet massive (they averaged about $40 million per
year, compared to $300 million in the period 1914-1929).46
By comparing the expansion of the Canadian west to other major periods of
Anglophone settlement in the 19th and early 20th century, Belich demonstrates the
connection of the Canadian colonization to a century of Anglophone land settlement
across the globe. This process of land settlement was characterized by economic and
settlement booms that preceded significant exports of the commodities traditionally
associated with such booms. For example, he contends that although explosive growth in
Western Australia between 1881 and 1911 was traditionally ascribed to gold, gold
production did not reach significant levels until 1892 but the colony’s population
doubled, imports and the number of bank branches tripled, and public debt and
expenditure increased fourfold between 1882 and 1892. He applies this same approach to
explaining the boom of western Canada by placing the production of wheat in a
secondary position to the construction of infrastructure as a driver of economic growth in
the period 1896-1914. His focus remains regional toward the Canadian West, aside from
a passing mention that some foreign investment went into Northern Ontario and the
Lakehead region and that those areas experienced rapid growth in this period.47
Nonetheless, his perspective provides an important foundation for this study. If
growth driven by boosterism and free allotments of land from the Canadian government
to private railroad companies led to rapid building of infrastructure in western Canada
and thus economic growth, even before western wheat exports actually manifested on a
significant scale, then such construction activities are an important facet in their own
right. To fully develop this facet of Canadian economic history, it is a worthwhile
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contribution to expand the examination of growth activities beyond the regional borders
of the prairie west, in this case to the shores of Georgian Bay.
The transnational shift in historical scholarship was also evident in new studies of
globalization which discussed the role that technology played in changing the
arrangement and magnitude of trade in the 19th century. Historians of globalization
established that the application of the steam engine in ships and railroads was a key
development in the modernization of transportation, which allowed for dramatically
lower shipping costs and thus trade in bulk goods on an unprecedented scale. This
argument was not new, but the phenomenon was examined in a comparative fashion that
transcended political boundaries to demonstrate how the technologies facilitated imperial
expansion, led to globally converged commodity prices, and complexified commodity
chains in ways that concentrated value creation in leading industrial countries. Two major
works that demonstrate this approach are Emily Rosenberg’s A World Connecting, 1870–
1945 (2012) and Jurgen Osterhammel’s The Transformation of the World: A Global
History of the Nineteenth Century (English version, 2014). While Canadian historians
dating back to Innis acknowledge the international nature of technological
transformations and market forces, this new body of scholarship situates the Canadian
experience within comparable historical developments across the world and establishes
its place as a part of a major shift in global trade and economic interconnectivity in the
late 19th and early 20th centuries. The transnational approach establishes the framework
for connecting the local history of a Georgian Bay grain port to global developments in
trade and technology.
However, the transnational approach can tend to focus on events and trends that
transcended political boundaries at the expense of providing nation and state their due
role. Historian Peter Vries suggests that scholars of history “try to allot state and nation
their share, which would mean their highly important place in global history, and try to
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incorporate them in more encompassing global stories.”48 The history of Depot Harbour
requires an examination of events at the level of the state, thus reintegrating that unit of
analysis into the relationship between a local port and the globalizing grain trade.
Omitting the role of the state and events at the level of the nation-state leaves only a set
of fluid transnational forces acting everywhere at the same time and intensity, when in
reality the effect of those forces on Depot Harbour were moderated and altered by
conditions specific to the Canadian political and economic context.
To provide an integrated understanding of the history of Depot Harbour through
an integrated examination of forces operating on the local, regional, national, and global
scale, this thesis draws on many historiographical approaches. They range from the
Laurentian school and staples thesis of the 1920s to the current framework of
transnational economic globalization. From the Laurentian school and staples thesis, this
work incorporates the importance of the wheat staples economy in the early 20th century
and the vital role played by the Great Lakes water transportation system in facilitating the
transportation of that grain. This thesis is informed by the approach of regional histories
concerning the grain trade and seeks to revise the regional focus of western histories by
extending the wheat economy eastward to include the lakes transportation system. At the
same time, it seeks to augment regional histories of Ontario by arguing that eastern
Georgian Bay at the turn of the 20th century was an important transportation link across
Canada, thus demonstrating that colonization of this “provincial north” was driven by the
transportation of wheat in addition to mineral resources, local agriculture, and timber.
The wheat trade brought disruption and change to the indigenous community of Parry
Island. Finally, this thesis seeks to modify the recent shift wherein transnational
globalizing forces have become the dominant unit of analysis in explaining economic
developments, at the expense of the nation-state. Globalization of commodity markets
and advancements in the transportation technology played an important role in creating
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the conditions for the economic success of Depot Harbour, but its decline and
abandonment can only be understood through circumstances specific to Canada.

Organization of Thesis
In Chapter One, I detail the period from the late 19th century up to 1904. I first present
necessary background about Parry Island and eastern Georgian Bay, 19th century
transformational changes in international commodity trading, and the role played by
transportation in the national policy of Canada. I then examine John Rudolphus Booth,
the Ottawa tycoon responsible for the creation of Depot Harbour and under whose
management the port quickly rose to prominence. Finally, Chapter One analyzes the
success of the port’s export route and the causes of its sale to the Grand Trunk Railway in
1904. I describe how forces operating at the local, national, and international level
aligned to facilitate the port’s early commercial success. The growth of international
trade in grain created a major stream of export grain from the North American interior.
Nationalistic Canadians desired to control the exports routes for this flow of grain. The
decision of J.R. Booth to construct Depot Harbour as a more direct export route from
Georgian Bay to Montreal and provide the new port with modern facilities and the full
support of its ownership was based on his private goal of expanding business activities.
Yet it functionally realized the desire of nationalistic Canadians to control more of the
western trade and was only made possible by the growth of the international wheat
market.
Chapter Two focuses on the period 1904-1945. It argues that the Grand Trunk
Railway’s management decisions to deprioritize Depot Harbour were driven by the
preexisting orientation of its railroad network in Ontario, relative to which Depot
Harbour was an out-of-the-way branch line. Western grain exports continued to expand,
and the Canadian Great Lakes network of infrastructure remained insufficient to handle
this stream of grain, but the Grand Trunk Railway invested in new port facilities at
Midland, despite the Depot Harbour route still offering a faster connection to Montreal
from the upper lakes. This decision was rooted in the fact that Midland offered a better
connection to the railroad’s main trunk line in southern Ontario. I then analyze how
financial pressures for the Grand Trunk Railway catalyzed its nationalization and
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incorporation into the Canadian National Railway (CNR) system by the early 1920s.
From its origin, the CNR faced pressures to consolidate its facilities, and the secondary
position to which Depot Harbour had fallen while under Grand Trunk management meant
that it was left with antiquated and undersized facilities. By 1928, the CNR had decided
to close Depot Harbour as a grain port and began to move railroad operations elsewhere.
These decisions were made even though the volume of grain moving over the Great
Lakes increased until the end of the 1920s and overseas markets continued to expand.
The upward trajectory of Great Lakes and international commerce became uncoupled
from Depot Harbour.
Lastly in Chapter Two, I consider the period from 1929 to 1945, when the global
economic system unraveled, and the grain trade collapsed. The significant decline of
international trade left ships vacant and grain sitting stagnant in elevators. Neither the
CNR nor the federal or provincial government was able to rebuild the direct rail line to
Depot Harbour after its destruction by winter weather, and even though Great Lakes
shipping increased again during the Second World War, the port was left completely
inadequate and disconnected from the national transportation system. By the end of the
war, the grain port was completely abandoned.
Having established historical trajectory of Depot Harbour in Chapters One and Two,
in Chapter Three I turn to the indigenous population on Parry Island whose land was
taken for the construction of the port and town. Examining the impact of the grain trade
from this perspective expands upon the argument of Chapters One and Two in two
important ways. First, it demonstrates that the economic forces of globalization and
national development acted not on terra nullius but rather disrupted an existing human
community. It localizes this history and roots it in a specific place, rather than assuming
that these events could have occurred at any site around the world that happened to be
located on a grain transportation route. Second, adding the perspective of the indigenous
population illustrates how the development of Parry Island as a major transportation link
for the grain trade was an episode of central Canadian urban and corporate interests
colonizing the provincial north of Ontario without regard for its indigenous inhabitants. It
demonstrates that the development of the Laurentian watershed as a key channel of
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transportation in the early 20th century Canadian wheat economy was intertwined with
intrusion, dispossession, and disruption of indigenous people who lived along the shores
of eastern Georgian Bay.
The wheat economy relied not only on disruption to indigenous life in the western
prairies but also along the Great Lakes. The reserve of the Wasauksing First Nation (or
Parry Island Band, as it was termed in the 19th and early 20th century) occupied the
entirety of Parry Island, and its citizenry worked in the port. The arrival of the grain trade
to Parry Island accelerated the shift toward a wage-based economy that was more
integrated with the economy of white Canadians. Whereas the arrival of the railroad to
eastern Georgian Bay brought improvement to the Canadian transportation system and an
economic foundation for a new settler town, its impact on the indigenous population was
one of land appropriation, increases in crime, and greater vulnerability to the volatility of
the global economy. I also describe how the Canadian National Railway continued to
impact indigenous life on Parry Island long past the disappearance of the grain port.
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Regional Ownership and Success as a Grain Port: The
Early Years of Depot Harbour
During the decade following 1895, Parry Island transformed from a remote corner

of Ontario to an essential link between North America and overseas markets in the grain
trade. For the first time, technological advances in transportation allowed for bulk
commodities like grain to be exported on a large scale intercontinentally. The consequent
expansion of the grain trade from the North American interior to European consumers
required transportation routes to move grain eastward across the Great Lakes Basin. The
prominent Ottawa Valley lumber baron J.R. Booth saw an opportunity to profit by
connecting his railroads used for hauling timber to the western grain trade.
Within the first five years of its creation, the new port of Depot Harbour became
the busiest grain transshipment port in Ontario. It offered an all-Canadian export route
eastward from the burgeoning Canadian West. The significant role that the port played in
the export trade garnered attention from the Canadian government. Its route featured
centrally in parliamentary debates and public discourse regarding the future of
transportation across Canada. Recognition of its importance was not bounded by the
borders of Canada. American railroad owners looking to extend control of transportation
systems westward and northward into Canada recognized the value of Depot Harbour.
The early success of Depot Harbour was due to several factors including the
management focus of J.R. Booth and an expanding international demand for grain
exports from the North American interior plains. It took place during a period of
expansion of Canadian transportation infrastructure that was buoyed by overall optimism
in the limitless potential of Canada. This spirit of national confidence led to the belief that
the development of the Canadian west would lead to continual and uninterrupted
economic growth. One notable manifestation of this belief was the development of
multiple transcontinental railroads as collaborations between private Canadian and
British corporations and the Canadian government. This national spirit of confidence, the
rising tide of global market interconnectivity, and the regional focus of J.R. Booth on his
grain port aligned favorably to propel Depot Harbour to preeminence.
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Chapter One first establishes the context in which Depot Harbour was created. It
focuses on regional, national, and international conditions: northeastern Georgian Bay’s
status as a remote lumber outpost, the Canadian national context of continental expansion
westward and the governmental policies that supported this expansion, and the
international context of an expanding, globalizing grain trade between North America
and Europe. This chapter explains how these circumstances allowed J.R. Booth to seize
an opportunity and invest in an extension of his railroad linking Georgian Bay to
Montreal. Depot Harbour was not the only grain port in Ontario during this period, but it
represented the most direct route from the upper Great Lakes to a tidewater port. It also
was the only Great Lakes port on the entire Booth railroad network, and its owner
devoted much attention and resources to it. This circumstance allowed Depot Harbour to
thrive as a grain port in its early years such that it led all Canadian lakes ports by a
significant margin in the volume of grain handled. Chapter One focuses on the period
1898-1904, when the macroeconomic trends of an expanding continental and
international wheat economy aligned with the regional ownership’s focus on and
investment in the port town, resulting in its ascendance to a central position on the
Canadian grain export route.

1.1 Geographical Context and Local History of Parry Island
Parry Island is not endowed with fertile soils or abundant natural resources useful
for commodity extraction. The island is geologically very young. The land was shaped by
multiple advances and retreats of a massive ice sheet over the last several hundred
thousand years. The final retreat around 12,000 years ago carved Georgian Bay and its
thousands of islands, including Parry Island, out of ancient Canadian Shield rock. The
island consists of 19,000 acres of this rock and it is located on the southernmost reaches
of the Canadian Shield. Many places on the island are covered by sand and gravel
deposits, while others are bare rock. Its location between the mainland coast and the open
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waters of Georgian Bay have left it vulnerable to harsh climatic forces. Predominantly
westerly winds bring above-average volumes of snow and rain to the island.49
Eastern Georgian Bay was inhabited by members of the Wendat and Algonquian
indigenous peoples who remained in the region into the 1600s. By the 17th century,
Iroquois raids destroyed trading networks around Georgian Bay and scattered the
region’s inhabitants further to the north. These raids left the region uninhabited by a
significant indigenous population. From the north, the Anishinaabe people expanded their
territory southward. Their habitation of the eastern shore of Georgian Bay did not extend
to year-round use of its islands. They instead used the island solely as a seasonal stopping
point.50 James Evans, a Wesleyan Methodist missionary, travelled through northeastern
Georgian Bay in July 1836 and noticed uninhabited camps on Parry Island.51 His record
is the earliest written record of indigenous habitation on the island. Permanent, yearround settlement on Parry Island began with the signing of the Robinson-Huron treaty by
the Wasauksing band in 1850 and the establishment of Parry Island as the band’s sole
reserve by 1853.52
The relationship of this reserve to the development of Depot Harbour is important
in the historical trajectory of the port town. The establishment of Depot Harbour was a
major factor in change and disruption to indigenous life on Parry Island. A larger
discussion of the historical relationship between the reserve and the port from the
perspective of life in the Parry Island reserve is described in Chapter Three. Within the
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scope of Chapter One, this relationship of the reserve contributes to the understanding of
the relative remoteness of eastern Georgian Bay before the mid-1890s. Parry Island itself
remained isolated from the rest of Canada and Euro-Canadian interest in it remained
limited to Christian missionaries, Department of Indian Affairs agents, and the occasional
lumber harvest by a local company of white settlers. The transformation of this isolated
region into a major transportation route testifies to the single-minded determination of
J.R. Booth to construct Depot Harbour according to his own plans, since he constructed
his port in an area without any other modern railroad infrastructure. It also displays his
willingness to disregard indigenous people and appropriate land from them, utilizing the
reach and bias of the Canadian government in the process of colonizing this region of
Ontario.
The relationship between indigenous people in northeastern Georgian Bay and
Euro-Canadian settlers was limited and sporadic before the arrival of the railroad in 1895.
Georgian Bay was first systematically surveyed and mapped in the early 19th century.
Between 1820 and 1822, the Royal Navy Commander Henry W. Bayfield made a
nautical survey of Lake Huron and Georgian Bay. Bayfield’s survey demonstrated that
the southern and western shores of Georgian Bay were relatively uniform lands, but its
northeastern shores were rocky and denuded of any substantial soils.53 Parry Island has
more areas with more soil than some islands in eastern Georgian Bay, but its thin soils
were nonetheless not well suited for farming.54 It was neither targeted nor used for
agriculture by Euro-Canadian farmers.
The lack of interest in Parry Island for agricultural development by settlers in
British North America reflected their disinterest in the broader region. Historically,
significant urbanization and agricultural development in the Great Lakes watershed
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followed a bifurcated pattern between northern and southern regions. This division can be
traced on a modern map as an imaginary line running roughly from Madison, WI, to
Ottawa. The southern shores of Georgian Bay lie to the south of this dividing line and the
northeastern shores lie to the north. By the early 1890s, the region to the south of the line
contained four of the ten largest cities in Canada and two of the ten largest cities in the
United States.55 Development to the north was far different. Euro-Canadians and EuroAmericans considered this region to be a remote “Midwestern Outback.”56 U.S. Senator
Henry Clay referred to the region as “a place beyond the remotest extent of the United
States, if not in the moon.”57 The prevailing attitude among white settlers was that the
only attractive features for economic use in this northern region were timber and
minerals.58
In Canada, officials thought of the islands of Lake Huron as remote and
forbidding, deeming it “intractable wilderness” unsuited to the lives and goals of white
settlers.59 In 1836, Sir Francis Bond Head, the Lieutenant-Governor of the colony of
Upper Canada, expressed his belief that the Manitoulin Islands and all the other islands of
Lake Huron comprised a natural reserve for the indigenous people of Ontario. His
statement represented how white settlers and colonial authorities believed that indigenous
people were incompatible with their view of modern civilization and that indigenous
people deserved no self-determination regarding where or how they would live. He
stated:
We should reap a very great benefit if we could persuade these Indians, who are
now impeding the progress of civilization in U. Canada, to resort [to a region]
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possessing the double advantage of being desirably adapted to them (inasmuch as
it affords fishing, hunting, and bird shooting, and fruit), and yet in no way adapted
for the white population.60
Bond Head’s statement demonstrates how bigoted colonial authorities viewed this region
as a wilderness unfit for white settlement yet possessing all the features needed in a place
to which indigenous peoples could be relegated.
By the second half of the 19th century, white settlers found the timber resources to
the north and east of Georgian Bay’s shores attractive for exploitation. Euro-Canadians
entered and settled in the region, but it remained a remote resource outpost centered
around the timber industry. Significant settlement in the Parry Island area began in the
1860s, but prior to 1865, there was no communication to the rest of British North
America except by canoe through the Muskoka Lakes or small boats and tugs that
travelled to the south shore of Georgian Bay. Regular steamship service to the area began
in 1865 when the Waubano commenced service between the Northern Railway’s
terminus at Collingwood, Parry Sound, and Thunder Bay.61 In 1867, J. and W. Beatty
and Company purchased 2,198 acres of Crown land at the mouth of the Seguin River for
a townsite. In 1869, the first official town plan was completed for the town of Parry
Sound. By 1871, the population of Parry Sound numbered 1,052 people, supported by a
sawmill that processed timber from a surrounding timber lease of 284 square miles,
produced 3.2 million board feet of timber products, and employed 80 men.62 Still, the
town remained isolated for the winter and spring seasons. Reflecting on the area in the
19th century, local writer E.E. Armstrong stated, “In winter to live in Parry Sound, must
have been like being shipwrecked or marooned.”63 The area’s winter isolation was also
noted by The Globe in 1898:
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It is not so long ago that the Parry Sounders had to fill their larders in the fall,
with the prospect of having to endure a winters siege. They were sixty-five miles
from the nearest railway, and when the harbor froze over in the natural course of
things they were shut out from the world. Sixty-five miles is not an impassable
distance, even for a loaded wagon, but at the season when it was most likely that
the necessity for traversing the distance arose, namely the spring before the ice
moved out of the harbor, the roads were in such a condition as to practically
forbid travel.64
Little news from the outside world arrived throughout the winter, and only later in spring
came the arrival of fresh food, supplies, and clothing.65
Parry Island itself remained largely shut off from the outside world. Life for its
inhabitants was gradually changing from subsistence farming, hunting, and gathering to
wage-based labor, but from the perspective of the Canadian national economy, or even
the economy of the province of Ontario, it remained a remote region. Meanwhile, the
global economic system of trade was undergoing massive changes in the type and volume
of products traded. By the 1890s, the ramifications of these changes would draw Parry
Island onto a key node of an international trade system.

1.2 Changes in the Global Grain Trade in the 19th Century
Over the course of the 19th century, the nature of international trade fundamentally
changed. From the mid-19th century to 1913, world trade expanded at a statistically
unprecedented rate. The bulk of this trade was between Europeans, or between Europe
and its white settler regions overseas (such as Australia, Canada, and the United States).
Three-fourths of the trade occurred between North America and Europe. Technological
changes in transportation allowed for lower costs in shipping bulk products such as wheat
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and rice, which in turn meant that these products were traded on such a massive scale that
they dominated world trade as measured by value.66
The applications of new technologies allowed for the growth in international trade of
bulky commodities like grain. Reduced freight rates allowed overseas products to
compete with, and in many cases overtake, domestic production in industrializing
European countries. The decline of freight rates in the latter half of the 19th century
occurred due to the application of improved steam engines to ships and railroad
locomotives. These engines had been invented decades earlier, but only in the 1860s did
they become commonly used in ships. This innovation lowered operating costs and
reduced the amount of fuel ships needed to carry. The engines were physically smaller,
and the combination of these factors allowed ships to transport more cargo. Goods had
been traded over long distances for millennia, whether across land, inland waterways, or
oceans. However, historically, intercontinental transportation rates were high, so the only
goods that could be shipped economically were those with a high value to weight ratio,
such as pepper, tea, coffee, or indigo. These goods often commanded a high price in their
destination markets because they were not produced in those markets.67 These imports
did not disrupt or compete with local production.
This pattern changed with the shifts toward improved technology and corresponding
decreases in transportation costs in the 19th century.68 In the grain market specifically,
between 1868 and 1902, the cost of transporting grain from Chicago to New York
declined by over 70% and the cost of transport from New York to Liverpool declined
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even more significantly, by almost 80%.69 This transportation change was accompanied
by foreign trade policies that allowed foreign grain to dominate food consumption in
some countries.
In Great Britain, protective tariffs on raw materials, including foodstuffs, were
eliminated by 1849. This elimination of grain tariffs set in motion a reconfiguration of
the European food supply system as “the transition of British foreign trade policy toward
a free trade regime was essential for globalizing and intensifying economic relations
among nations.”70 Europe drew on increasingly distant sources of supply. World grain
markets became more integrated. Although homogenization of prices and grades of grain
did not occur across all countries, between North America and Great Britain these
measures became standardized. Before the repeal of the British tariffs (the corn laws) in
the 1840s, almost all European countries were self-sufficient, or nearly so, in the
production of their principal bread grains. Yet by the eve of World War One, western and
central European countries imported in excess of 30% of the wheat needed to feed their
populaces. Great Britain led the field with over 75% of its wheat imported from abroad.71
International wheat price converged. Until the 1840s, the difference between the price
of wheat in England and in the United States differed by up to 100%. By the end of the
19th century; however, that price differential plummeted to under 20%.72 In Britain, this
convergence allowed for North American wheat to become a major source of food. This
change in turn led to changes in the entire pattern of food consumption in Great Britain,
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including a shift from brown bread and consumption of other grains to consumption of
white bread. In the 19th century, meat and dairy became less available to the British
working-class, and white bread provided a cheap alternative which was also easier to
digest (than brown bread) on its own. However, white bread was nutritionally poorer than
brown bread. This change led to social struggle over issues of bread cost, quality, and
nutrition.73
The influx of North American grain also affected continental Europe. Most European
countries protected domestic agriculture through offsetting tariff policies, except for
Britain and Denmark which followed policies of free trade. In protectionist countries, the
intrusion of competitively priced North American grain resulted in tariff policies that
protected the interests of domestic grain producers and marketers.74 These tariffs
effectively “balkanized” Continental European markets from the effects of global grain
market integration.75 The unification of international wheat markets thus presented
challenges to existing food systems across Europe. It led to questions of national security
regarding food sources and exacerbated political debates regarding whether each country
should adopt a regime of free trade or domestic protectionism for its food supply.
The disruption and change in grain markets were not the only significant impact
caused by utilization of new steam engines in transportation systems. In addition to lower
transportation costs, they also aided colonial powers in asserting their authority over new
regions. In the late 19th century, colonial powers utilized the steamboat to expand their
imperial reach further into continental interiors. This expansion occurred around the
world, as colonialists pushed up major river systems in China, India, southeast Asia, and
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Africa.76 In North America, migrants flooded into the Ohio-Mississippi-Missouri River
watershed as “the dramatic increase in the speed of travel and the drop in the cost of
freight that steamboats brought changed the Midwest faster than anyone could have
foreseen.”77 The vessels carried invading soldiers, settlers, tradesmen, and miners into the
interior of the continent, along with the animals, supplies, and weapons they needed for
ventures of military control, agricultural settlement, and mineral exploitation. On the
downstream journey they carried passengers and export goods.78
The railroad played a similar role in allowing colonial expansion into new regions. In
Canada, the extension of the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) west of Lake Superior
helped the Canadian government assert its sovereignty into this western region. A
prominent example of the effect of the railway was the difference in the ability of the
Canadian government to respond to the Red River Rebellion of 1870 and the 1885 NorthWest Rebellion. In 1870, government troops needed three months to reach the Red River
Colony in Manitoba and in the meantime, the rebelling Metis were able to achieve many
of their demands in an agreement with the Canadian government.79 By 1885, the railroad
allowed troops to reach Saskatchewan in only 16 days from the time of mobilization, and
in this case the Metis and Indigenous groups who had risen up against the Canadian
government were defeated, their leaders were prosecuted, and the Canadian government
did not need to reach a settlement that addressed the grievances of those who had
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rebelled.80 The railroads played their first role in establishing the western Canadian wheat
economy by helping ensure that Canada maintained sovereignty over its western territory.
The expansion of the United States and Canada into the North American interior were
processes of “frontier expansion,” whereby a colonizing society pushes into new territory
to develop land for agriculture or mineral extraction. 81 This type of colonization was
coupled with settlement, and the extent and environmental impact of this settlement was
enormously increased by industrial technologies such as the railroad.82 The influence of
the railroad and steamship on the globalization of the commodity market was not the sole
catalyst for the colonial expansion into the North American interior by the United States
and Canada. It was, however, a requisite condition for those processes to occur on such a
massive scale and rapid speed in the 19th century. The midwestern United States
developed into a globally significant grain producing region over the 19th century. The
western Canadian prairies were beginning to follow the same pattern by the end of that
century. Improved railroad and shipping links from interior agricultural regions of North
America to export ports on the Atlantic Ocean and St. Lawrence estuary were needed to
handle the export flow of grain.
The processes of transforming the American Midwest and the Canadian Prairies into
wheat exporting regions, which included the construction of transcontinental railroads,
required dispossessing indigenous land and revoking the ability of indigenous people to
use it. In the United States, the transformation of the Great Lakes region into extremely
agriculturally productive lands occupied by white settlers involved the forcible removal
of indigenous people. This process was codified in the Indian Removal Act of 1830 and
over the next decade nearly the entire population of 100,000 indigenous people living in
the United States east of the Mississippi River were pressured or forced to move to the
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west of the river.83 The process of transforming the Canadian Prairies involved
government policies of forced migration, starving indigenous peoples, and allowing
disease to ravage indigenous societies in order to allow white settlers to more easily
dispossess indigenous land and impose control over it.84 By the late 1880s, the
indigenous population of western Canada reached its all-time demographic nadir due to
these policies – the land had been made available for settler agriculture through the use of
genocidal tactics.85 In both regions, these processes were extremely traumatic for
indigenous societies.

1.3 Grain Exports and Transportation: The North American
and Canadian Context
In the 19th century, the North American frontier provided Europeans with a vast,
untapped resource region. To the relatively crowded, urban populations of Europe, the
North American agricultural frontier provided a major source of material wealth in the
form of a tremendous surplus of theretofore unexploited, rich farmland.86 This potential
of this land to produce tremendous volumes of foodstuffs required the input of labor and
capital from Europe and its neo-European offshoots of the United States and Canada, as
well as efficient transportation systems to allow for the conveyance of harvests to
consumers in Europe. By the late 19th century, this process of realizing the full potential
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of the American Midwest was reaching its zenith as steamships and railroads effectively
linked North American grain production to the European economy.87
In the latter 1800s, North American wheat exports came to comprise the majority of
international exports, but American wheat made up a dominant share of this trade until
the turn of the century. By 1854, Chicago served as the largest wheat market and export
port in the world. It was supplied by grain grown in the American Midwest. In 1854, the
six largest European grain ports combined for exports of 40,496,000 bushels of grain
while Chicago alone exported 30,000,000 bushels.88 Canada was a relative newcomer as
a major exporter in a well-developed international wheat trade. As late as the period
1895-1899, the region around the Black Sea and the United States accounted for over
80% of the world export trade in wheat, while Canada supplied only 4% of the global
supply in 1900.89 The American wheat production held a huge lead over that of Canada,
and the transportation system that supported it was also much more developed.
Understanding the landscape of the wheat export transportation route across the
Great Lakes region requires an examination of developments within Canada that
increased the ability for wheat to move eastward on all-Canadian routes, while
simultaneously remaining aware that American wheat production, shipping companies,
and ports continued to dominate the trade through the 1890s. Western Canadian wheat
production and transportation systems developed after American routes were well
established. Canadian wheat producers and shippers faced a competitive disadvantage in
the region stretching from the Great Lakes to the Atlantic seaboard. Geographically, this
region was a unified watershed comprised of the entire region draining into the Great
Lakes and St. Lawrence River. However, national factors bounded by the political border
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between the United States and Canada significantly shaped the arrangement of
transportation routes across the Great Lakes. Maritime laws – specifically the coasting
laws of the United States – disadvantaged Canadian ports on Lake Erie and Lake Ontario
while allowing a more direct export route through eastern Georgian Bay to economically
succeed.
American shipping companies and American infrastructure on the Great Lakes held a
strong advantage in tonnage and modern ships to export markets. In the late 19th century,
the volume of grain exported from the United States dwarfed the volume exported from
Canada (Figure 1 depicts the movement of grain and flour on the Great Lakes). In 1880,
the United States exported 186,000,000 bushels of wheat and wheat flour. The volume
increased to 234,000,000 in 1901. The same year, Canada exported more wheat and
wheat flour than at any time in its history, but the volume was only ~70,000,000
bushels.90 Chicago served as a major hub for grain exports in the United States;
Milwaukee and Duluth were other important ports. Between 1880 and 1898, the lake
route eastward from these ports (and other minor ports on Lake Michigan) increased the
volume of grain carried from 100,324,000 bushels to 170,104,00 bushels.91
The main destination for cargoes travelling on the upper Great Lakes eastward was
the port of Buffalo, NY. Buffalo received 105,453,372 bushels of grain in 1880, and this
volume increased to 215,537,169 by 1898.92 The port took in ~83% of all grain exports
transported on the Great Lakes, even as the amount of grain exported from Lake Superior
ports (including the Canadian ports of Fort William and Port Arthur) increased from
4,659,356 bushels in 1880 to 88,418,380 bushels by 1898.93
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Figure 1: Movement of Grain and Flour on the Great Lakes, 1897 and 190794
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Despite the increase in Canadian grain exports through the 1880s and 1890s, the
American export route captured the majority of Canadian grain cargoes trade.
Buffalo was able to dominate as an export port partly because the Welland canal
link between the Great Lakes above Niagara Falls – Lake Superior, Lake Michigan, Lake
Huron, Lake and Lake Erie – and Lake Ontario (and the St. Lawrence River) was
inadequate to accommodate the large steamships that carried grain. M. Stephen Salmon
described the condition of Canadian shipping on the lakes and noted the obstacles it
faced:
The 1890s were the nadir of Canada’s shipping industry on the Great Lakes…the
smaller locks on the Welland Canal and the St. Lawrence canals restricted
development. The manmade link between Lake Erie and Lake Ontario (the
Welland Canal) was only able to accommodate ships of a maximum length of 270
feet.95
The bulk freighters that serviced the upper lakes were over 290 feet at the beginning of
the 1890s and their lengths increased into the 1900s.96 Neither American nor Canadian
grain shippers could load their cargoes onto a single vessel for transit between the upper
lakes ports and saltwater ports on the St. Lawrence estuary or the Atlantic Ocean. Their
large ships could only travel as far as the eastern end of Lake Erie, where Buffalo was
advantageously situated to intake their cargoes and transfer them to American saltwater
ports on the Atlantic Ocean, via railroad and canal links across New York state. Lacking
a direct link of their own from Lake Erie to Atlantic ports, Canadian shipping companies
operated relatively small vessels that could traverse the Welland Canal. These vessels
then deposited their cargoes at Kingston, ON, where the grain was loaded on barges for
towage to Montreal. By 1899, the entire Canadian grain fleet consisted of only 27 vessels
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with a total capacity of 31,000 tons.97 For comparison, in 1896 over 19,000 ships passed
through the maritime reporting station at Detroit, an average of one ship every minute for
the eight months of open maritime navigation on the lakes.98
The Canadian fleet was small compared to the American fleet on the lakes. In 1894, the
American Great Lakes merchant marine totaled over 1,200,000 tons while the entire
Canadian fleet totaled about 146,000 tons (see Figure 2). The American fleet utilized
ships of five hundred feet in length by the turn of the 20th century. These large ships
could deposit their cargoes at Buffalo where they could be directly transferred to barges
or railroad cars that would carry them to seagoing ships in New York City.99 Canada
lacked a similarly well-positioned transshipment port.
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shipped from Georgian Bay to the United States via steamship, but harvested timber was also bundled into
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commodity carried on the lakes. Its carriage in significant volumes was driven by the exploitation of major
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Figure 2: Tonnage of American and Canadian Great Lakes Merchant Marine,
1894100
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Despite a lack of Canadian transportation networks, the first wheat exports from
the Canadian west began in the late 1870s. Canadian infrastructure was initially almost
entirely undeveloped in the early years of western grain exports, and although significant
expansion occurred in the 1880s and 1890s, American routes remained predominant.
During the decade between 1870 and 1880, wheat processors and consumers from
outside of Manitoba began to recognize wheat produced in that province (then the only
region of the Canadian prairies with a significant settler population) for its high
quality.101 The first comprehensive statistics of grain production in Manitoba were
collected by the provincial government in 1876, and in that year 480,000 bushels were
produced. Also, in 1876, the first shipment of wheat travelled from the west to Toronto; it
was used to improve the quality of wheat seed in Ontario. No railroad ran from Manitoba
to any point on the Canadian shores of Lake Superior. The most geographically expedient
export route from Manitoba to the east was down the Red River Valley via boat (and after
1879, via railroad) to St. Paul, MN. From St. Paul, railroad and lake steamship
connections across the American Midwest and from American lake ports allowed for
further export to central Canada. Between 1876 and 1883, grain exports moved south
through Minnesota and then over American railways or lake ports to market.102
Throughout the 19th century, the international grain market was centered around Great
Britain. Liverpool and London specifically were the import and distribution centres for
Great Britain and all of western Europe.103
Key developments in the mid-1880s improved the ability to transport wheat through
Canadian routes from Winnipeg to central Canada. In 1883, the CPR opened for business
between Winnipeg and Port Arthur on Lake Superior. In the winter of 1883-1884, the

101

MacGibbon, The Canadian Grain Trade, 25.

102

MacGibbon, The Canadian Grain Trade, 25–27; Edward Porritt, “Canada’s National Grain Route,”
Political Science Quarterly 33, no. 3 (1918): 345–46, https://doi.org/10.2307/2141902.
103

Morton Rothstein, “Centralizing Firms and Spreading Markets: The World of International Grain
Traders, 1846-1914,” Business and Economic History Vol. 17, Papers presented at the thirty-fourth annual
meeting of the Business History Conference (1988): 103,107.
50

first grain elevator west of Collingwood was built at Port Arthur. By 1885, this
infrastructure allowed for a larger export trade in grain, relative to what was possible
when all grain had to be transported in individual sacks.104 The lake route was vital to the
wheat export trade. The CPR was the only Canadian railroad between central Canada and
the west between 1885 and 1913. Moving grain from the hub of Winnipeg to the
Lakehead ports of Fort William and Port Arthur was an acute problem for the railroad.
The CPR had to move most of the wheat crop from western farms to eastern ports shortly
after it was harvested in a short period of time. All available boxcars and engines that
could be spared were employed in moving grain, but there was only a single railroad line
between Winnipeg and Fort William. Transportation stoppages occurred in 1901 and
1902, negatively affecting all parties involved with the sale, financing, and export of
western grain.105 These stoppages highlighted the importance of the lake route because
all the grain involved was destined for export via lake freighter. No significant volumes
of grain moved eastward from Fort William by rail. Thus, transporting the full volume of
export grain the entire distance across the Canadian shield from the prairie region to
export ports on the St. Lawrence River or Atlantic Ocean was beyond the capabilities of
the all-rail route.106 As a result, steamships on the Great Lakes played a crucial role in the
transportation route for grain moving east from the prairies to markets abroad from both
Canadian and American points of origin. Still, without a Canadian route across Ontario
that could offer a more direct connection to ocean-going vessels at Montreal, Buffalo
would remain unchallenged as the preferred destination for lake freighters.
Montreal developed as the dominant Canadian export port in the late 19th century.
The development of rail networks across Ontario that terminated at Montreal led to that
city becoming the dominant export terminus for grain in Canada. After 1886, Montreal
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bypassed Quebec City as the leading port in Canada. Between 1894 and 1914, the greater
part of grain exports in Canada “by far” passed through Montreal.107 Figures 3 and 4
illustrate the CPR network in central Canada in 1887. The map demonstrates how
Montreal was geographically the logical export terminus for the CPR. It was the closest
ocean port eastward of the confluence of rail lines from southern and northern Ontario. It
also demonstrates how the CPR network lay to the north of Lake Erie and Lake Ontario
and was oriented toward the St. Lawrence ports. By the 1890s, this arrangement of
transportation routes in Canada had begun shifting grain exports to a route running
directly from Lake Huron to Montreal.
Meanwhile, because new transportation facilities created more northerly export routes
that bypassed Lake Erie and Lake Ontario and ran more directly across Ontario from
Lake Huron to Montreal, Toronto was omitted from a central place on the export
network. Until 1887, Toronto enjoyed a pre-eminent position in the transportation of
grain across Canada. In the process of completing its railroad and elevator links at Port
Arthur, the CPR built a grain transfer elevator at Owen Sound and contemplated building
one at Toronto, and Toronto looked to remain a major city in the grain trade. However,
the CPR ultimately decided against building a grain elevator at Toronto. The shift from
Toronto to Montreal both demonstrates the influence of American coasting laws on the
arrangement of Great Lakes shipping traffic and set the condition where a direct eastwest rail connection from Georgian Bay would link to the largest Canadian ocean port.
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Figure 3: Canadian Pacific Railway Network in Central Canada, 1887108
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Figure 4: Canadian Pacific Railway Network in Ontario and Southern Quebec,
1887109
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American ships were subject to the coasting laws of the United States. These laws
decreed that only American ships could carry cargoes directly from one American port to
another. However, in 1875 the United States had altered this rule to allow Canadian
shippers to carry grain from one American Great Lakes port to another, provided the
grain travelled overland through the Dominion of Canada for part of the journey between
the two ports. This 1875 protocol allowed Canadian shippers to use a route that included
Chicago, Collingwood, Toronto, and Ogdensburg, NY. In 1885, the United States
government revoked this provision, thus eliminating the use of this binational route.
Toronto could no longer serve as a stop-over point for American ships, which weakened
the city’s ability to serve the grain export route. Although the city would go on to serve as
a grain market for Ontario and western wheat, by 1916 not one of the forty licensed grain
elevators in Ontario was located there.110 Meanwhile, since American coasting laws
allowed vessels of any country to carry cargoes directly from American ports to Canadian
ports, Canadian ports on Lake Huron and Georgian Bay did not face a loss of traffic.
Overall, despite the expansions in transportation infrastructure in both the
Canadian West and in Ontario, American shipping companies remained dominant on the
Great Lakes. Canadian shipping companies were only able to stay in business by
gathering enough small cargoes at the margins of the grain industry. Even though Canada
possessed a significant share of the coastline of the Great Lakes, Canadian ships carried a
small fraction of the cargoes that travelled across their waters. In the grain export trade,
the main obstacle to an increased Canadian share of the trade was the geographic
disadvantage Canada faced in its lack of a more direct, expedient route from the upper
lakes to its tidewater ports. Canadian ports on Lake Erie and Lake Ontario were
disadvantaged due to American coasting laws. Buffalo’s dominance as a port for the
wheat trade, and American dominance of traffic on the Great Lakes, would persist
unchallenged unless a more direct route from the Canadian west to Montreal was created.
The economic space stretching from the Great Lakes Basin to the Atlantic Ocean
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remained divided by its two nation-states, and Canadian ability to assume a greater share
of transportation across the region remained contingent upon the construction of this new
route.
The line that could most directly connect Montreal to the upper great lakes ran
directly from the eastern shore of Georgian Bay to Montreal, bypassing southwestern
Ontario and Toronto and substantially shortening the distance travelled by exported
goods. However, this route travelled across rocky, rugged, densely forested lands in
central Ontario before reaching the Ottawa River Valley and its connection to Montreal.
These natural obstacles, however, were minimized for someone who already had a
transportation network in the area. John Rudolphus Booth possessed such a network.

1.4 J.R. Booth: Founder of Depot Harbour
Since the era of New France, individual capitalists and industrialists in Canada strove
to expand the reach of their commercial ventures westward. This argument features
centrally in the Laurentian school of historiography, which posits that central Canadian
businessmen acted as driving agents of national expansion.111 John Rudolphus Booth fit
the mold of a far-sighted central Canadian industrialist. His railroad extension from the
Ottawa Valley to Georgian Bay allowed a Canadian route to capture a greater share of the
grain export trade, thereby keeping more of the downstream economic effects of the
western grain boom within Canada. This in turn served to connect the process of national
expansion from the western prairies to the eastern shore of Georgian Bay.
Booth was involved with the expansion of infrastructure and industry from a young
age. Born on a remote Quebec farm in 1827, he spent his early working years honing
construction and engineering skills by helping to build bridges for the Central Vermont
Railway. He helped construct a paper mill and sawmill and managed the latter for a year.
By 1853, he had built up experience in the railroad and timber-milling industries, and he

111

Careless, “Frontierism, Metropolitanism, and Canadian History,” 79.
56

moved to Bytown (which would become Ottawa).112 The town was then only a small
lumber village, but its designation as the capital of Upper Canada in 1857 catalyzed
major construction works that provided Booth with his first significant contract and
began his ascent to the status of a major figure in the timber business.
Booth constructed sawmills on the Chaudière Falls of the Ottawa River in 1859,
and their production capacities and location near Parliament Hill allowed him to bid for
and secure the contract to supply lumber for the construction of three government
buildings. His ability to fulfill the contract was aided by his recent purchase of a timber
tract ~15 miles upstream from Ottawa. He floated logs from this tract down to his
Chaudière mills. This government contract provided Booth with the first major
accomplishment in an ownership role and a foundation for enlarging his timber
holdings.113 Expansion would take his interests west, into the central Ontario highlands
and towards Georgian Bay.
By 1867, Booth purchased a major tract of timber around the headwaters of the
Madawaska River, in the area that would become Algonquin Park.114 This development
was the first of several that moved Booth’s timber harvesting operations beyond the reach
of rivers large enough to allow felled timber to be floated out from their place of harvest.
The rivers and creeks in this highland region were too small to move the large trees being
cut down. Booth built railroad lines to transport the timber.115
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Not only did railroads allow Booth’s timbering operations to access areas
unreachable by water transportation alone, but they also provided additional logistical
advantages in the lumber business. They reduced labor costs in transporting timber,
provided greater freedom from seasonal weather constraints (such as frozen rivers), and
allowed for faster transportation of felled timber from its site of harvest to processing
mills and onward to commercial market.116 Buoyed by these advantages, Booth
continued to expand his timbering operations into the rugged highlands of central
Ontario. Railroad technology allowed Booth to exploit the region’s timber resources in a
manner that was previously impossible.
Booth’s investment in railroads was not limited to his timber harvesting
operations. He invested in improving the transportation network between his Ottawa
mills and export markets for his finished lumber products, primarily the United States.
Starting in 1879, Booth developed the Canada Atlantic Railway (CAR) as a link between
Ottawa and Coteau Landing on the St. Lawrence River (~15 miles upstream from
Montreal). The CAR was complete by 1882 and connected Ottawa to the ports of
Montreal, Portland (ME), and other ports in New England. The railroad built a permanent
bridge over the St. Lawrence River in 1889-1890, completing a continuous rail route
from Booth’s timber harvesting regions in central Ontario to year-round tidewater
ports.117 The CAR provided Booth control of a major transportation artery though the
Ottawa Valley.
The western end of this transportation line could only transport men and
equipment into logging areas and export felled timber, unless it could be linked to the
Great Lakes and connect to lake shipping. Booth realized he could extend his railroad
network to Georgian Bay and capture some of the enormous export trade in grain.118 By
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1888, Booth set this extension in motion by chartering two new railroads: the Ottawa,
Arnprior, and Renfrew Railway, and the Ottawa and Parry Sound Railway. These lines
would be amalgamated into the Ottawa, Arnprior, and Parry Sound Railway (OAPS).119
Construction on the OAPS commenced in 1892. When completed, the railway would
reduce the journey from Chicago to Montreal by ~800 miles (see Figure 5). The OAPS
thus offered the most direct route through Canada for exports from the upper Great
Lakes.120
To finance the OAPS, Booth looked to government subsidies to support his own
investment. The city of Ottawa, province of Ontario, and national government of Canada
subsidized the railroad to the total sum of $868,400.121 The total cost of the railroad was
roughly $3,200,000.122 Booth utilized government subsidies and favorable regulations
when it suited his business interests and he ignored them when they interfered with
business decisions that enhanced profits and undercut competitors. As an example, a few
years later (in 1903) Booth lobbied for protective legislation to prohibit the export of
unmanufactured pulpwood.

119

Benidickson, “John Rudolphus Booth (1827-1925),” 330.

120

The OAPS route directly through central Ontario threatened to shift further north the main Canadian
route for western exports, weakening Toronto’s position as a major commercial city and diminishing trade
throughout all of southern and southwestern Ontario. Regarding the possible construction of the OAPS, the
Council of the Toronto Board of Trade stated in 1893, “Your committed are strongly of the opinion that the
effect would be extremely disastrous, not only as far as Toronto is concerned, but other commercial centres
such as Hamilton, London, and Chatham, ports on Lake Ontario such as Whitby, Port Hope, Trenton, etc.,
and ports on Georgian bay, Collingwood, Owen Sound, Midland, Kincardine, and Wiarton would be
adversely affected.” The council’s statement continued with the argument that the Canadian government
should not provide any further financial assistance to the OAPS, which when completed “will seriously
affect the commercial interests of Toronto and Western Ontario” (see “The Board of Trade Council:
Adverse Report Upon the Ottawa, Arnprior & Parry Sound Railway -- Telegraphic Service in the Empire”
in The Globe (1844-1936); Toronto, Ont., March 2, 1893.).
121

“The Board of Trade Council: Adverse Report Upon the Ottawa, Arnprior & Parry Sound Railway -Telegraphic Service in the Empire,” The Globe (1844-1936); Toronto, Ont., March 2, 1893.
122

Stevens, Canadian National Railways Volume 2: Towards the Inevitable 1896-1922, 366–67.
59

Figure 5: The Booth Railway Network123
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As an owner of significant pulp and paper operations in Ottawa,Booth was concerned that
American pulp and paper businesses would come to dominate the manufacture of these
processes and decimate Ontario’s forests in the process.124 Legislation passed in 1873
prohibited dumping sawmill waste in waterways. Booth was convicted and fined for
violating this ban but continued the practice of dumping for decades afterward.125 He
cared little for labor regulations. In 1889, Booth testified to the Royal Commission on the
Relations of Labor and Capital that he had no knowledge of any government regulations
under the Ontario Factories Act.126 That Act was passed in 1884 and contained 41
clauses protecting the safety, health, and well-being of workers in manufacturing or
finishing operations, such as Booth’s lumber milling operations.127 Booth’s contempt for
regulations extended beyond his own workers, especially when those regulations stood in
the way of his business ventures. In 1895 he ordered surveyors from his railroad to
trespass onto the reserve lands of Parry Island and begin mapping out a route for his
railroad, even though entering onto reserve land required permission from the
Department of Indian Affairs under Canadian law. Over the following few years, Booth
repeatedly demonstrated disrespect for the wishes of indigenous people regarding control
and use of their land and other private property (see Chapter Three for more detail).
Booth did not just ignore government regulations that he found burdensome. He
was an autocratic owner who sought to maintain the maximum level of control over his
business operations. As shown by his disregard for environmental and labor regulations,
his domineering style meant that he did not tolerate attempts by other entities to control
how he conducted his enterprises. This disdain extended to union activities – in 1891 he
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broke a prolonged strike by millworkers by using police and militia suppression.128 It
also affected his financial philosophy. The timber industry featured a high degree of risk.
Rather than taking on a great degree of debt from banking houses or private investors,
Booth preferred to maintain sole proprietorship and control in as many business holdings
as possible.129 Booth operated as independently as he could in his business endeavors. He
only looked to government support when it directly benefitted him, and he balked at
attempts of outside forces to influence his decisions and operations.
Booth’s decision to construct a railroad link to Georgian Bay was thus not directly
dictated or orchestrated by any branch of government. He realized the economic
advantage of connecting the western end of his regional network to trade across the Great
Lakes, in particular the expanding international grain trade. Nonetheless, it aligned with
political goals at the national level, in particular the goal held by the Conservative
government of expanding transportation routes on an east-west axis across Canada, and
prevailing attitudes that regarded the property rights of indigenous people as meaningless
and an obstacle to economic progress.

1.5 Transportation Across Canada: Government Attitudes
and Policy
For much of the 19th century, capitalists in what would become Canada had desired
to integrate British North America into a broader North American economic system that
transcended the political border with the United States. However, by the mid-1860s, this
vision faded. The Canadian–American Reciprocity Treaty of 1854 was terminated by the
United States in 1866 due to a combination of protectionist sentiment and anger at Britain
for tacitly supporting the Confederacy during the Civil War.130 The need for the colonies
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of British North America to reorient their economic relationships was a major factor in
catalyzing Canadian Confederation in 1867.131 From its establishment, the national
government of Canada operated with the central purpose of forming and developing the
formerly separate colonies of British North America into a political and economic unit
integrated on a national basis. To achieve this goal, the diverse and geographically
scattered colonies had to be united economically.132 Transportation was a key element in
allowing economic connection between the Canadian provinces and territories, and the
development of the Canadian West was the most significant episode in the use of
transportation networks to integrate Canada economically in the late 19th century.
Within three years after Canadian Confederation in 1867, the Conservative national
government considered the development of the West as an urgent issue of national
policy.133 The American agricultural frontier moved closer to the international boundary
of the 49th parallel, and commerce was established between the Red River settlement and
St. Paul, MN, via river boat and cart.134 Events in the American Congress demonstrated
the attitude of many American national politicians that annexation of British territory
west of the 90th meridian (approximately all territory west of Lake Superior) was
inevitable.135 The American transcontinental railway network was expanding westward
and northward, threatening to establish American transportation as the dominant
economic connection to Canada’s western region and thus “Americanize” it in interests
and feelings.136 Canadian leaders were aware of the American threat and concluded that
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in response, a railway from central Canada to the Pacific Coast had to be built without
delay.137
Accordingly, the Conservative government guaranteed the commencement of a
Pacific Railway within two years of the union of British Columbia to Canada in July
1871 and its completion within 10 years.138 The line was ultimately constructed as a joint
venture between the Canadian Pacific Railway Company and the Canadian government
and opened for service in 1886.139 Protecting western Canadian territory from American
encroachment strongly influenced its route. The section connecting the extant central
Canadian railroad system to Fort Garry on the Red River was built entirely on Canadian
soil, even though this choice meant constructing tracks through the nearly impassable
terrain of the Canadian Shield to the north of Lake Superior when a route through
American territory to the south of the lakes would have avoided any major obstacles.140
The western section between the prairies and the Pacific Ocean was similarly
influenced. The railroad followed a southerly route over the semi-arid region of (what is
today) southern Alberta and the extremely difficult Kicking Horse Pass. A more northerly
route would have passed through far more arable land and crossed the Rocky Mountains
via Yellowhead Pass, the easiest route across the mountains. The rationale for the
southerly route was that it was much closer to the U.S. border and thus defended against
the intrusion of American railroads into Canadian territory.141 The Canadian railroad had
to serve as a defensive measure against American economic intrusion. Despite greater
difficulties in its construction and higher costs, there could be no doubt that an all-
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Canadian route that followed (and reinforced) the border was the only viable plan for a
Pacific railway.142
The impetus to defend Canadian territory from domination by American railroads
continued; in 1897, the Canadian Pacific Railroad constructed the Crow’s Nest Pass
branch into the Kootenay-Columbia Valleys of southern British Columbia in order to
ensure that supply and outward movement into that burgeoning mining region moved
over Canadian rail lines, instead of being drawn southward to American lines. Gaining
Canadian control over the region’s transportation was of such national importance that no
federal political party opposed a government subsidy for the construction of the branch
line.143
Transportation was a key element in Canadian national policy of the late 19th century,
and the construction of transcontinental railroads helped to assure economic unity
between eastern and western Canada. The impetus to ensure Canadian sovereignty over
the West influenced decisions to build railroads along routes that, despite higher costs
and more difficult terrain, provided a bulwark against American intrusion.
In relation to Depot Harbour, J.R. Booth was not motivated by a desire to facilitate
commerce across Canada at the expense of doing business in the United States. Yet in its
operation, his port effectively furthered the national policy goal of improving allCanadian transportation. Furthermore, Booth utilized government subsidies to help
finance the construction of his railroad. He took advantage of the nationalistic impetus to
expand the Canadian east-west transportation system. Having secured these subsidies and
commenced construction, Booth was faced with the decision of where exactly to place his
port terminus.
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1.6 Early Local History of Depot Harbour
By 1893, laborers were constructing the OAPS through the rugged highlands of
central Ontario. The only remaining major decision regarding the route was the location
of the lakeside port that would serve as the terminus and transshipment site on Georgian
Bay. The town of Parry Sound was a likely site. Since 1884, its citizens had been
working to create a railway between their town and the existing Northern and Pacific
Railway. This line ran parallel to the eastern shore of Georgian Bay but inland. The
intended juncture of the town’s railroad and the Northern and Pacific Line lay 35 miles
inland from Parry Sound.144 Part of the line was constructed, but only twenty miles were
complete by 1892 when insolvency halted construction and allowed J.R. Booth to acquire
the incomplete line in the spring of 1893.145
After the acquisition, Booth promised to fulfill the desires of Parry Sound’s
citizenry and construct his lake port in their town. The townspeople were pleased with his
supposed plan. The Parry Sound North Star claimed that “perseverance in the
prosecution of that enterprise [the town’s effort to obtain a rail link] led to its success,
and attracted the attention of capitalists until that shrewd, long headed, and enterprising
gentlemen, J.R. Booth, saw in our line a necessary link the completion of his great
scheme.”146 Continued progress on the construction of the railway prompted the
newspaper to claim “our citizens will soon be able to hear the whistle of the
locomotive.”147 These hopes were never realized. Booth bypassed Parry Sound to build
his port on Parry Island. In doing so, he created an entirely new community rather than
expanding an existing town. As the OAPS reached nearer to Georgian Bay, Booth
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negotiated with property owners in Parry Sound. The owners of the proposed port
demanded a price Booth felt to be excessive.148 He was further dissuaded from
terminating his line in Parry Sound when his chief railroad engineer deemed the available
port site less than ideal, since it was only accessible via an extremely steep grade.149
Booth had learned of the deep-water harbor on the north side of Parry Island; it was
considered the best natural harbor on the Great Lakes.150 Booth decided to move his port
to Parry Island.
Although the proposed site stood on the reserve land of the Parry Island Band,
Booth knew he had the legal advantage in appropriating the necessary acreage. An 1887
amendment to the Indian Act allowed railroad companies to expropriate reserve land,
provided it was used for railroad purposes.151 Furthermore, while the OAPS was not a
project planned or initiated by the government, it had already received hundreds of
thousands of dollars in government subsidies. Booth had no reason to believe that
authorities in Ottawa would side against him in his goal of annexing the needed land.
His confidence was such that he sent a team of surveyors onto Parry Island in
February 1895 to map out the rail route, despite having no permission from the reserve
band or the Department of Indian Affairs.152 The band protested the incursion of the
railroad over the course of that year, but the complaints yielded no concessions to the
indigenous population. By October, Booth’s railway had been granted the right of way
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and 314.26 acres for the port and town site.153 From the perspective of Parry Island’s
indigenous population, the incursion of the railroad accelerated economic shifts and
incursions of Euro-Canadian social and cultural customs into their way of life. The story
of these changes, and the impact of the creation of the port town on the local indigenous
population, is told in Chapter Three.
Within the confines of the Depot Harbour town site, the physical transformation
of the land began with the arrival of hundreds of workmen in 1895 to construct the harbor
facilities, grain elevator, and railroad lines. Over the next three years, these laborers
erected five thousand feet of docks, one 700’ by 80’ warehouse, one 600’ by 60’
warehouse, railway tracks, and a million-bushel grain elevator.154 To build these
facilities, the workers drove pilings into the lakebed and piled rubble on top of them to
provide a foundation for the warehouses. They extended the rail lines to the warehouses
on top of a 2,300 feet-long double-tracked railway trestle and constructed an additional
7,800 feet of railway platform. These facilities provided the port with the capacity to
handle a variety of freight including flour, livestock feed, and package freight such as
manufactured goods. Four lakes steamers could simultaneously tie up and transfer cargo
at the port. To handle rail-borne traffic to and from the site, the OAPS purchased modern
rail cars, each with a capacity of 1,000 bushels.155 These facilities were completed by the
beginning of the 1898 navigation season on the Great Lakes (early spring). Figure 6
depicts the harbor facilities of the new port.
The OAPS constructed Depot Harbour as a company town, meaning that it owned
the houses and communal institutions that supported its workers in addition to all of the
transportation facilities. Within this overarching framework of company control, a
significant community developed. By 1899, the company had constructed 57 houses and
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rented them to its labor force (see Figure 7 for an illustration of the town). The population
grew quickly, reaching 300 by October, and despite the dozens of houses that had been
erected, the housing supply did not keep up with the influx of workers.156 The
burgeoning population soon prompted the arrival of religious and commercial providers
and the organization of community institutions. These included a social lodge for railway
workers, a Presbyterian minister, a Methodist minister, and shoe salesmen.157 The
population began to include women and children in addition to the single men who had
made up the first group of railway workers to arrive.
In 1898, 20 families in Depot Harbour were associated with the Presbyterian Church
congregation.158 Within another year, a school had been built to educate the town’s
children.159
From its transportation facilities to its population and community institutions, J.R.
Booth’s new town transformed the rocky shore of Parry Island into a modern lake port
focused on the transportation industry. Its rapid flourishing was due to its immediate
prosperity as a grain export route. Starting with the very first cargoes of western wheat
that arrived on its docks, Depot Harbour demonstrated its potential to provide the best
export route through central Canada.
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Figure 6: Depot Harbour Harbor Facilities160
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Figure 7: Depot Harbour Townsite, 1899161
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1.7 Success as Grain Export Route
The first cargoes to be exported via the Depot Harbour route arrived in April
1898, and they established the new link as an attractive, competitive route from the upper
Great Lakes to the Atlantic Ocean. Within weeks of the opening of navigation on
Georgian Bay on April 17th, five schooners and lake steamers carrying cargoes of
between 21,000 bushels and 103,000 bushels of grain arrived at the port.162 The arrival of
the Lynn with 215,000 tons of corn from Chicago days later marked the largest cargo ever
delivered to a Canadian port by a single ship. The corn was carried to Montreal via 350
railroad cars. Newspaper coverage heralded the arrival of the Lynn’s cargo as proof that
the Depot Harbour route would spark competition between lake shipping routes. The
coverage announced that Chicago was the primary focal point from which the OAPS
intended to draw shipments, but its officials expected that they could also capture a large
share of Canadian grain exports moving east from Port Arthur and Fort William.163
Within 16 days of its arrival, the Lynn’s shipment reached Coteau Landing and was
transferred to barges for a short journey downriver to oceangoing ships at Montreal.164
The OAPS route offered the same pricing as competing Canadian lines but it carried
freight to tidewater in only five to seven days, the fastest available speed.165 The route
attracted attention from American shippers accustomed to exporting grain south through
the Gulf of Mexico. They announced that they would send “great quantities” through
Depot Harbour in the 1898 shipping season.166
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Great quantities of grain soon flowed through the port. One hundred and twentyfive vessels unloaded 10,000,000 bushels of grain over the course of the year. One of
those journeys, that of the Roman, illustrated the advantage of increased speed offered by
the OAPS route. The total travel time from Duluth to Liverpool (UK) via Depot Harbour
for its cargo of wheat was only 15 days. It marked a new speed record for shipping from
the interior of North America to European markets (for reference, the standard shipping
time only from Duluth to New York City was 15 days in 1899).167 From each of the
major upper Great Lakes ports, the OAPS route offered reduction in travel distance to
Montreal, relative to other available routes in Canada.168 The CAR contended that its
route offered the only Canadian route that could compete with the Erie Canal route
through Buffalo.169
To service his port’s lake-borne traffic, J.R. Booth established the Canada
Atlantic Transit Company of the United States and the Canada Atlantic Transit Company
of Canada to provide regular freighter service from upper lakes ports to Depot
Harbour.170 To service both railroad and lake shipping operations, Booth purchased
rolling stock and ships from the United States. From 1887 to 1902, the Pullman Company
of the United States furnished the CAR with parlor cars for its operations.171 The OAPS
was amalgamated into the CAR in 1899, and these cars were used on the Depot Harbour
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line.172 The Canada Atlantic Transit Company of the United States purchased three ships,
the Arthur Orr, George N. Orr, and Kearsarge. These vessels were constructed in
Chicago and sold by American shipping companies.173 While American and Canadian
shipping companies delivered cargoes to Depot Harbour, port operations also relied on
machinery from both countries. This utilization of commerce and equipment from both
sides of the border highlight the way in which the OAPS and CAR targeted resources and
markets in both countries to maximize the success of its port.
The CAR operated Depot Harbour as the railroad’s only lake port. This
arrangement meant that the company’s resources did not have to be divided between
multiple routes. Instead, they were focused on a single route, whereas other Canadian
railroads competing for the grain export trade were faced with having to divert rolling
stock amongst various routes, not all of which served the export trade. This advantage
held by the CAR made itself apparent in the 1899 navigation season, when investment in
its rolling stock allowed the Depot Harbour route to gain a greater share of the export
trade across Canada while its competitors were forced to divert their stock of rail cars.
In 1899, nearly 14,000,000 bushels of grain passed through Depot Harbour’s
elevator on their path eastward.174 To accommodate this influx, the CAR required
between 100 and 120 grain cars daily. By the fall, the elevators at Midland, ON, became
overtaxed due to a shortage of grain cars provided by the Grand Trunk Railway (GTR),
but the CAR possessed sufficient rolling stock for its route.175 The GTR and other
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national Canadian railroads diverted thousands of rail cars to Chicago and other western
cities, damaging the ability of their lakes ports to handle large volumes of grain.176 In
contrast, the CAR maintained adequate equipment on its Georgian Bay route to continue
to handle the grain export flow. During the 1899 shipping season, the amount of lakes
shipping capacity fell significantly short of the demand.177 This shortage would result in
temporary changes to maritime law on the Great Lakes that would allow American
shipping companies to carry grain between the Canadian Lakehead and Canadian ports.
Among the possible Canadian routes available, these shippers chose Depot Harbour as
their primary export route.
In October 1899, 4,000,000 bushels of wheat awaited shipment from the Canadian
Lakehead ports.178 Canadian shipping companies were hampered by their small stock of
ships.179 Since Canadian coasting laws prevented American ships from carrying cargoes
between two Canadian ports, American shipping companies were not able to alleviate the
congestion at the Canadian Lakehead by carrying cargoes to Ontario ports. Four hundred
grain cars arrived daily at the Lakehead, adding to the backlog. Farmers from the west
risked their harvest being stranded over the winter on the shores of Lake Superior, dealers
were reluctant to sign contracts for delivery, and buyers similarly hesitated due to fears
that grain could not reach tidewater for export before the close of navigation on the
lakes.180 The concerns of these factions increased political pressure on the Canadian
government to suspend coasting laws and allow American shippers to alleviate the
stockpile.
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On October 14th, the Minister of Finance produced a report supporting the
position that under the current arrangement of shipping regulations, Canadian and
American shipping appeared to be insufficient for moving the surplus of grain from the
Lakehead through Canadian routes to export. Canadian shippers were already operating
at over 100% capacity. The minister argued that American ships could carry the grain to
the primary American export hub of Buffalo. He accordingly recommended that the
coasting laws be suspended on the Great Lakes for the remainder of the year. 181 By
October 20th, the collectors of customs at Canadian lakes ports across the lakes received
instructions to allow such activity by American ships.182
This relaxation in coasting laws proved highly effective, but it was not Buffalo
that benefitted. In November, members of the Montreal Corn Exchange testified that
Midland, Collingwood, and Depot Harbour had become the primary distributing centers
for western wheat once the coasting laws were suspended. They declared that through
these Georgian Bay ports, their Montreal exchange could have done even more business
in western Canadian wheat if the laws had been relaxed earlier in the year. As it stood, in
1899, the Montreal Exchange did more business in Manitoba wheat than had been
conducted for years.183
Among all Canadian lake and rail ports, Depot Harbour was preeminent. It
handled 13,693,781 bushels of western grain in 1899. The GTR route through Midland
came in a distant second, handling 6,815,303 bushels. Among Canadian routes, the CAR
route exported the most grain through Montreal: 11,100,000 bushels; the Midland route
again came in second place with 3,500,000 bushels. Compared to all Canadian pathways,

181

“GRAIN CARRIERS: American Vessels May Engage in Canadian Trade,” The Globe (1844-1936),
October 17, 1899.
182

“Sessional Papers of the Dominion of Canada: Volume 13, Fifth Session of the Eighth Parliament,
Session 1900,” vol. 34 (Ottawa: S.E. Dawson, 1900), 13,
http://www.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.9_08052_34_13.
183

“THE CANADIAN GRAIN ROUTES: Beneficial Effects of the Suspension of the Coasting
Regulations,” The Globe (1844-1936), November 17, 1899.
76

the Depot Harbour route handled the majority of American grain exported from Chicago:
8,833,269 bushels out of 19,606,599 in total (~45%).184 Tables 1, 2, and 3 depict the
grain export values for Canadian transshipment ports in 1899. The ability of the CAR to
maintain an adequate supply of rail cars on its line while the GTR diverted its stock away
from Georgian Bay meant that Depot Harbour could offer more consistent transportation
than competing Canadian ports, so even when several Georgian Bay ports benefitted
from the inflow of western grain carried by American ships, Depot Harbour emerged as
the dominant port.
By its second year of operation, Depot Harbour had become the dominant grain
port in Ontario. Its success was influenced by the shorter, more rapid route it offered
across central Canada, but it was also determined by the fact that the CAR maintained its
resources on the Depot Harbour line whereas other railroads such as the GTR diverted
their rolling stock away from their lake ports. When conditions arose that allowed
American ships to service the Lakehead ports in addition to Chicago, Duluth, and other
U.S. grain ports, they favored the CAR route. Depot Harbour would not have been
successful without its advantageous geographic position, but that position alone did not
guarantee its success. The combination of regional ownership and regionally-oriented
management practices (CAR focus on the Georgian Bay – Ottawa – Montreal route)
framed its attractiveness and success as a grain port.
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Table 1: Western Grain Exported via Canadian Lake and Rail Ports, 1899185

Port

Bushels

Depot Harbour

13,693,781

Midland

6,815,303

Kingston

6,434,793

Sarnia

3,416,856

Owen Sound

2,620,177

Prescott

1,591,258

Goderich

865,132

Collingwood

236,292
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Table 2: Western Grain Exported via Montreal, using Canadian Lake and Rail
Ports, 1899186

Port

Bushels

Depot Harbour

11,100,000

Midland

4,500,000

Kingston

3,500,000

Owen Sound

1,500,000

Prescott

1,100,000
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Table 3: Grain shipped from Chicago through Canadian Routes, 1899187

Bushels
Shipped by all Canadian

19,606,599

Routes
Shipped via the Depot

8,833,269

Harbour Route

187
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Understanding the large volume of grain its port handled, the CAR announced in
January 1900 that its current infrastructure was inadequate and that it would build a
second elevator with a capacity of 1,500,000 bushels.188 However, the CAR never built
the elevator. This lack of expansion did not immediately impact the preeminence of its
port. In 1900, Depot Harbour handled a large volume of Canadian grain exports and
increased its share of wheat from Chicago. It took in 51.1% of wheat exported from
Chicago through Canadian lake ports. Even when the volume of wheat exported through
Canada on all-railroad routes was included, Depot Harbour handled 39.0% of all exports,
the largest single share (see Table 4).189 In the short term, the speed advantage of the
CAR route remained as well. In June 1901, it set a new speed record for transporting
cargo between Chicago and Montreal of five days.190
The town continued to expand in the early 1900s. Depot Harbour’s population
grew to 562 people by 1901, according to the Census of Canada.191 The residents of the
town were primarily Euro-Canadian, American, or Anglo-Celtic in origin. While
indigenous people worked for the railroad, only one person of “Indian” origin was listed
as residing within the port town. Male residents were listed as working in occupations
ranging from laborer (the most common) and millwright to engineer, cooper, and
conductor.192
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Table 4: Exports from Chicago through Canadian Routes, 1900193

Transshipment Port or Route

Bushels

Depot Harbour

3,089,381

Kingston

526,516

Prescott

152,934

Midland

1,725,000

Goderich

419,600

All-Rail Route through Canada

2,004,271

193
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Many of the railroad workers were living in shacks, so the CAR built 26 more houses in
1901, which increased the number of houses to over 100.194 Continued growth and
expansion demonstrated the upward economic trajectory for Depot Harbour in the very
first years of the 20th century.
In the longer term, however, the failure to expand port facilities beginning in 1900
marked an important first step in the relative decline of the port. This decision to not
invest in expansion at Depot Harbour stemmed from the same fact of regional ownership
that allowed the CAR to focus its resources on Depot Harbour. J.R. Booth’s focus on his
single Georgian Bay transportation link allowed the port to offer better service than ports
operated by other Canadian railroads. However, J.R. Booth possessed less capital and
resources than the larger railroads. The success of his railroad attracted the interest of
larger railroads that wanted to purchase the CAR line and the Canadian government,
which considered nationalizing the system. Rather than continue to compete against
national railroad systems while needing to focus his resources on his Ottawa timber
operations, Booth decided to withdraw from the railroad business by selling the CAR.

1.8 J.R. Booth: Ownership and Sale of the CAR
John Rudolphus Booth maintained a personal and almost total ownership in the
companies supporting the Depot Harbour route. When the Canada Atlantic Transit
Company was incorporated on June 13th, 1898, J.R. Booth and four close business
associates or family members owned the entire stock of 10,000 shares.195 Booth also
owned 99.8% (2,495 out of 2,500 shares) of the Canada Atlantic Transit Company of the
United States, and he controlled 98% of the stock of the CAR.196 The former company
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was one of the lakes shipping companies established to provide freighter service between
upper lakes ports and Depot Harbour, while the latter was the regional railroad that
operated from eastern Georgian Bay through the Ottawa River Valley, Montreal, and
connected with American railroads in northern Vermont. Booth was the majority
stockholder (by a significant margin) of both companies. He individually purchased two
ships at a cost of $440,000 and provided them to the American company.197 Between
1900 and 1903, he directly owned the steamer Ottawa that was operated by the Canadian
company.198
Because Booth effectively owned the CAR, he owned the entire town site of
Depot Harbour and its buildings. One resident stated that he owned “the people too.”199
While Booth was alleged to have fashioned Depot Harbour as “the Pullman of Canada”,
this description inaccurately portrayed Booth as having constructed his port town as an
endeavor in social engineering in addition to commercial activity.200 Pullman, Illinois,
was constructed by the railroad car magnate George M. Pullman as a model town that
would not only house his manufacturing workforce but also provide a social environment
isolated from (in his view) pernicious outside influences. Pullman provided modern,
clean, homes and community buildings, controlled which books were allowed in the town
library (banning those of Karl Marx, among others) and which forms of entertainment
were shown in the town theatre. He felt he could avoid unionization with this
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combination of providing this carefully curated combination of material comforts and
social influences.201
In contrast, Depot Harbour represented a purely commercial venture for J.R.
Booth. He maintained almost total ownership, but this was due to his generally autocratic
style of control and management of his companies, not an ideological desire for social
control of his labor force. He did not try to control the lives of Depot Harbor residents.
Booth constructed a Georgian Bay port simply because he needed a connection between
the lakes trade and his railroad. He was pragmatic in allowing outside social institutions
that served his workforce, such as allowing multiple religious groups to establish
congregations. He took advantage of all the available workforce on Parry Island. In
employing indigenous people from the reserve, Booth’s priority was to ensure an
adequate workforce, and this outweighed any racial bias.202 While it is true that Booth
disliked government regulations that protected workers and labor unions, he built his port
as a practical means to connect with the western export trade.
As long as the port was a profitable component of his business portfolio,
ownership and control remained in Booth’s interest. Within the first years of its
operation, its success in handling large volumes of grain demonstrated a need to expand
its port facilities. This required substantial investment by Booth. In 1899, Booth
petitioned the Dominion Government to fund an additional grain elevator, unloading
equipment, and improved ship channels. The government refused this request because
Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier desired to maintain the political backing of supporters of
the Intercolonial Railway, who sought to construct a new railway to the Canadian
Lakehead. Supporting the CAR route would have been supporting a rival to this proposed
railroad, so the request for funds was denied. This left Booth to privately finance these
improvements. In 1900, his ability to do so was hamstrung when a major fire destroyed
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many of his Ottawa lumber mills and 100,000,000 feet of finished timber. He was left in
a weak financial position to fund improvements and expansion of the port. Needing to
refocus attention and resources on his timber operations, Booth began for the first time to
consider selling the CAR.203 Canadian and American railroad companies were interested
in buying it. Faced with continuing to compete with these railroads or sell his railroad to
one of them, plus the need to focus investment back on his timber operations, a sale was
attractive.
The sale of Depot Harbour was a major turning point for the port because it
altered the conditions that had shaped its early success. Under ownership and
management by J.R. Booth, the CAR line from Georgian Bay to Ottawa connected to the
western grain trade but remained a line with a specific, regional export focus as an
improved connection between the upper Great Lakes and Montreal. The advantage of the
Depot Harbour route reinforces the importance of a shortened Great Lakes-Laurentian
route in Canada’s aim to control its western development and the specific significance of
Georgian Bay in that network.
Yet this early period for the port also demonstrates the importance of J.R. Booth.
He was a businessman and entrepreneur whose search for increased business opportunity
drove the creation and operation of the port. He constructed modern transportation
facilities and structures for his workers, and the whole of his focus on attracting western
commerce went to Depot Harbour. The transition in global trade toward intercontinental
movement of bulk commodities, the emergence of the North American interior as a
massive grain producing region, and the spirit of Canadian nationalism evident in
government support for his railroad positioned Booth’s venture for success. Yet the rapid
commercial success of Depot Harbour was contingent on Booth’s investment and support
in his port. Its construction as a company town focused entirely around transportation (as
opposed to an addition to Parry Sound or other established centers) allowed Booth to
control all business operations there, but it also singularly tied its economic fortune to the
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role it would play in the Canadian transportation network at large. When its ownership
changed, that role changed with it.
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2

National Ownership and Decline: Depot Harbour after
1904
The year 1904 does not mark a turning point in the annals of economic

globalization, the development of the Canadian wheat economy, or even the history of
the Canadian Great Lakes at-large. The global commodity economy drew increasingly
interconnected, the wheat economy of the Canadian Prairie West continued to boom, and
Canadian Great Lake shipowners expanded their fleets in response. While transit between
Lakes Superior, Michigan, Huron, and Erie was relatively seamless due to natural
waterways and modern canals, Lake Erie remained connected to Lake Ontario by only
the antiquated Welland Canal, meaning western export cargoes needed to be transshipped
in Ontario or the United States. This left the CAR route as the most direct Canadian
passage for exports. Despite all of these continuities, 1904 marked the beginning of
Depot Harbour’s decline from eminence in Ontario grain ports.
In that year, Booth sold the CAR to the Grand Trunk Railway. This sale was
completed after the decision was made to build two new transcontinental railroads rather
than focus on the proven lake-and-rail route. Depot Harbour thus avoided incorporation
into a government-owned national transportation system and was left for the GTR to
acquire. Ownership by the GTR placed Depot Harbour in a wholly new position relative
to the Canadian port and rail network. Rather than being managed as the single terminus
of a regional rail network, the railroad became one branch line for a massive national
railroad, and thus it competed against the other GTR ports on Georgian Bay for
investment and expansion. Within the GTR network, Depot Harbour was at a
disadvantage.
The company focused investment and expansion elsewhere. The decision to not
modernize and enlarge Depot Harbour was the first step in a series of decisions and
developments that led to the disappearance of the port. Chapter Two analyses these
developments. First, Depot Harbour became divorced from the overall tide of shipping
and railroad expansion across Canada, and it lost its leading position among Ontario grain
ports. Later, the retreat from global trade that began as part of the global economic
depression in the late 1920s splintered the international wheat economy, precluding
88

Depot Harbour’s potential economic recovery and ultimately leading to its abandonment
by 1945.

2.1 Sale to the Grand Trunk Railway
The first major attempt to purchase the CAR came from a conglomerate of
American railroads, of which the New York Central was the largest. In January of 1902,
the acquisition appeared to be complete. On January 29th, the Globe reported that “the
deal was completed this morning” and the Chicago Daily Tribune stated that “all that
remains...is the paying over of the cash.”204 The accounts stated that the CAR system was
to be incorporated into the network of the New York Central and Rutland Railroads, and
that new tracks would be laid to Sudbury, linking tracks to the Canadian Lakehead. Thus,
a continuous system from northwestern Ontario to New York and Boston would have
been created, all under American ownership and control. Ultimately, the deal between
this American syndicate and the CAR was not completed. Booth retained ownership for
the time being, but the failed sale did not deter his interest in selling the Depot Harbour
route.
He ultimately sold his railway in 1904 to the GTR, but between 1902 and 1904,
Depot Harbour featured in national debates regarding the best way to improve
transportation between central and western Canada. The debate resulted in the decision to
construct the National Transcontinental Railway. These debates demonstrated the
difference between the objectives and aims of the government and national railroad
companies, such as the GTR, and the CAR’s regional and specific focus. The national
railroads were caught up in a spirit of optimism and expansion, which set conditions for
later financial problems and the need for consolidation. In contrast, the CAR operated a
successful grain port and its regional focus on grain and timber exports through the
Ottawa Valley did not involve ambitions for national-level operations.
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The leadership of the Liberal government, in power since 1896, desired to
construct an additional railroad to the west. The national economy was doing well –
partly due to the rapid development of the prairie region – and public sentiment was
optimistic about the future and thus supported an almost unlimited expansion of
railways.205 Railway expansion was needed in certain areas of the west. Wheat exports
were an acute problem for the railroads, because there existed only a short period
between the crop harvest and the time when the exported wheat needed to arrive at
eastern ocean ports. Since this wheat passed through the Lake Superior ports, sufficient
capacity was needed to ensure reliable export transportation. At the turn of the century,
only one line of the CPR ran between the western hub of Winnipeg and the Canadian
Lakehead ports. Interruptions in service on that line in 1901 and 1902 negatively affected
all entities involved with the sale, financing, and export of the crop.206 The need for
additional capacity from Winnipeg to Lake Superior was thus apparent. It was addressed
when the Canadian Northern built a line from Winnipeg to Port Arthur that was
completed by 1902.207
However, an additional transcontinental line did not realistically promise
significant improvements in the capacity to export wheat, and this deficiency was argued
by several members of parliament who opposed the Liberal government’s plan for a new
long-haul railroad.208 A new rail link to the west offered potential benefits for existing
railroads. For the GTR, which operated only in Ontario and Quebec, and the Canadian
Northern, which operated only west of Port Arthur and Fort William, a transcontinental
line would allow them to capture the benefits of long haul traffic and access new regions
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of the country.209 If a new transcontinental line was to be built, the logical course of
action was to combine or connect those two lines in a co-operative arrangement.
However, the GTR wanted to buy out the Canadian Northern, while the western company
had no desire to be entirely subsumed. Rather than force a merger using its powers of
granting charters and subsidies, the Liberal cabinet decided to pursue an entirely new
plan of building a new, direct line to Canadian ports on the Atlantic that would carry
grain over an all-rail journey.210 By the time the proposed plan was introduced to
Parliament, the railroad had evolved into an ambitious scheme to construct a railroad all
the way from Moncton, NB, to the Pacific Coast. The line would travel northwest from
Quebec through mostly unexplored northern country and would not connect to the shores
of the Great Lakes, making it entirely divorced from lakes shipping. It was named the
National Transcontinental Railway (NTR). See Figure 8 for the route of the NTR.
Since the great lakes dominated the grain export trade, the impetus for the Liberal
cabinet to construct a new transport route that bypassed them was not the most logical
approach to realize the transportation of grain through Canada. Other Liberal politicians
recognized the value of the great lakes grain trade, including the success of the Depot
Harbour route. In 1900, Liberal MP John Charlton stated in parliamentary debate that the
capacity of the CAR to carry grain from Depot Harbour to Montreal “leaves nothing to be
desired, and leaves nothing that can possibly be attained in the shape of securing cheaper
transportation.” Speaking about the grain trade generally, he stated:
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Figure 8: Map of the National Transcontinental Railway, 1904211
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We are, of course, deeply interested in the subject. Canada desires to secure as
large a portion of this trade for her own seaports as possible, and the question with
us is, what is the best method to be adopted for the purpose of securing this trade.
I hold that we have in our own railway lines which reach the waters of the upper
lakes and the north-west, all the facilities and means necessary for solving this
problem, and securing the realization of our desires in this respect.212
This same sentiment of ensuring that Canada retained as large as possible a share of the
grain trade animated public opinion in 1902 when the CAR was allegedly going to be
sold to the American railroad syndicate. The government was urged “to nationalize the
road [the CAR] as part of a new transcontinental route” that would provide the
Intercontinental Railway a direct route from Halifax to the Great Lakes.213 The value of
the Great Lakes connection was recognized and the CAR route was acknowledged as a
premiere option for that connection.
This recognition extended to the Minister of Railways, A.G. Blair. As the Liberal
Cabinet formulated their plan for the NTR in 1902-1903, he remained highly skeptical of
the proposed railroad. Eventually, Blair resigned in protest of the proposal. In his
resignation speech of July 1903, he stated:
If we wanted to do something of advantage for the transportation of the country, if
we wanted to secure to our Canadian sea-ports the transportation of western
products, we would have extended the Intercolonial to Georgian Bay by acquiring
the Canada Atlantic…business can be brought from the western country by the
lake route and down over the Intercolonial Railway which will never, perhaps, be
brought by any other possible route that may be constructed in the country.214
Blair knew that the great lakes were a key link in export transportation, and that a single
new railroad that bypassed the lakes would not be able to provide a significant difference
in that trade. Even those who supported the NTR plan recognized the value of the Depot
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Harbour route. Senator J.P.B. Casgrain stated that at a carriage rate of ten cents, it offered
the best lake and rail option for carriage of wheat to Montreal. He acknowledged that the
NTR route would charge “a rate of something better than twelve and fourteen cents a
bushel” but argued that its competitive advantage was that it avoided high maritime
insurance rates and could operate year-round.215
Despite the lack of merit in building an entirely new railroad across the Canadian
shield from central Canada to the west, a lack that especially applied to its utility in the
grain trade, the NTR project was approved by Parliament and construction proceeded.
The government directly built the NTR line westward to Winnipeg, with the agreement
that the GTR would lease the line and operate railroad traffic on it at the conclusion of its
construction. The GTR secured the contract to construct the western section of the new
transcontinental railroad, which would be called the Grand Trunk Pacific Railway
(GTPR) but it was heavily financed by government loans.216 These new railroad projects
reflected a hubristic belief in continual growth in Canada, led by the development of the
west.217
There is no question that in the early 1900s, the Canadian railway system was
imperfect and required expansion.218 However, the scale and route of the NTR
demonstrated government policy and action based on a feeling of confidence in Canada,
not a careful consideration of the realities of export trade and transportation. The Great
Lakes offered the best transportation route to the west. True, it was closed to traffic
during the winter months, but lake ships directly connected western exports to Ontario
railroads and eastern export ports in a way that a new railroad travelling a circuitous route
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through uncharted wilderness away from the lakes to the north could not. Despite this
reality, an optimistic mood prevailed. “Parliament, the press, and businessmen all were
thinking in terms of progressive prosperity and rapid expansion. It was this spirit which
gave a grandiose character to the plan for providing additional railway facilities.”219
These sentiments fueled the approval of the NTR and GTRP projects. The government
plan thus bypassed the Great Lakes and the CAR.
Because the government scheme did not include the CAR route, J.R. Booth still
looked to sell his railroad. Possible buyers included the GTR, which continued to lack a
rail connection between its central Canadian system to the west. It had gained a western
subsidiary in the GTRP, but opportunity remained to strengthen its link between
Winnipeg and central Canada. The CAR route provided the best available Canadian
route between the Great Lakes and Montreal. This route included access to Ottawa,
which the GTR lacked.220 A sale of the CAR to the GTR thus proved an attractive
proposition to both parties, if the exact terms could be settled. They were, and the GTR
agreed to pay Booth a sum of $14,000,000 for the CAR. The sale was agreed to in
principle in August 1904 and the properties were formally transferred 14 months later.221

2.2 The Port under Ownership by the Grand Trunk and
Canadian National Railways, 1905-1928
For Depot Harbour, the direct result of the 1903 debate over the new national railroad
and its outcome - the approval of the NTR and GTPR lines - was that it became
incorporated into the GTR system in Ontario. This system included several other grain
ports, namely Sarnia, Goderich, Southampton, Owen Sound, Meaford, Collingwood, and
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Midland. Depot Harbour was still the nearest Ontario port to tidewater. It retained its
geographic advantage while part of the GTR system. However, it lost the advantage of
being the only port under the management of its owner.
When Booth owned Depot Harbour, he essentially had two choices regarding his port
town. If he wanted the CAR to remain competitive in the grain trade, he could continue to
actively seek improvement in the port. It was the only CAR grain port, so either it
functioned as a facility to transship grain, or it did not, in which case the entire system
would fail to attract grain exports. This was the case for Depot Harbour during its first
years of development and operation. If Booth decided not to compete in the grain trade,
he could sell his port, which he did when losses in his timber operations forced his
investment and attention away from the railroad system.
The GTR faced a different set of options in determining how and to what extent it
would operate in the grain export trade. In 1904, the entire CAR system encompassed
only 400.30 miles of tracks, while the GTR system spanned 3,126.13 miles of track,
making it the second largest railroad system in Canada behind the Canadian Pacific.
Rather than a regional transportation link possessing a single port and focused narrowly
on the export of a handful of commodities, the GTR owned extensive operations across
Ontario and Quebec, and its network extended into Atlantic Canada, New England, and
across Michigan to Chicago. With the acquisition of the CAR, it owned and operated
eight grain ports in Ontario. Outside of Depot Harbour, these ports were located on the
southern shore of Georgian Bay or the eastern shore of Lake Huron. The Depot Harbour
route was relatively isolated from the rest of the GTR system in Ontario. It offered a
more direct route through Ottawa to Montreal, and this was an attractive feature that
influenced its acquisition by the GTR. Its relatively separate routing, however, meant that
if the GTR decided to consolidate port operations, it could either focus attention on the
one port it operated on the northeastern shore of Georgian Bay, or it could focus on the
cluster of ports it operated to the south. Only the latter were constructed to connect to the
GTR’s main line that ran along the north shore of Lake Ontario to Montreal. See Figure 9
for an illustration of this situation.
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The position of the CAR line within the GTR system meant that the GTR could
continue to maintain and invest in shipping grain across Ontario from the Great Lakes to
tidewater ports without investing in the Depot Harbour route. Continued growth of grain
exports from the interior of North America meant that at the time of acquisition by the
GTR, there would be more than sufficient grain exports for all the GTR ports to handle.
In announcing the sale, the Globe argued that grain exports were growing at such a rate
that “within a few years” the GTR would have enough traffic for all its grain ports,
including Depot Harbour.222 This optimism was born out. Grain exports continued to
grow for two decades after the GTR took over the CAR. The transportation route for
these exports continued to be strained, and the lake and rail routes in Canada repeatedly
failed to provide sufficient capacity for the volume of exported grain. The relative decline
of Depot Harbour (see Table 5) was not caused by a downturn in its largest export
commodity.
Growth in the international wheat trade remained robust through the first three
decades of the 20th century. Between 1903 and 1929, the trade expanded 44%.223 The
international wheat trade expanded at an average annual rate of 3.2% from 1903 to 1913
and 5.9% from 1918 to 1931. The First World War of 1914-1918 caused a sharp descent
in the trade, but in the course of recovery from the war not only did the overall trade
return to steady growth but the United States, Canada, Argentina, Australia, and the
Punjab Region in India became important players in the global wheat trade. The war
caused a decline in European production and ended wheat exports from Russia, which
stimulated greater growth in North America and Australia.
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Figure 9: Map of Grand Trunk Railway System, 1901224
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Table 5: Grain Exports from Canadian Lakehead ports through Canadian Routes,
1904-1907 225

Year

1904

1905

1906

1907

Depot Harbour

7,109,528

9,067,510

5,246,243

5,677,280

Owen Sound

1,824,953

2,535,337

1,817,698

2,017,698

Midland

2,618,052

2,417,469

3,527,309

3,684,541

Collingwood

688,813

489,788

690,618

289,241

Point Edward

1,568,581

2,251,070

2,663,382

2,474,728

Meaford

1,615,334

596,913

1,468,084

1,335,408

Goderich

3,564,087

2,010,684

1,431,823

3,819,607

Total

18,989,348

19,368,771

16,845,157

19,298,503
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These regions increased their rate of production significantly – 46% between 1914 and
1925 – while production generally declined elsewhere in the world.226 The Canadian role
in this increase was significant. Canada only exported 4% of the world’s wheat supply in
1900, but by 1915 it supplied 16% and by 1923 it was the world’s largest supplier, a
position it would hold through 1929.227 In absolute terms, Canadian wheat exports
increased nearly 1200%, from an average volume of 24 million bushels in the period
1898-1902 to an average of 309 million bushels in the period 1925-1929.228 This
explosive growth was driven by wheat produced in the Canadian west. By 1917, the three
prairie provinces accounted for the entire volume of national wheat exports.229
The primary export path for these wheat exports continued to be the lake and rail
route across the Great Lakes. By 1913, the western Canadian export crop totaled about
~139,000,000 bushels. Of this total, ~130,000,000 bushels were exported via lakes
shipping from Port Arthur and Fort William and another ~7,800,000 bushels were
shipped from Duluth.230 Nearly 100% of wheat exports were moved through lake ports
on their journey to export markets. By 1923, ~296,000,000 bushels of western grain were
shipped over the lake and rail system from Port Arthur and Fort William.231
Canadian transportation routes remained inadequate to handle this volume of grain
exports. One aspect of this inadequacy was lake shipping. The Canadian lakes fleet grew
significantly between 1900 and 1914, approximately tripling in capacity from 12,993 tons
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to 36,488 tons.232 The Canadian fleet experienced another period of growth in the 1920s,
when Canadian shipowners added more than 200 vessels of 475,000 tons to their
fleets.233 However, even this degree of expansion could not keep up with the demand for
tonnage created by the growth of the grain trade. Since the Canadian merchant fleet was
insufficient to handle the Canadian crop, the American fleet had to be called into the
trade. However, due to coasting laws, American ships could only transport grain from the
Canadian Lakehead to American ports such as Buffalo. Another important shortcoming
in the Canadian routes was the insufficient capacity of Ontario grain elevators to
accommodate the large volume of grain.234 During the height of the shipping season,
Canadian lake grain elevators became “choked with grain” and grain carriers arriving at
Ontario ports had to wait in port until the elevators were relieved.235 The third
shortcoming in the Ontario grain handling system was a lack of railway rolling stock.
Railroad companies did not operate adequate numbers of rail cars to carry grain away
from lake elevators, which contributed to congestion in those elevators.
An example of the inadequacy of elevator and rail capacity occurred when the GTR
informed shippers on November 2, 1906 that it would no longer accept any export grain
at its Georgian Bay ports in that year. The navigation season for export from Montreal
did not close until November 15th, but the GTR could not complete transport to Montreal
before that date. The railroad already faced a backlog of nearly two weeks. Ships
commissioned for the Georgian Bay ports in 1906 handled 5,950,000 bushels per week
but in aggregate the grain elevators could only handle 3,395,000 bushels per week. This
discrepancy existed because the elevators were not large enough to store more grain and
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not enough rail cars were available to rapidly move grain away from the elevators.236
Elevator capacity did not keep up with the increase in grain exports. By 1916, the
elevators at the Canadian Lakehead possessed a capacity of 41,035,000 bushels but the
Georgian Bay elevators in aggregate had a capacity of only 12,800,000 bushels. This was
insufficient to handle the flow of western grain down the lakes.237 The disparity remained
into the 1920s. In 1925, the receiving capacity of all the Ontario elevators on Georgian
Bay, Lake Huron, and Lake Erie for receiving grain was less than one-third the capacity
of elevators on the upper lakes that loaded grain onto lake vessels for export.238
Thus, a major need existed for expanded and improved facilities at Georgian Bay
grain handling ports. Considering Depot Harbour strictly in relation to the business of
exporting grain, the port was positioned for expansion and a continued position as the
leading lake port. Yet soon after its acquisition by the GTR, its share of grain handling
began to decline and its preeminent position as the leading Ontario grain port was lost.
Initially, the changes were driven by financial decisions made by the GTR. The railroad
company invested in Depot Harbour to a level only sufficient enough to maintain and
replace existing infrastructure, rather than making the necessary expenditures to expand
the port’s capacity. In the same period, the GTR invested in its facilities at Midland,
prioritizing that port as its lake terminus of the future.
Once J.R. Booth began preparing to sell his railroad, he decreased investment in
maintaining and expanding railroad and port facilities. The CAR announced in 1900 that
it would build an additional grain elevator at Depot Harbour with a capacity of 1,500,000
bushels, but this was never completed under Booth’s ownership. The expansion that was
ultimately completed by the GTR in 1907 only offered an additional 1,000,000 bushel
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capacity, and was the final enlargement of the port’s grain facilities.239 The GTR did
invest in its newly acquired grain port, but during the first years of owning Depot
Harbour, the company invested most heavily elsewhere, specifically in its port complex
at Midland and Tiffin on the southern shore of Georgian Bay. By 1908, it had constructed
a new port facility at Tiffin with a concrete elevator that could accommodate 2,000,000
bushels. Two years later this facility possessed three elevators with a combined capacity
of over 4,000,000 bushels.240 The choice of the GTR to focus its grain port investments
at Tiffin was because the CAR route was largely separate and isolated from the rest of the
GTR system (refer again to Figure 9 for a map of this system).
The Depot Harbour route ran directly west to east from Georgian Bay to Ottawa. This
layout meant that it was the most direct route from the upper Great Lakes to Montreal,
but it also meant that the port lacked a southward link to the main trunk line of the GTR.
Such a link would not have provided Depot Harbour with any advantage in the grain
export trade, since cargoes travelling along it would have travelled a longer, more
circuitous route to a tidewater port, obviating the competitive advantage of the port.
However, under GTR ownership, this missing connection to the trunk line meant that the
former CAR path was a detached branch line. Depot Harbour could still handle grain
exports and send them onward to Ottawa and Montreal, and profits from such business
could add to the bottom line of the GTR. However, the port could not add an additional
branch to the main network of the railroad, and it was thus not an attractive target for the
GTR to invest in as the grain port of the future. The shorter export route provided by
Depot Harbour proved to be a disadvantage for port when it came under GTR control.
The condition of Depot Harbour’s facilities in 1905 required investment by its
ownership, but this investment was recognized by the GTR at the time of the sale.
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Because J.R. Booth had neglected improvements in the infrastructure of Depot Harbour
for several years, at the time of the GTR acquisition in 1905 the system was “down-atheel and in need of large expenditures for rehabilitation and re-equipment.”241 In the
process of finalizing its purchase, the GTR reserved between $1,000,000 and $3,000,000
in bonds for such outlays.242 While the capacity of the grain elevator was expanded, the
majority of the money invested by the GTR in the Depot Harbour route went toward
replacing or maintaining existing facilities on the former CAR route. The GTR made the
investments that were necessary to maintain service through Depot Harbour, but they did
not prove sufficient to allow for profitable operation of the route, let alone keeping Depot
Harbour as the leading Ontario grain port.
Between 1896 and 1905, the CAR under the ownership of J.R. Booth posted annual
profits averaging $367,000 and the port captured the largest share of the western grain
trade, relative to all Ontario ports.243 Within the first two years of operation by the GTR,
its share of grain traffic began to decline. Table 5 (see page 96) shows this loss in grain
traffic from the Canadian Lakehead. The GTR continued to need to invest in maintaining
existing facilities on the former CAR route, including replacing the railroad bridge that
connected Parry Island to the mainland shore of Georgian Bay, a rebuilding project that
lasted from 1912 to 1914.244 Besides the expansion of the grain elevator – an expansion
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that was smaller than initially planned under Booth’s ownership – the investments made
by the GTR only maintained the same transport capacity as had been present during the
period up to 1905. By 1913 and 1914, the former CAR line posted losses of $599,000 and
$830,000, respectively.245 During the first ten years owning the former Booth line, the
GTR lost over $4,000,000 on the route. Meanwhile, by 1913, Depot Harbour handled
only 2,963,915 bushels of western Canadian grain while Midland and Tiffin together
transshipped 12,269,728.246
The GTR had ostensibly been given access to long-haul railroad traffic from western
Canada when it was granted the lease of the National Transcontinental Railway route
eastward from Winnipeg and the construction and operation contract for the Grand Trunk
Pacific Railway from Winnipeg to the Pacific Ocean. However, the GTR continued to
rely on its network in central Canada for profitable operations. The entire new railroad
line from Quebec City to the Pacific Ocean was completed for operation by 1914, but the
GTR refused to honor its lease on the Winnipeg-Quebec City section due to its cost being
200% higher than originally stated.247 Profits from the Grand Trunk Pacific Railway
never proved significant for the GTR, due to a combination of factors that included a
failure to develop port facilities at its Pacific Ocean terminus of Prince Rupert, an
inadequate system of feeder lines, and competition from the Canadian Northern.248 The
GTR continued to rely on transporting cargoes from the region around the Great Lakes to
Atlantic ports, which accounted for 70% of its profits by 1917.249 Thus, the railroad’s
financial problems extended beyond Depot Harbour and the former CAR network to
western Canada. The Ontario region served by the lines that competed with Depot
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Harbour was actually its most profitable, whereas its expansions beyond central and
southern Ontario burdened it with high costs and unprofitable operations.
In the period after the GTR began to focus on other grain ports, life for the
townspeople of Depot Harbour suffered. The GTR provided inferior community services
relative to J.R. Booth. Whereas over 2,275 tons of fresh ice were stored annually in the
town during its early years, GTR management significantly cut back on this supply.
Electricity was only supplied to areas inhabited by more economically privileged people
while the remainder of the community used coal-oil lamps. Similarly, wealthier
neighborhoods were provided with concrete sidewalks while areas occupied by bluecollar laborers were left with deteriorating cinder block paths and boardwalks. 250 J.R.
Booth built his lakeside town with modern amenities throughout, but they were reduced
or removed for many inhabitants by the GTR. The situation grew worse through the
1910s, and by 1921 infrastructure had deteriorated to the extent that contamination in the
water supply led to an outbreak of typhoid fever.251 The number of people suffering
under these worsening conditions increased through the 1910s. From an official
population of 562 in 1901, the citizenry had grown to 657 in 1911 and 1,242 in 1921.252
This population continued to rely on the transportation business as the economic
base of the community. The community was located on an island whose only natural
resources were limited timberlands, and nearby Parry Sound was already a center for the
timber milling industry. Even if its inhabitants had desired to expand into other industrial
or commercial ventures, the GTR continued to own all of the land that had originally
been appropriated by J.R. Booth from the Parry Island Reserve. The railroad did not
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choose to invest in diversifying the economy of Depot Harbour, essentially restricting
avenues of business to those that could be handled by the port.
Outside of commodities transportation, commercial possibilities for the port were
limited. Depot Harbour potentially could have served as a minor conduit for migration
between the United States and Canada, albeit other larger ports and border towns offered
easier access between the two countries. While a part-time immigration inspector was
stationed there beginning in 1909, the records of the immigration office reflect that no
direct passenger service occurred between U.S. ports and Depot Harbour, and virtually no
people were processed entering Canada from the multitude of freight ships. The inspector
stated “an average number of 82 freight steamers from Chicago, Milwaukee, Duluth, and
Detroit call[ed] [t]here each season and 42 calls [were] from regular and 40 from freight
tramps.”253 From 1909 to 1914, two men were recorded as having entered Canada
through Depot Harbour and four were denied entry.254 Virtually no one used, or
attempted to use, the port as an entry point into Canada. Its port was only used for the
transportation of goods, not people, thus it remained dominated by the commodity
transportation business and remained dependent on the decisions made by its ownership
regarding its grain facilities and transshipment activities.
In the years immediately following its acquisition by the GTR, the Depot Harbour
route effectively became a branch line that operated independently of a main trunk line
and its subsidiary feeder railroads. Because the former CAR system was not treated as a
central link in the overall GTR network, it was vulnerable to further diminishment when
the overbuilt Canadian railroad system, including the GTR, were pushed by financial
difficulties towards nationalization and consolidation.
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The construction of the Grand Trunk Pacific Railway and the National
Transcontinental Railway were merely two (albeit major) examples of railroad expansion
in Canada during the period between 1900 and 1914 when the total mileage in operation
nearly doubled.255 By 1915, Canada was left with an overbuilt railroad system that was
excessive relative to its needs and population.256 The country had over 30,000 miles of
tracks but a population of less than 9,000,000, meaning that there was one mile of
railroad track for every 250 Canadians (1:250). In comparison, the corresponding ratio in
the United States was 1:400, in Great Britain 1:2000, and in Russia 1:4000.257 The spirit
of “unbounded optimism” that had fueled this frenzy of expansion in the early years of
the century collapsed under its material excess by the middle of the 1910s.258
The GTR expanded its infrastructure across the west through the Grand Trunk Pacific
Railway, but the GTPR had not yet established the necessary traffic to make this major
expenditure cost effective, thus the GTR required an ongoing stream of outside capital to
finance its operations. There were three major sources of financing: the London money
market, the New York money market, and loans from the Canadian government. After
1912, the London market became unwilling to continue lending and the New York
market only offered smaller loans at higher interest rates. By 1916, when further loans to
the GTR were proposed, Parliament realized that it needed to properly evaluate its
relationship to the railroads it was financially supporting and ensure that those railroads
were being managed in a responsible, tenable manner that would not pose a risk to the
credit of the Canadian government, since it had already provided several hundreds of
millions of dollars in financial support.259 Given the additional urgency of maintaining
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operational railroads as the First World War continued, the government sought to ensure
that the GTR did not collapse. The government also aimed to find a more sustainable
solution than simply providing additional loans to the railroad.260 By 1917, municipal,
provincial, and federal financial support for the CPR, the GTR, and the Canadian
Northern had reached over $640,000,000 in loans.261
A Royal Commission was appointed in 1916 to study the railroad issue and provide
possible solutions. The Commission reported its findings in 1917 and stated a majority
opinion that the GTR, GTPR, and Canadian Northern be combined into a single system.
However, the commission was opposed to the idea of these three railroads being acquired
and operated by the CPR, on the grounds that such an action would result in a railway
monopoly across Canada.262 Over the next six years, the Grand Trunk Pacific, Grand
Trunk, and Canadian National were taken under government ownership and operation.
They all became part of a state railway system called the Canadian National Railways
(CNR) by 1923. In October 1919, two acts of Parliament and an agreement set the
acquisition of the GTR and its subsidiaries by the government in motion. However, due
to arbitration over the value of the stock, the actual transition to full CNR management
took place in stages over the next four years. In 1920, the company came under
management of a temporary board made up of both CNR and GTR representatives; in
1921, the head office was moved to Canada and the English directorate of the company
resigned; and finally in 1923 an act to incorporate the CNR was passed and the GTR
came fully under the same board of management as the CNR.263
The CNR began its operations with significant obstacles, as argued by historian A.W.
Currie who said “few companies ever began operations under greater handicaps than the
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Canadian National. It was a conglomeration of several lines, ill coordinated, often
competitive with each other, poorly equipped, sometimes badly built…the new system
had a truly stupendous debt.”264 The CNR competed against the advantageously
positioned, well-managed, and financially healthy Canadian Pacific.265 In ten of its first
years of operation, between 1921 and 1931, the CNR amassed losses of $546,000,000.266
In parts of Canada, the Canadian Northern, GTPR, and GTR had built competing
railroad systems that offered similar services. The CNR was faced with attempting to
unify the web of lines it had inherited from these companies. The general management
approach employed by Sir Henry Thornton, the president and chairman of the CNR until
1932, was to reduce operating mileage and consolidate service where possible.267 The
company looked to operate more cost-effectively in these areas. Where two sets of rails
closely paralleled one another, the CNR consolidated service by tearing up one set of
tracks. This approach was utilized in multiple locations in western Canada. West of
Edmonton, Canadian Northern and Grand Trunk Pacific Lines ran in parallel toward
Yellowhead Pass. Over 100 miles of GTPR track and 100 miles of Canadian Northern
tracks were removed in the section to consolidate service.268
The same impetus toward consolidation and improvements toward efficiency applied
in the region around Georgian Bay. As the CNR looked to streamline service in this
region in the 1920s, the condition of port facilities influenced decisions about which ports
they would continue to operate and which they would close. In 1922, the GTR leased the
grain elevator at Depot Harbour to the Armour Grain Company of New Jersey for ten
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years. The conditions of the deal confirm the dilapidated condition of the elevator. It
provided for $100,000 in investments to the elevator, including repairs, new machinery,
and an additional marine tower (which would increase its ability to handle ship
unloading).269 The elevator was lacking in maintenance and upkeep.
Negotiations between the lessor and lessee also showed that the elevator was more
likely to be destroyed in a fire than more modern, concrete elevators such as those at
other CNR ports on Georgian Bay. Fire insurance rates for the older wood and metal
elevator at Depot Harbour were $2.98 per $100 worth of grain, whereas at the main
concrete Midland-Tiffin elevators they were only $0.20. Representatives of the railroad
and the elevator company both held the opinion that grain could only be attracted to
Depot Harbour (versus Midland, Port McNicoll, and other ports) if the higher fire
insurance rate could be mitigated. Toward this goal, the Armour Grain Company agreed
to cover the difference between the $2.98 rate and the $0.20 rate for the first ten days that
grain was held in the Depot Harbour elevator. If grain was held longer than 10 days, such
a delay was due to the failure of the GTR to supply cars in a reasonable timeframe to haul
away the grain, thus the GTR assumed the equalization payments at that point in time.270
The terms of the elevator lease stated that the Armour Company would charge rates that
were “as liberal as those in effect at other Georgian Bay elevator ports,” which made it
necessary for the GTR and Armour Company to make up the cost difference.271
Despite the cost involved in allowing grain to sit in the elevator for extended periods,
the general superintendent of the railroad car service stated days later that the
arrangement regarding fire insurance equalization payments “places upon the car service
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department a responsibility which it cannot assume.”272 Even with the burden of
maintaining equalization payments, the railroad could not guarantee that it would send
adequate numbers of rail cars to Depot Harbour. The GTR was still providing enough
support to Depot Harbour to allow it to continue to function as a grain port, but it was
neither prioritizing the port as a major grain hub nor investing in its future.
By 1925, the inferior port facilities and relative isolation of this route put it firmly
in a subordinate position in the CNR system. In that year, total port operations at Midland
provided earnings of over $3,100,000 while Depot Harbour only contributed
$113,000.273 With the CNR fully in control, the company’s goal of consolidating service
catalyzed an examination to consider moving all Depot Harbour operations to Midland.
The company commissioned a report to consider the current port facilities at both ports,
the improvements required at Midland that would allow for all of Depot Harbour’s traffic
to be transferred there, and the potential cost savings provided by consolidation. The
report advocated maintenance of the status quo for the time being, stating that “the
present elevator and equipment [at Depot Harbour] should be good for the next five
years, with ordinary maintenance expense, approximately $3,000 per year.”274 Over
$1,650,000 would have to be invested at Midland to expand its facilities to accommodate
the business currently handled at Depot Harbour, and investment would result in an
annual deficit of $56,511 given all income and expenses of operating out of the single
port. However, the report recognized that, omitting the new facilities, operating solely out
of Midland would be cheaper – a net operational savings of $56,767 – and that moving
all operations to Midland would result in no loss in traffic. Given this set of projections,
the CNR decided to retain current activities in Depot Harbour but stated that significant
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maintenance or renewal of the facilities at Midland would require re-examination of the
move to Midland.275
Because Depot Harbour remained a company town, the CNR funded almost all
infrastructure and community services. Among these were schools, residential
construction, utilities, the hotel, town doctor, and stores.276 The remote nature of the
town offered some advantages from the perspective of the railroad. It held the opinion
that the labour force was “adequate and not difficult to handle, due to the fact that they
are more or less isolated from large labour centers.”277 Nonetheless, the expense of
providing the wide range of services contributed to the potential cost savings of
consolidating all port services at Midland.
The bias toward Midland was again expressed in early 1927. The CNR more
plainly stated the inadequacies of the Depot Harbour infrastructure and its unwillingness
to invest in them:
We all know that the elevator at that point is an old structure and may be burned
down at any time. The docks and sheds are all right for a few years, but there is no
doubt they will require to be rebuilt within a comparatively short time. When this
occurs, if it is desirable to duplicate the facilities at all, the chances are it would be
more economical to duplicate them at Midland. It is my understanding that the
proposal to install a sprinkler system at Depot Harbour had been turned down. I
agree with this.278
The decision was effectively made to abandon Depot Harbour. The port’s most
significant shortcomings by the late 1920s were its outmoded facilities and the fire risk
they incurred. The company that owned and operated it displayed no interest in even
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providing a sprinkler system that would reduce the risk of fire, let alone modernizing the
facilities themselves. Consolidation of grain facilities at Midland was on the horizon. In
1928, the CNR shut down the railroad roundhouse, office, and mechanic shops at Depot
Harbour and moved them a few miles away to South Parry, a location on the main line of
the CNR.279
Despite the growth of Canadian wheat exports and Canadian lakes shipping in the
period 1904 to 1928, Depot Harbour stagnated, became outdated, and ultimately lost the
confidence of its ownership as a lake terminus with a viable long-term future. Its transfer
to the GTR in 1904 was the catalyst for this outcome. Operation under the GTR directly
exposed the port to developments across the entire system of Canadian railroads and
ports to a degree that it had never been while under Booth’s ownership. Whereas Depot
Harbour had been the single point of connection to the west for the independently
operated CAR, the GTR had no vested interest in Depot Harbour specifically. By 1928,
neglect of Depot Harbour left it vulnerable to abandonment.

2.3 Collapse of International Trade and the Final Years of
the Grain Port, 1929-1945
Between 1929 and 1933, global trade collapsed, and overseas wheat markets contracted.
In the period from the First World War into the early 1920s, North American grain
farmers had increased their share of the European market, but by the late 1920s most
European countries (in an effort to protect domestic farmers) raised tariffs. The Soviet
Union began to export wheat again in 1928-1929, adding additional supply to the world
market.280 The price of grain crashed, and the cost of transportation increased.
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In the period 1928-1932, the price of transporting wheat from Winnipeg to London
increased 79.9% and the price increased 40.7% on the Chicago to London route.281 From
1924 to 1928, wheat exports comprised 72.7% of all Canadian exports, but in the period
1928-1932 that percentage dropped to 66.7%.282 In absolute terms, the quantity of
Canadian wheat exported in that period declined by over 31 million bushels.283 The price
of wheat collapsed: between 1927 and 1933, the price per bushel decreased from 146.3
cents to 68.1 cents.284 The shipping industry suffered a corresponding decline.
By the end of 1931, about 18,000,000 tons of vessels were laid up in port,
representing about 20% of world tonnage.285 On the Great Lakes between 1928 and
1932, the number of ships operating decreased 10% from 1,412 to 1,266.286 In 1934,
approximately 181,000,000 bushels of wheat were shipped eastward from Fort William
and Port Arthur via lake freighter, a 49% decrease from the ~296,000,000 bushels
shipped in 1923.287
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The shipping industry was not the only mode of transportation to suffer from the
economic downturn. The Canadian National Railways, from its origin a collection of
financially troubled railroads, faced annual losses that reached $112,000,000 – an amount
equivalent to over one-third of the entire annual revenue of the Dominion government.
The CNR enacted cost-cutting measures, but the railway system still managed to amass
over $3,000,000,000 in funded debt by 1935.288
Even if the CNR had changed its position regarding the future of Depot Harbour,
the company was in a poor financial position to invest in improving or expanding the
port. The one remaining advantage of Depot Harbour was its geographic position – it still
offered a shorter export route to Montreal than Midland or any other Georgian Bay port.
However, this remaining advantage was eliminated in 1933. In the spring of that year, an
ice flow in Algonquin Park damaged a trestle on the railroad line to Depot Harbour,
making it unusable by trains. The CNR asked the federal government and the government
of Ontario for funds to repair the trestle. Facing tight financial constraints, the federal
government denied the request.289 The provincial government was focused on expanding
automobile routes rather than repairing a minor rail connection and it chose to subsidize
the construction of highway 60 through the region instead of providing funds to the
railroad.290 Without government support for the trestle work, the debt-saddled CNR was
not in a good position to finance the restoration itself and chose not to carry out the work.
The loss of the direct rail route from Depot Harbour eastward removed any
remaining rationale for reviving the port. The outdated port facilities remained in use, but
they attracted little commerce. In May of 1935, William Smith, collector of records for
the Department of Immigration and Colonization, reported that “there has been very little
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activity in the grain business since 1928.”291 He stated that 900,000 bushels of grain were
present in the elevator at that time and that 100,000 bushels of corn and 200,000 bushels
of oats had been shipped out in the current navigation season, after awaiting transit from
Depot Harbour since 1933. The Kearsarge had been tied up at the port since 1933. It was
one of the original ships purchased by the Canada Atlantic Transit Company of the
United States in 1899 and still operated on the lakes trade.292
Smith went on to describe how the port had received 74 visits by freighters in the
preceding year, but that 66 of those visits had been by only three ships. The three ships
were all owned by the Canada Atlantic Transit Company of the United States or the
Canada Atlantic Transit Company of Canada, which were originally established in the
late 1890s to convey cargo specifically to J.R. Booth’s port. 293 In 1934, the Canada
Atlantic Transit Company of the United States delivered only 368,000 bushels of wheat
to the port. The company was losing money. In 1934 and 1935, it reported net deficits of
$47,943 and $33,342. 294 Of the 11% of visits by ships not from the Canada Atlantic
Transit Companies, four visits were by ships carrying coal and only one ship delivered
grain.295 The grain commerce of Depot Harbour had diminished to the point that grain
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waited multiple seasons simply to be exported away from the grain elevator and one of
the companies dedicated to providing shipping for the port had one of its freighters tied
up in port for years.
The community suffered alongside the grain industry. By the mid-1930s, the only
remaining structures were a group of houses, a truck shop, a train maintenance shop, the
railroad station, a store, a school, and a boarding house. The boarding house burned down
in 1936 and was not rebuilt. The community offered little economic opportunity, and by
1935 its younger people were leaving for other communities with a brighter future.296
The economic fortunes of Depot Harbour remained gloomy even after grain
traffic to Georgian Bay ports picked up slightly after the nadir of the Great Depression.
For example, by 1940 the Canada Atlantic Company of the United States shipped
3,230,000 bushels of grain eastward. However, these cargoes were carried only to
Midland and Owen Sound. Even the shipping company originally established to service
Depot Harbour had shifted its focus to other ports. The company soon fell victim to
financial difficulties. Its operational loss for the year 1940 was ~$87,000 and this
worsened the deficit of over $2,000,000 that the company had accumulated in operations
between 1905 and 1939.297 By 1940, the Delwarnic and Canatco were the only
remaining freighters with regular service to Depot Harbour. They were withdrawn from
this service in the middle of 1941 and sent to the West Indies.298 The end of the regular
ship service marked the end of the grain trade at Depot Harbour. The CNR planned to
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maintain the port as a small coal transshipment point, so it decided to dismantle the grain
elevator and replace it with a structure for loading rail cars with coal.299
The destruction of the grain elevator in an explosion and fire in 1945 marked the
end to Depot Harbour’s history as a grain port. In August, the building was being
dismantled by a salvage and wrecking company. Approximately 25% was demolished by
August 14th, when a fire broke out in the elevator and soon spread to the freight sheds,
which housed explosive materials to be used in the Second World War. The resultant
explosion destroyed the freight sheds and elevator and caused between $3,000,000 and
$4,000,000 in damages.300 Depot Harbour lost the last vestige of its original and once
dominant industry, and the grain port which only 40 years before gathered attention as a
leading export link lay in ruins.
Meanwhile, other Georgian Bay grain ports continued to be heavy recipients of
western wheat cargoes. During the Second World War, as Depot Harbour was
abandoned, the bay ports collectively gained additional wheat shipments that normally
would have been moved through Buffalo or Port Colborne. They attracted these cargoes
because they continued to offer a shortened export route compared to transportation down
Lake Erie, thus allowing ships to spend less time per journey.301 The geographic
advantage of the Georgian Bay grain export route remained, but Depot Harbour no longer
shared in its commerce.
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Economic activity at the port lingered between 1945 and 1951 in the form of a
small coal trans-shipping business operated by the Century Coal Company. During these
six years, the town retained inhabitants, but when coal operations ceased in 1951, the
CNR sold off the remaining buildings in town for building materials.302 Some of the
structures remained standing into the 1950s (see Figures 10, 11, 12, 13), but the town
ceased to exist as a functional community. The final use of the port was for the shipment
of iron ore from the Moose Mountain Mine, approximately 80 miles to the north. This
operation lasted from 1959 to 1979, but by this time the port workers commuted from
Parry Sound.303 By 1965, the only remaining building was the Catholic Church and the
ruins of the railroad roundhouse and water tank.304 The church burned down in the latter
half of the 1960s.305 Since the termination of port activity, the Parry Island Band
attempted to regain ownership and control over the Depot Harbour site, and this effort
continues today (see Chapter Three). The physical signs of the once bustling port became
faded and overgrown; they are today limited to a few concrete shells of railroad buildings
and sections of the harbor docks.
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Figure 10: Depot Harbour Townsite, 1953306
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Figure 11: Depot Harbour Townsite and Docks, 1953 307
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Photographs of Depot Harbour Townsite.
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Figure 12: Remaining Homes in Depot Harbour, 1953 308
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Photographs of Depot Harbour Townsite.
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Figure 13: Remaining Homes and Debris in Depot Harbour, 1954 309
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Looking at the overall trajectory of Depot Harbour from its sale to the Grand
Trunk Railway in 1904 to its demise as a grain port in 1945, it is clear that 1904 marked a
critical turning point. Beginning in that year, the port became detached from the
continued expansion of the Canadian Great Lakes grain trade, merchant fleet, and the
international wheat economy. Its sale to the Grand Trunk Railway positioned it
unfavorably within the GTR system, and as a result Midland’s port facilities were
expanded instead of those at Depot Harbour. Under GTR ownership, port facilities
remained outdated and undersized even as grain exports continued to increase and the
Canadian Great Lakes fleet continued to grow. Depot Harbour’s status as part of the GTR
meant that it was nationalized into the Canadian National Railway system. Since its
facilities had deteriorated, the CNR ultimately felt that the port’s future was limited to the
lifespan of its aging infrastructure – it would not be revitalized. Finally, the national and
global economic depression that began in 1929 set the conditions under which the direct
rail link to Montreal was not repaired. Thus, even when the Second World War caused an
increase in grain traffic to Georgian Bay ports, Depot Harbour’s docks stood empty and
by the end of the war its facilities were destroyed.
Depot Harbour was a grain port and company town centered around the
transshipment of western wheat to world markets. It offered the most direct link in
Canada between the upper Great Lakes and an ocean port. Assuming a globalized world
where the effects of technology, transportation, and economics transcended political
boundaries, the development of this port on the shores of Georgian Bay would have been
determined solely by the state of the wheat trade. However, its decline and abandonment
between 1904 and 1945 demonstrate the enormous influence caused by developments
specific to the Canadian railway system. One of the key developments was the
nationalization caused by the overbuilding of the national railroad network in Canada,
which was a problem rooted in Canadian nationalistic sentiment, not international market
forces. The deterioration of Depot Harbour can only be understood by incorporating both
the effect of the globalization wheat commodity trade and the way in which ideological
currents common to nationalistic Canadians impacted transportation across the country.
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3

The Grain Trade and the Parry Island Indigenous
Community
Parry Island was drawn into the orbit of the international economy by the arrival

of the Ottawa, Arnprior, and Parry Sound Railway in 1895, but the island was already
home to a permanent population of indigenous people (what is today the Wasauksing
First Nation). The creation of the Depot Harbour grain transportation route required the
forceful appropriation of land from this community, and its operation influenced a shift
toward a wage labor-based economy. Chapters One and Two focused on the factors
responsible for the creation, success, decline, and disappearance of the Depot Harbour
grain port. Yet these factors did not act upon an empty landscape on Parry Island – the
railroad arrived into the middle of a half-century old reserve community. Examining the
impact of the grain trade upon the indigenous community demonstrates that, while Depot
Harbour improved the Canadian transportation network and provided an economic base
for a new town, it also required an intrusion into an existing community that did not
desire its presence.
Chapter Three considers the impact of the grain trade on the indigenous
population of Parry Island. It first establishes the history of the community there, from its
creation in 1850 through the forty-five years leading up to the arrival of the railroad. The
lives of the indigenous North American peoples who came to reside on the island were
already influenced by the policies of British North America and Canada and the actions
of white settlers across Ontario (and specifically Georgian Bay) in this period. These
changes included conversion to Christianity, adoption of farming, and reliance on goods
produced in nearby white settler communities. This chapter then describes the process of
forced expulsion from land that preceded the construction of Depot Harbour. The
creation of the port created a settler community directly on the island. Its railroad and
docks provided a significant source of wage-based jobs, which accelerated the shift
toward reliance on wage labor, drew many new inhabitants to the island from reserves
elsewhere, and altered the spatial arrangement of the indigenous community on the island
as people moved closer to the port. The magnitude of its impact was fully felt when the
economic downturn of the 1930s left the indigenous community without wage income
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and reliant on relief from the Department of Indian Affairs. Finally, the chapter details
how the legacy of Depot Harbour, in the form of railway ownership of land on the island,
continued to impact the indigenous community into the 21st century. Chapter Three
demonstrates the impact of the grain trade upon the Wasauksing First Nation,
demonstrating that the alignment of forces in the 1890s that led to the port’s success also
involved violent intrusion into an established indigenous community, accelerating
permanent and fundamental change in its relationship to the settler economy. The
unravelling of this alignment after 1904, and especially after 1929, led not only to the
decline of the port but negatively impacted the indigenous community that surrounded it.
While grain transportation ceased as an activity in the Second World War, its legacy on
Parry Island continues to the present day in the form of contested ownership over the
railroad land tract.
Discussing the effects of the grain trade on the indigenous people of Parry Island
is important for several reasons. The creation of Depot Harbour did not occur on a blank
slate of untouched wilderness, but rather encroached upon the lives and land of
indigenous people who had already faced geographic dislocation and economic
transformation. Instead of thinking of the port as one that could have been created and
operated at any site around the world that happened to be located on a grain
transportation route, the perspective of the indigenous people of Parry Island roots the
history of the port in a specific place in Canada, Ontario, and Georgian Bay and
demonstrates its human impact beyond simply its role as a place for white settlers to
work for a railroad company. This chapter does not contend that the grain trade was the
only manifestation of white settler Canada that affected life on Parry Island, but it did
catalyze additional economic changes and resulted in the only major episode of land
dispossession from the reserve. In addition, discussing the impact of the port on Parry
Island’s indigenous people demonstrates that in the process of expanding the Canadian
grain transportation routes across the Laurentian watershed, both private businessmen
such as J.R. Booth and the national government treated the region’s existing inhabitants
with disdain. The growth of the wheat economy meant disruption to indigenous life not
only in the western prairies but also along the shores of Georgian Bay.
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In examining this relationship between the indigenous community and the grain
trade, this thesis utilizes the scholarship of historian Franz M. Koennecke, who provides a
thorough examination of indigenous life on Parry Island. Koennecke’s work is
supplemented by Robin Brownlie’s A Fatherly Eye: Indian Agents, Government Power,
and Aboriginal Resistance in Ontario, 1918-1939, which focuses on the Parry Sound
Indian agency (which includes Parry Island). In combination, these works provide a
significant foundation of scholarship regarding the indigenous people of Parry Island.
Since it is the intent of Chapter Three to analyze the relationship between Depot Harbour
and its indigenous neighbors rather than to provide a wholly new record of indigenous
life on Parry Island overall, this chapter primarily draws on information from Koennecke
and Brownlie to provide a basis for its analysis.

3.1 Indigenous Life on Parry Island before the Creation of
Depot Harbour
The first people to permanently inhabit Parry Island were a collection of three
indigenous peoples from across (what is today) Ontario and the United States: two
Anishinaabe bands and a group of Potawatomi and Odawa people. The Anishinaabe band
negotiated with the colonial government for the ownership of the island, while the
Potawatomi and Odawa people ended up on the island in the process of fleeing military
persecution in the United States. Before 1850, Parry Island lacked a permanent
population, but by 1875 several permanent communities based around agriculture existed.
Before 1850, Parry Island was only used as “a seasonal stopping point” by the
Anishinaabe groups who lived in the eastern Georgian Bay region. 310 The specific
history or uses of Parry Island before this year are not well established.311 Beginning in
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1850, two Anishinaabe groups were the first to settle there.312 The discovery of mineral
resources in the lands on the northern borders of Lake Huron and Lake Superior
prompted the colonial government of Canada to view this region as a potential source of
valuable natural assets. After repeated protests regarding how Euro-Canadians entering
the region were disregarding indigenous habitation and use of these lands, a large
collection of indigenous people negotiated two treaties with the British Crown that
surrendered most of these lands in exchange for cash and perpetual annuities.313 One of
these treaties was the Robinson-Huron treaty. For the future residents of Parry Island, the
terms of this treaty granted “for Chief Mekis and his band, residing at Wasaquesing
(Sandy Island), a tract of land at a place on the main shore opposite the island; being the
place now occupied by them for residence and cultivation four miles square.”314
After the signing of the treaty in 1850, the band under Chief Mekis believed that
Parry Island was part of the lands to which they were entitled possession and control.
They intended to establish a permanent community on the island, but desired to also
maintain control of the mainland tract granted by treaty. Two agents representing the
British Crown negotiated with the band to gain control of the mainland tract. They
reported that the band requested an exchange of the mainland tract for Parry Island, and
the agreement as stated by the agents was approved by an order-in-council in January
1853. In reality, the band members did not become aware of this property transfer until
Euro-Canadian lumbermen pushed them out of a summer settlement and onto Parry
Island. The band was left with only the island as their reserve lands. 315
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They were joined by another band of Anishinaabe, the Shawanaga band led by
Chief Muckatamishoquet, who decided to live on Parry Island after the signing of the
Robinson-Huron treaty.316 Part of Chief Megis’s band remained in a village called
Obogawanung between Lake Rosseau and Lake Muskoka.317 In the early 1860s the band
made a serious effort to exchange Parry Island for Obogawanung. They had made
significant land alterations there, including building 20 log huts and gardens plots. This
effort interfered with an existing agreement with the Shawanaga band and with Chief
Solomon Jones, who was recognized by Shawanaga, Isle au Sable, and Muskoka bands as
Head Chief.318 Chief Jones was a Methodist who believed that Parry Island “was a
suitable place for the expected Christianization of the Anishinaabe of the Georgian Bay
north shore.”319 The Department of Indian Affairs (DIA) knew that the site of
Obogawanung contained some good farmland and its location was attractive to white
settlers, so it sided with Chief Jones and the band members living in the village were
forced to move to Parry Island by the end of the 1860s.320
The Shawanaga band had adopted Christianity in the period after the War of
1812, when Wesleyan Methodist missionaries helped introduce Christianity to the
indigenous people of (what is today) southern Ontario. These missionaries also
introduced and encouraged a lifestyle in permanent villages whose economic base was
farming.321 In contrast, the portion of Chief Megis’s band who initially settled on Parry
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Island were not converts to Christianity before arriving on the island. They did practice
limited farming in the early years of living there.322
The other group of indigenous people to arrive on Parry Island came as political
refugees from the territory of the United States. These Potawatomi and Odawa people
fled American troops after the U.S. government instituted a policy of removal for all
indigenous peoples from east of the Mississippi River.323 They first settled with
Anishinabek communities in southern Georgian Bay, then arrived to Parry Island
between 1865 and 1877.324 By 1877, around 125 people from the three groups lived on
the island.325 Seventy-three people were enrolled as members of the Parry Island band.
The Anishinaabe, Potawatomi and Odawa were not enrolled.326
The island’s inhabitants lived in a string of villages ranging from the northwest
corner of Parry Island to the south-central coast. Two principal villages contained the
greatest concentration of Anishinaabe residents and were known as the Upper Village and
the Lower Village. The Potawatomi and Odawa lived in a separate settlement called the
Middle Village (see Figure 14). Each village contained a cluster of log homes, and each
home abutted a plot of farmland. These homes were built of finished timber that was
processed in Parry Sound and purchased there. The Upper and Lower Village each also
contained a church and cemetery.327

322

Ibid, 152; Rogers and Tobobondung, “Parry Island Farmers: A Period of Change in the Way of Life of
the Algonkians of Southern Ontario,” 284–85.
323

Koennecke, “Once Upon a Time There Was a Railway on Wasauksing First Nation Territory,” 105.

324

Rogers and Tobobondung, “Parry Island Farmers: A Period of Change in the Way of Life of the
Algonkians of Southern Ontario,” 273.
325

Ibid., 279.

326

Koennecke, “Wasoksing: The History of Parry Island and Anishnawbe Community in the Georgian
Bay, 1850 to 1920,” 165.
327

Ibid., 284.
131

Figure 14: Map of Villages on Parry Island, 1877328
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For those inhabitants who were not Christians upon arriving to the island,
conversion to Christianity provided a belief system and set of values that promoted a
lifestyle of agriculture and permanent settlement. Missionaries promoting both Roman
Catholicism and Methodism arrived on the island. Roman Catholicism gained a
following, especially in the Lower Village, but details about the size of the indigenous
congregation are not available.329 Methodism arrived with the missionary Abner Elliot
and his first convert was John Pegahmagabow in the period 1869-1870. Within four
years, the congregation had 22 observants. Including Elliot, the only Methodist
missionaries to operate in indigenous communities on the north shore of Georgian Bay
were Anishinaabe. Their goal was to convert indigenous people into practicing the
customs and habits of the Anglo-Saxon Victorian middle class. Toward this end, they
encouraged farming as economic livelihood that encouraged industry and the
accumulation of private property.330
Farming became part of the economic base of the community, but it also relied on
fishing, hunting, and gathering. Agriculture was practiced primarily in the period from
late spring to the autumn. Major fall and winter activities included trapping, hunting,
gathering wild rice, and maple harvesting. While each village practised farming to a
different extent – Middle Village carrying out the most extensive agriculture and Upper
Village the least – it became an important base of food production for the entire
indigenous population. The community grew a variety of crops including potatoes, corn,
oats, beans, peas, squash, carrots, cucumbers, turnips, wheat, and timothy hay. In
addition, the people had orchards consisted primarily of apple trees, from which cider
was produced. Corn and beans were the principle crops. The island offered only limited
arable land. Corn fields were located halfway up slopes, because low lying ground was
swampy whereas elevated areas were too rocky. The soil was sandy, including in areas
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where crops were grown. Men used horses to plough and harrow farm plots, then men
and women planted crops by hand with the aid of hoes.331
Ethnologists Edward S. Rogers and Flora Tobobondung stated that farming
provided 50% to 60% of food consumed on the island, with another 30% to 40% coming
from game and fish with the remainder accounted for by provisions purchased in Parry
Sound. Harvested crops from Parry Island were used to purchase these foodstuffs.332 Fish
may have been a more important resource than was stated by the ethnologists. Reports
from Department of Indian Affairs agents in 1857 and 1874 stated that the band relied on
fishing for its primary food source.333 Regardless of which source provided a higher
percentage of food, farming became an important practice on the island. More than 80
acres of land was under cultivation by 1874.334
With the base of farming, fishing, hunting, and gathering, the Parry Island Band
was largely self-sufficient, but it relied on Euro-Canadians in Parry Sound to provide
some foodstuffs and finished timber products for building materials. The Band also took
in income from the island’s harvestable timber. However, the band did not directly
control this resource. In 1871, it surrendered timber rights in exchange for a payment of
$26,900 and semi-annual interest payments. Similar to the negotiations that led to the
surrender of the band’s reserve tract on the mainland, the negotiation for the surrender of
the timber rights featured devious tactics by the agents of the DIA. Band members who
were present for the process stated that all the chiefs who signed the agreement were
drunk and that the representatives of the band believed they were only signing over the

331

E.S. Rogers and Flora Tobobondung, “Parry Island Farmers: A Period of Change in the Way of Life of
the Algonkians of Southern Ontario,” in Contributions to Canadian Ethnology, 1975, ed. David Brez
Carlisle, National Museum of Man Mercury Series 31 (Ottawa: National Museums of Canada, 1975), 310.
332

Rogers and Tobobondung, “Parry Island Farmers: A Period of Change in the Way of Life of the
Algonkians of Southern Ontario,” 307.
333

Koennecke, “Wasoksing: The History of Parry Island and Anishnawbe Community in the Georgian
Bay, 1850 to 1920,” 107.
334

Ibid., 280.
134

rights to harvest pine trees, not hardwood species.335 A final financial contribution to the
band came from the small annuity provided by the Robinson-Huron treaty, which
provided approximately $4.00 per person per year.336
By the beginning of the 1870s, a significant indigenous community was
established on Parry Island with farming the major source of its economic livelihood.
Farming was supplemented by hunting, fishing, and gathering; and income and goods
from the Euro-Canadian settler community and state. Of these supplements of EuroCanadian origins, some were voluntary, such as the food provisions and lumber products
purchased in Parry Island. However, others were outcomes of contested negotiation
processes. The band wanted to ensure a stream of income from its timber resources, but
the negotiation process was conducted under deceptive circumstances and the band
believed it was giving up less than was actually taken by the DIA. Likewise, the band
desired to ensure a stream of revenue and rights to land through the Robinson-Huron
treaty. It was able to achieve that goal, but in the follow-up negotiation regarding its
mainland tract, the band ended up losing rights to an area of land without intending to do
so.
In land rights, economic practices, and natural resource access, Euro-Canadian
settlers and agents of the state fundamentally transformed the livelihoods of the
indigenous community of Parry Island. The very establishment of the island as a reserve
was catalyzed by the encroachment of white settlers onto the northern shores of Lake
Huron, and the twenty years that followed witnessed the arrival of more indigenous
people who were either fleeing persecution or who were pushed out of their homes by the
desires of white settlers to occupy them. In 1870, the Canadian west had not yet begun to
export significant amounts of wheat, and J.R. Booth was only beginning to harvest timber
in the highlands west of Ottawa. The global changes in technology that allowed for trade
of bulky commodities like grain were beginning to influence trade patterns, but it would
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be 25 years before their arrival on the shores of Parry Island. Still, the lives of indigenous
people who arrived on the island were already significantly changed. In the two and a
half decades before the arrival of J.R. Booth’s railroad, indigenous life continued to be
altered.
White settlers continued to arrive in Georgian Bay in the last decades of the 19th
century, and their presence and activities influenced the lives of the inhabitants on Parry
Island. One of the largest impacts was the activity of the commercial fishing fleet, which
was fully established by 1885. The large harvests of the fleet increased pressure on the
fish populations upon which indigenous people relied. This pressure was intensified by
the increase in lumber processing activity around eastern Georgian Bay. Mills, such as
those at Parry Sound, released substantial amounts of sawdust into coastal waters,
polluting fish habitats.337 The regional increase in lumber milling provided employment
opportunities for indigenous people to earn wages. The expansion of the lumber industry
led to the inhabitants of Parry Sound requiring more resources, such as firewood. Parry
Island residents began selling firewood to the townspeople in the 1880s.338 The
townspeople of Parry Sound also employed indigenous people as domestic servants.339
Euro-Canadians also entered the region as explorers, surveyors, missionaries, and
tourists. Indigenous people found employment assisting and guiding these ventures.340
The influx of white settlers to the region caused a shift toward wage-based labor for the
indigenous people of Parry Island, increasing the economic change they experienced
before the arrival of the railroad.
Tensions surrounded unequal access to resources and land rights between the
Parry Island band and the settler community. The band quickly protested when an
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unlicensed company cut down trees on one of the island’s peninsulas, and it
unsuccessfully attempted to reclaim its right over hardwood on the island.341 Protests to
the DIA regarding timber rights were generally unsuccessful, but on one land rights issue
the band succeeded. In 1879-1880, the DIA stated its intention to survey Parry Island and
to mark individual plots for ownership by individual indigenous people. Viewing this
action as another attempt at land dispossession, the band resisted the planned survey and
instead took it upon itself to determine the best arrangement for locating families and
individuals on the island.342
The reserve community also resisted the attempt of the DIA to educate its
younger population. By 1882, the Lower Village had a school whose teacher was
assigned by the DIA, and by the mid-1880s children on the island were more available to
attend, since their families began leaving them at home rather than taking them hunting
and trapping. The Upper Village also had a schoolhouse. Yet into the 1890s, neither
school was well attended. In 1893, parents were fined for children who did not attend, but
this measure did not improve attendance. Parents also refused to allow their children to
be sent to the Shingwauk Residential School despite the wishes of the Canadian
government (four children ultimately attended, but they may have done so
voluntarily).343
On the eve of the arrival of Booth’s railroad to Parry Island, the economic and
social practices of the indigenous community were already altered by the influence of
Euro-Canadians. The September 1894 report of the Indian Affairs Agent summarized
some of these conditions:
The crops of last season were abundant, and present prospects in the same
direction are bright. Labour at neighbouring lumbering establishments has been in
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good demand, and the wages for such labour has also been good, consequently
peace and plenty have reigned through the band throughout the year. Relief was
extended to only one family – that of late Chief Pegamagabo – during the year.
The two schools have been in full operation, but I regret to report that the
attendance of the pupils has not been what I could have desired.344
Wage labour was a major source of employment and income that helped ensure
prosperity for the indigenous population of Parry Island. While working wage-labour jobs
meant that the community was increasingly reliant on the local white settler economy,
these jobs allowed inhabitants of the Parry Island reserve to generate income for
themselves and their families. Indigenous people on many reserves elsewhere in Ontario
did not have access to a significant number of wage-based jobs, but on Parry Island these
sources of income allowed indigenous people to support themselves in a wage and
commodity-based economy. Growth in the availability of wage-labour jobs on Parry
Island allowed the economic base of the indigenous community to move toward more
complete reliance on the commodity economy of the settler population, but this
transformation remained incomplete by the 1890s. Beyond employment, the DIA was
attempting to influence the younger generation of indigenous people into practicing the
customs of Anglo-Canadian life, although its ability to do so was contested and resisted
when indigenous children chose to not attend school, or their families kept them from
attending.
The indigenous community on Parry Island was thus influenced by the arrival of DIA
agents, Christian missionaries, and Anglo-Canadian schooling in the half century before
1895. However, it was able to resist some of the changes that the DIA sought to effect,
such as uniform schooling by Anglo-Canadian teachers and the division of reserve land
into family plots. Outside of having given up their timber harvesting rights, the
indigenous community retained title to the entire island and the physical footprint of the
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settler community remained small. The arrival of the Ottawa, Arnprior, and Parry Sound
Railroad in 1895 meant a direct and major intrusion of industrial, modern Canada into the
reserve. The establishment of the grain trade on the island required the dispossession of
land from the reserve and the construction of a settler town meant an increase in crime,
destruction of indigenous property, and the direct presence of a major site of jobs that
shifted the economic base for the reserve community toward wage labour.

3.2 Creation of Depot Harbour: Its Effects on Parry Island
The first major event for the Parry Island Band that was driven by the arrival of the
railroad was the seizure of land by the OAPS. The initial manifestation of this process
was the arrival of surveyors in February 1895. The Indian Act stated that these surveyors
needed permission from the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs to visit reserve
land, but they lacked permission. The band protested by writing a council resolution
against this infraction of its property rights. In an attempt to assuage these concerns, the
DIA told the band “to rest assured that the Department will do its utmost to guard their
interests in every way.”345 Because the band had already suffered multiple land seizures
with the blessing of the DIA, it did not trust the agency’s promises. By May, the band
council declared its unwillingness to surrender any land. It believed the OAPS could and
should find an alternative port site on the mainland.346
The railroad’s tracks reached Rose Point, just opposite the island across the
narrow channel separating it from the mainland, by September of 1895. The band could
plainly see that the railroad intended to extend its tracks onto its island, and so again
objected to the DIA by submitting a written protest with the assistance of Dr. Walton, the
local superintendent of Indian Affairs.347 However, the force of Canadian law was on the
side of the railroad. An 1887 amendment to the Indian Act allowed expropriation of
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reserve land for railroad purposes. J.R. Booth’s application for 314.26 acres of Parry
Island was thus immediately approved by the DIA.348
Recognizing the unwillingness of the Parry Island Band to surrender its land, the
DIA dispatched two agents to the island in October 1895 to negotiate the property
transfer. The two men aimed to overcome the “existing prejudice” of band members
against the land transfer and carried five pounds of tobacco as a gift to incentivize a
smooth handover.349 The agents informed the band that they could surrender the land
cooperatively, or it would be expropriated by force, but either way they would lose
ownership of the tract. In a thinly-veiled attempt to justify the undesired land
appropriation, the agents told the indigenous community that the railroad would provide
economic opportunities, both in the form of wage labour and by providing a market for
the island’s farmers to sell their harvested foods to the crews of ships using the port. They
also claimed that cooperation would mean that the band would receive a higher price for
its land. In response to these supposed advantages, the band stated concerns about the
intrusion of the railroad onto its reserve. Band members voiced concerns about the arrival
of whisky traders onto the island in the wake of the railroad. In response the DIA agents
stated that “the strong arm of the law wielded by the Department” protected the band
from alcohol traders, whether or not the railroad was constructed.350
The band had little choice but to consent to the surrender of the land. It signed the
agreement handing over the railroad tract, despite the document containing no conditions
or provisions addressing band concerns. In addition to alcohol sales, the concerns and
requests by the band included the fear that trains would injure or kill livestock owned by
the band, a desire to decrease the amount of land taken in order to construct a lighthouse,
and a wish for a right of way for wagon and foot traffic across the railway bridge
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connecting the island to the mainland. The band also hoped that only white people
directly employed by the railroad would live on the island. While no written agreement
was provided, the DIA did promise to provide the best possible price for the land, and the
OAPS implied that it would construct and maintain proper fencing around its tracks to
provide protection for livestock. The railroad violated or ignored all of these requests
within the first few years of operating on Parry Island.
The government followed through with its promise to provide a higher price for
the appropriated land. It paid nine dollars per acre, whereas Euro-Canadian settlers on the
mainland received less for their bushland. The railroad, in contrast, denied responsibility
to provide any pedestrian or wagon access across its bridge. It allowed alcohol sales on
its land and allowed parts of its tract to be used by people who did not directly work for
the railroad. It agreed to construct protective fences and cattle guards around its tracks
and to employ indigenous people. The OAPS commenced laying tracks on Parry Island in
February 1896. The construction process soon damaged reserve lands not covered by the
land transfer agreement. Blasting operations blew rocks onto agricultural fields, freerunning horses owned by the company destroyed crops, and railroad laborers illegally
harvested sand and soil from reserve lands. Ultimately, the company paid some
compensation to band members, but it failed to pay the amounts requested and was slow
to pay. The OAPS also found that it could avoid a large rock formation that complicated
its construction efforts by building its tracks directly on reserve land. It did so, and the
band did not realize this violation until the 1960s. The company’s promises about fencing
around its tracks were left unfulfilled. Cows owned by band members wandered onto the
tracks and were killed by trains. The railroad paid out compensation, but the fencing was
never fully completed.351
Disruption to indigenous land ownership continued in 1899 when J.R. Booth
requested an additional 110.5 acres of reserve land for the expansion of Depot Harbour.
The DIA did not even formally process this request; instead it immediately and
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peremptorily appropriated the land for the railroad. The band protested and paid for a
legal evaluation that would help establish a basis for fighting the decision in court.
Despite this proposed legal challenge, the Canada Atlantic Railway began to survey this
new tract, prompting Chief Megis and his councilors to protest directly to J.R. Booth.
They pointed out that the survey was illegal according to a resolution passed by the band
council. Booth simply forwarded their complaints to the DIA. The response of the agency
clearly demonstrated its indifference to band concerns. The DIA in Ottawa wrote their
local representative, Superintendent McClean, with instructions to inform the band that
their land was sold according to the law and that $1,102.50 was added to the band’s
financial trust. The agency added:
You will also be good enough to explain to the Indians that they must not, in any
way, interfere with the use and occupation of the said land by the Railway
Company otherwise they may render themselves liable to whatever action Mr.
Booth may be disposed, on behalf of the Company to take against them.352
The DIA continued to support the actions of the railway company despite protests by the
band to the agency.353 When cattle from Depot Harbour wandered onto reserve lands and
destroyed gardens, the owners of those cattle did not face consequences, but when cattle
owned by band members wandered into the port town, officials there impounded them
and demanded that their owners pay for their release.354 The negative influence of white
settlers extended beyond negligent livestock control.
White residents on the island committed crimes against the indigenous
population. Reserve members reported boat theft, firewood theft from a reserve school,
and the assault of an elderly man. By 1901, the issue of crime became severe enough that
the band hired Joseph Partridge as a constable. In the following year, the band
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constructed a small jail and began locking the Catholic Church.355 By 1911, the band
began locking the meeting hall which was constructed in 1902.356 Although indigenous
people were prevented from legally purchasing or consuming alcohol due to an 1884
amendment to the Indian Act of Canada, white traders illicitly sold alcohol to reserve
members.357 Before the arrival of the railroad, the presence of white settlers on the Parry
Island was constrained to DIA agents and schoolteachers as well as the occasional team
of lumbermen, but the creation of a permanent settler population exposed the reserve
population to new threats of crime.
The presence of the railroad town on the island meant the arrival of commercial
outlets, such as grocery stores and butcher shops. Indigenous people shopped at these
places, which reinforced the need to earn wages in order to pay for the goods.358 Railroad
and port activities required many laborers, thereby increasing opportunities for wageearning work. By 1905, the effect of abundant wage employment was noted by the local
DIA superintendent, who stated “the lumbering operations of several large concerns at
Parry Sound, together with the works in connection with the Canada Atlantic Railway at
Depot Harbour, located on the reserve enable the members of the band to secure
employment at almost any time they may desire it.”359
These employment opportunities attracted more indigenous people to live on the
island, and this influx partly influenced the need to improve the roads that connected
indigenous villages to other parts of the island. In 1896, the band council decided to
spend between $50 and $100 in wages to pay reserve inhabitants to work on these roads.
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Despite this financial incentive, higher wages at Depot Harbour and Parry Sound drew
away so many men that there was an insufficient workforce to improve these roads. The
population of indigenous people who arrived on the island after the arrival of the railroad
continued to increase. By 1910, the population of newcomers reached 109 and made up
half of the reserve population. By 1924, 240 people lived on the reserve and 170 of them
were not enrolled in the Parry Island Band. A significant portion of these newcomers
came only for the wage labor opportunities and either lived on the island seasonally or
stayed for only a few years. Those who stayed beyond the shipping season built small
huts near Depot Harbour. These huts passed to other seasonal workers when the original
inhabitants moved away. They were considered property of the Parry Island Band and
their inhabitants used them free of charge.360 It was not only workers who chose to live
near the port. The presence of Depot Harbour caused a geographic shift in the island’s
population toward the new town.
After 1913, the population of the Lower Village declined.361 The school closed in
1915 because the population of schoolchildren was too small to justify its operation.362
The reason for the decline was the death of older inhabitants coupled with the migration
of the remaining population to sites closer to Depot Harbour, which had become the hub
for employment on the island. By the summer of 1924, the last inhabitant of Lower
Village moved away, and the village ceased to exist. From that point, only the road
linking Depot Harbour and the Upper Village needed to be maintained.363
The new port provided economic opportunities for indigenous Parry Islanders
beyond direct employment by the railroad and port. Reserve inhabitants sold firewood to
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town residents and businesses.364 The access provided by the railroad encouraged white
hunters and fisherman to visit, and they hired indigenous men as hunting and fishing
guides. By 1908, hunting and fishing were of secondary importance as pursuits for the
indigenous population. This change was not driven by scarcity of wild fish and game, but
rather by the direct and indirect wage employment opportunities that provided easier
ways for the reserve population to make money.365
The presence of job opportunities in the grain trade meant that the indigenous
population of the reserve had a reliable source of employment in the first three decades of
the 20th century. The impact of this shift toward wage labour was highlighted when those
job opportunities evaporated as the grain trade collapsed at the end of the 1920s. The loss
of wage-based employment opportunities catalyzed demand for aid from the federal
government. This process played out in indigenous communities across Georgian Bay.
Hundreds of indigenous people in the region became reliant on aid provided by their DIA
agent.366
The indigenous population on Parry Island experienced a loss of wage labour that
decimated its economic base. Until the onset of the decline in trade, “a high proportion of
Aboriginal men had supported themselves partly or primarily through wage labour.”367
The largest employer at that time was Depot Harbour. By 1932, during the nadir of the
grain trade, the entire indigenous population of the Parry Sound agency reported no wage
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income at all.368 The lack of wage income left the reserve population out of work on a
long-term basis and largely reliant on the inadequate aid provided by its DIA agent.369
Because grain-handling operations did not return to Depot Harbour after the
1930s, the turn from wage labour to reliance on government aid in that period marked the
last direct effect of the grain trade on employment for the indigenous population.
However, the Depot Harbour town site and railroad tract remained in the hands of the
Canadian National Railways. Even after the all port activities ceased in 1979, the
Canadian National Railways kept control of the railroad tract on the island. By 1985, the
tracks had been unused for any regular transportation service for six years, but the CNR
decided to harvest gravel from the island to use for roadbed fill elsewhere. The Parry
Island Band found the activity unacceptable, especially since the original terms of the
property annexation did not allow for gravel harvesting and because the activity
commenced without a preliminary environmental impact study. The band actively
protested the CNR’s activity when over 100 members protested in person on the railroad
tracks. The protest prompted private talks between the band and the CNR, with an
expectation by the autumn of 1985 that the band would attempt to buy back the railroad
tract.370 The band succeeded in halting the gravel-mining activities, and by August of
1987 all railroad tracks were removed from the island.371
The removal of railroad tracks ended railroad transportation on Parry Island, but
the legacy of the grain trade was not completely eradicated. In the years since 1987, the
band assumed a large degree of practical control over the railroad tract, but formal
ownership remains with the CNR. The band has used the Depot Harbour site to host its
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annual pow wow celebration, and it controls fishing activity on the site.372 Official
ownership remains with the Canadian government, although preliminary activities that
are prerequisite to the transfer of land back to the Parry Island Band (now the
Wasauksing First Nation) have occurred. As of 2017-2018, legal land surveys and the
second phase of an environmental site assessment were complete. Pending an acceptable
environmental status for the tract, these actions would allow the band to restart
discussions with the Canadian government to have the lands returned to the reserve.
In considering the overall relationship between Depot Harbour and Parry Island’s
original inhabitants, the grain trade did not encroach in the 1890s onto an untouched
arcadia where indigenous people lived without contact or influence from the Canadian
government or its settlers. The permanent reserve population was established less than 50
years before the arrival of the railroad, and its creation was due to negotiations between a
colonial government eager to confine indigenous people in the region to small reserves
on land with relatively poor natural resources. In the decades before the arrival of the
grain trade, the Parry Island community was influenced by the activities of white settlers
in the region, such as commercial fishing and timber harvesting. Christian missionaries
and DIA agents also influenced changes in religion, schooling, and a transition toward
subsistence farming, albeit these attempts were sometimes resisted and were incomplete.
However, the creation of Depot Harbour caused the direct intrusion of Canadian
settlers and their staples economy onto Parry Island. Improvement of the Canadian lakeand-rail transportation system meant the deterioration of indigenous land rights, because
J.R. Booth, backed by Canadian law, appropriated hundreds of acres for his railroad. The
indigenous people living there protested the loss of their land, and when it became clear
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they were going to lose it in any case, requested conditions that would mitigate its
impact. These conditions were not honored by the railroad and the DIA displayed no
serious effort to help the reserve community. Depot Harbour increased crime on the
island, led to property damage, and brought unwanted alcohol sales.
Even after the grain trade ceased active operations on Parry Island, the land on
which it had once operated remained under the ownership of the Canadian National
Railways. It continued to be a source of contention between the reserve and the railroad
company, leading to protest in the 1980s and the removal of tracks from the island.
Today, the land remains under the ownership of the Canadian Government and the
Wasauksing First Nation continues in its attempt to regain ownership. The grain trade left
a legacy in both the economic life and the land of the people of Parry Island.
This thesis demonstrates that the history of Depot Harbour can only be explained
by integrating an understanding of forces operating at the local, regional, national, and
global scale. The concrete place where this story occurred – Parry Island, within Ontario
and Canada – matters. Depot Harbour was located in its specific site because J.R. Booth
knew he could obtain the land he needed with the backing of a Canadian government that
viewed indigenous land rights with contempt when they came in conflict with expanding
the Canadian transportation system. The extension of the lake-and-rail system across the
Laurentian watershed served as a vital transportation channel that facilitated the wheat
staples economy, but its utilization came with a human cost. From land ownership and
crime to the spatial arrangement of villages and economic livelihood, Depot Harbour’s
influence and legacy demonstrate that the western wheat staples economy helped effect a
transformation in the lives of indigenous people on the far shores of the Great Lakes. This
aspect of the history of the port thus calls for the Canadian wheat economy to be
considered for its consequences on indigenous communities adjacent to the transportation
hubs and infrastructure it induced in the Great Lakes region. Whereas the devastating
impact of the wheat economy on indigenous people in the Canadian prairies has been
firmly established in Canadian historiography, its impact in the Great Lakes remains
under-investigated.
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Conclusions
The history of Depot Harbour demonstrates how the western wheat economy
catalyzed colonization and economic development along the shores of Georgian Bay,
thus inviting reconsideration of the geographical limits of grain’s influence on Canadian
economic development. The wheat economy has featured centrally in Canadian history
since the creation of the Laurentian school and staples thesis in the early 20th century.
The magnitude of its impact on the development of the modern Canadian nation and the
prairie provinces is indisputable, and the central role that the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence
watershed played in facilitating this western expansion of Canada remains a central
theme in Canadian economic history. The Georgian Bay grain ports played a key role in
connecting the wheat fields of the west to markets across the Atlantic Ocean. While
railroads have garnered attention as the key transportation mode of early 20th century
Canada, it was only through their use in conjunction with Great Lakes shipping that the
defining staple of the era was able to be successfully cultivated.
Yet the macroeconomics of an expanding wheat economy were insufficient to
guarantee the success and survival of a Great Lakes grain port. Depot Harbour only
thrived when its regionally-focused ownership provided adequate support and
investment. The transfer of its ownership to a national railway left the future of the port
to be determined by the Canadian national transportation system, whose struggles were
divorced from the success and expansion of the wheat economy. Only the auspicious
alignment of factors at the local, national, and international level ensured the success of
Depot Harbour.
In explaining the reasons for the historical trajectory of the port, I argue that the
emergence of a successful grain port on the eastern shore of Georgian Bay was
contingent on the convergence of factors at the regional, national, and international level.
The emergence of long-distance trade in bulk commodities, facilitated by new
transportation technologies, was a global development that was foundational in the
successful agricultural development of the North American interior. The nationalistic
impetus to expand Canadian transportation on an east-west axis provided additional
incentive and government support for an improved export route through Georgian Bay,
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beyond the geographic advantage it offered in connecting the upper Great Lakes and
Montreal. J.R. Booth’s search for profitable business opportunities was realized when he
expanded the commerce served by his Ottawa Valley railroads by connecting a single rail
line to the western export trade. As owner, he provided his terminus port with his full
support. At the local level, eastern Georgian Bay offered the most direct overland
connection to Montreal, and Parry Island specifically presented a protected natural
harbor. The land needed to build the port, town, and rail lines could be appropriated from
reserve land because the expansion of the Canadian rail network was a greater priority
that preserving indigenous land rights. Each of these factors was necessary for the
creation and success of Depot Harbour, but none was sufficient on its own. In this case,
their alignment only lasted for six years (1898-1904).
The year 1904 marked a significant turning point for only one of the
aforementioned factors. J.R. Booth’s sale to the Grand Trunk altered the level of support
for and focus on the port from its ownership. Canadian national policy remained focused
on improving the transportation system from east to west, modern transportation systems
continued to facilitate the movement of wheat exports across the Great Lakes, and eastern
Georgian Bay persisted as the fastest export route eastward. Yet the change in ownership
meant that Depot Harbour never modernized or expanded to remain the leading Ontario
grain port. The unravelling of intranational and international trade during the Great
Depression of the 1930s exacerbated the downturn at Depot Harbour by influencing the
decision to not repair its direct rail line to Ottawa. This decision effectively secured the
port’s abandonment in the early 1940s, despite the increase in grain shipments caused by
the Second World War.
The arrival of the grain trade to Parry Island required the expropriation of land
from the indigenous reserve that made up the entirety of the island; thus modern, urban
Canada arrived at this shore of Georgian Bay in the form of exploitation with little regard
for the people who were already present. J.R. Booth and his railway and shipping
companies utilized the harbor and island land with little regard for the property of
inhabitants. The indigenous people living on Parry Island had already faced expulsion
from mainland territories due to colonization by white settlers and a British colonial (or
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Canadian after 1867) government biased against indigenous land rights. However, the
arrival of the railroad meant a settler community based on the Anglo-Canadian economic
system of wage labor arose in the middle of their reserve. Its presence accelerated a shift
toward reliance on employment on the railroad and docks and altered the spatial layout of
the reserve community. Indigenous people from elsewhere in Canada arrived to find
employment at Depot Harbour, and reserve inhabitants moved closer to the port to have
easier access to its economic opportunities.
The construction of the port on reserve land meant that it was created wholly to
serve the transportation industry. The island lacked natural resources besides its protected
harbour and offered no advantage toward harvesting or processing the fish and timber
that were the area’s raw materials. Its railroad line offered the shortest connection
between the upper Great Lakes and Montreal, but the line passed through the rugged
terrain of the central Ontario highlands rather than the fertile farmlands of southern
Ontario, making it unappealing as a point of immigration from the United States to
Canada. It never developed an economic base beyond its port and railroad operations.
Depot Harbour remained a company town reliant on both the decisions of its ownership
and the conditions of national and international grain markets.
A company town requires a company leader to envision and construct it, and J.R.
Booth was that person for Depot Harbour. His endeavor to connect the Ottawa Valley to
Georgian Bay and the western markets beyond was simultaneously an extension rooted in
the Canadian national policy, and a transnational attempt to reach across the United
States-Canada political boundary to attract commerce. Booth took advantage of the
prevailing sentiment of building up Canadian trade routes to help achieve the economic
unification of Canada from east to west; he took advantage of government subsidies and
the ability to appropriate indigenous reserve land for railroad purposes. Yet in planning
his lake connection in the early 1890s and building it in the middle of that decade, his
target market was Chicago, then the largest grain exporting port on the Great Lakes. He
established two shipping companies to serve his port, one in Canada and one in the
United States. The creation of Depot Harbour was aimed at international commerce
across the Great Lakes. J.R. Booth provides a case study of a central Canadian capitalist
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attempting to attract commerce from the American agricultural frontier in the 1890s, even
while Canada attempted to build up its own western agricultural frontier as part of an
effort to create and expand a separate Canadian nation on the North American
continent.373 In both the Great Lakes and western prairies, Canadian capitalists operated
with a mindset that dispossession of indigenous land was advantageous and inevitable.
This thesis thus supports the utility of using the transnational Great-Lakes region
as one important unit of historical analysis in conjunction with others at larger and
smaller scales. It invites the possibility of expanding the study of the grain trade across
the lakes basin beyond a single port. J.R. Booth aimed to capitalize on commerce from
both sides of the international border. In Permeable Border: The Great Lakes Basin as
Transnational Region, 1650-1990 (2005), John J. Bukowczyk argued that “region” in the
Great Lakes is “an area integrated by a fluid and dynamic set of economic (and other)
relationships.”374 The aim to construct a Canadian grain port in the mid-1890s, years
before the Canadian West produced significant wheat exports, demonstrates economic
integration that transcended the political boundary.
After the Grand Trunk Railway acquired the port in 1904, the company’s focus
and investment on the new port never matched the same level as Booth. The Grand Trunk
already possessed other grain ports that were better connected to its trunk line. While
Depot Harbour retained its geographic advantage in having the shortest route to
Montreal, the GTR never expanded or fully modernized the port’s facilities and it
allowed services for the townspeople to deteriorate as well. I thus argue that the
individual role played by J.R. Booth was key in the early success of Depot Harbour.
Canadian political economist S.D. Clark argued in 1964 that the geography of Canada
favored “large-scale bureaucratic forms of organization and wide-spread intervention by
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the state.”375 This pattern of bureaucratic-elitist development contrasted with the
American pattern of individual enterprise.376 Yet in the case of J.R. Booth and Depot
Harbour, it was individual enterprise that drove the creation and success of the port,
whereas its decline was rooted by the transfer of ownership to a much larger-scale
organization, which in turn was absorbed into a nationalized rail system.
For Depot Harbour, greater nationalization and centralization exposed the port to
factors beyond those of the grain industry, which negatively affected its ability to attract
grain exports and attract investment from its ownership. One of those factors was the
overexpansion of Canadian railroads in the early 20th century, which led to financial
distress and the nationalization of multiple railroads. In quantitative terms, railroad
overexpansion occurred in Canada in a way unparalleled elsewhere around the globe. It
was induced by a hubristic belief that the western Canadian hinterland required multiple
transcontinental lines to support it, despite a relatively tiny population. In comparison,
neither the United States nor Russia over-expanded their railroad networks, despite those
two countries also seeking to control wide-ranging transcontinental regions.377
The issue of Canadian railroad overexpansion is an example of the salience of
factors at the level of the nation-state for the history of Depot Harbour. The importance of
national factors calls for modification of the trend toward transnational approaches that
have become commonplace in recent historical scholarship. Transnational histories that
avoid the nation as the unit of study and instead investigate relationships, transfers, and
interactions independent of national lines have emerged as an important tool in analyzing
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the period of globalization and deglobalization from 1870 to 1945.378 They provide a
crucial understanding and contextualization of the advancements in technology that
facilitated the globalization of grain in the 19th century. Without their perspective, the
historical understanding of Depot Harbour would be incomplete. However, I also contend
that developments that arose entirely within the economic and political context of the
Canadian nation were significant influences on the course of events at Depot Harbour.
The full understanding of the history of the port is only possible by combining a
transnational understanding of late 19th and early 20th century commodity globalization
with a recognition of consolidation in Canadian railroads and its effects.
Because railroad nationalization in Canada influenced the decision to consolidate
facilities and neglect Depot Harbour, I argue that it led to the reconfiguration of Canadian
lakes shipping by affecting which ports were able to retain operations and which
ultimately were shuttered. The fate of Depot Harbour demonstrates the interrelationship
between national-level developments in Canadian transportation and the economic
fortunes of Ontario lakes ports. Expanded research into the connection between lake
ports and the broader landscape of Canadian transportation is a promising opportunity in
the expanding the historiography of Canadian lakes ports and the wheat staples economy.
It suggests a greater interconnection between developments on the Great Lakes and in the
western prairies.
The fact that Depot Harbour quickly became a key transportation link connecting
Montreal to the western hinterland demonstrates the importance of this region in the
development of the economic unification of Canada at the turn of the 20th century. Today
the region’s rocky shores and gnarled stands of timber are dotted with vacation cottages
and national parks. However, this region did not always serve as a place of escape from
modern, industrialized Canadian life. The lake-and-rail connection through Depot
Harbour was the intrusion of urban, industrial Canada to this region with the aim of
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connecting to its western staples hinterland. Its function as a transportation link calls for
the consideration of the region as part of the wheat economy alongside the farm fields of
Saskatchewan and the dockside grain elevators at Montreal.
In calling for the incorporation of the region in the broader history of the wheat
economy, the story of Depot Harbour returns attention to the Laurentian school’s
argument that the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence watershed was key to the development of the
Canadian economy. By specifically focusing on the overland connection between
Georgian Bay and tidewater, it demonstrates that this route continued to be of economic
importance. This importance was not the hypothetical potential of a new ship canal but
actually played out in the carriage of commerce, long after the voyageurs ceased plying
the waters of the French River with canoes full of furs.
My thesis also proves that the effects of the wheat economy upon indigenous
people were not limited to the prairie west. The creation and operation of Depot Harbour
meant that decisions made about the land never acknowledged Indigenous ownership or
wishes and it represented an intrusion of the white settler Canadian economy into its
midst. This disruption was led by J.R. Booth, a private businessman, but it was facilitated
and abetted by the disdainful attitudes and actions of the Canadian government regarding
indigenous legal rights. Both informal and formal agents of national expansion
contributed to the deleterious influence of the grain trade upon the Parry Island
indigenous community. The presence of the port and railroad accelerated a change to a
wage-based economy, which left the indigenous community dependent on government
aid when those bases of employment collapsed in the 1930s. The grain trade left a legacy
of land appropriation that continues to the present day, nearly 75 years after its port
operations ceased. Thus, this thesis calls attention to the effects of the grain trade on
indigenous people far beyond the traditional geographic boundaries of the western prairie
region.
Depot Harbour was created and quickly thrived as a port because J.R. Booth
seized upon an immediate opportunity to create a shorter and faster transportation link to
the West. Its development was driven by short-term economic opportunism that
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disregarded any effects upon Wasauksing First Nation. However, it is this indigenous
population on Parry Island that felt the longest-lasting ramifications from its construction
and operation. The fleeting economic moment of Canada’s late 19th century push for a
transcontinental wheat economy left an ongoing disturbance to Parry Island’s original
inhabitants.
Land dispossession and the restructuring of the indigenous life toward reliance on
wage labour in the white settler economy of Canada are the most salient legacies of
Depot Harbour today. Had the port retained its leading status as an Ontario Great Lakes
grain transshipment point, its importance on a national and continental scale for the
transportation of commodities may also have remained to the present day. However,
Depot Harbour’s disappearance precluded any such continued role or relevance. Its
disintegration was driven by overinvestment in national railroads at the expense of this
lake port. Therefore, the story of Depot Harbour provides one small case study which
suggests that, in the early 20th century, the focus of investment and development on the
growth of railroads across Canada deterred more significant investment in Canadian lake
shipping routes. While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide any broad
arguments regarding this relationship, it calls for further research into the relationship
between these two transportation sectors during the Canadian wheat boom.
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